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91.
Tebes JK 《American journal of community psychology》2005,35(3-4):213-230
Embedded in community science are implicit theories on the nature of reality (ontology), the justification of knowledge claims (epistemology), and how knowledge is constructed (methodology). These implicit theories influence the conceptualization and practice of research, and open up or constrain its possibilities. The purpose of this paper is to make some of these theories explicit, trace their intellectual history, and propose a shift in the way research in the social and behavioral sciences, and community science in particular, is conceptualized and practiced. After describing the influence and decline of logical empiricism, the underlying philosophical framework for science for the past century, I summarize contemporary views in the philosophy of science that are alternatives to logical empiricism. These include contextualism, normative naturalism, and scientific realism, and propose that a modified version of contextualism, known as perspectivism, affords the philosophical framework for an emerging community science. I then discuss the implications of perspectivism for community science in the form of four propositions to guide the practice of research.Portions of this paper are based on an invited paper presented at the May 1997 Pre-Conference Workshop of the Biennial Conference of the Society for Community Research and Action, Columbia, South Carolina. 相似文献
92.
Summary In this paper I address some shortcomings in Larry Laudan’s normative naturalism. I make it clear that Laudan’s rejection of the “meta-methodology thesis”, or MMT is unnecessary, and that a reformulated version MMT can be sustained. I contend that a major difficulty that attends Laudan’s account is his contention that a naturalistic philosophy of science cannot accommodate any a priori justification of methodological rules, and consider what sort of naturalism might best replace Laudan’s. To do this, I discuss Michael Friedman’s account of a relativised a priori and show that it is consistent with naturalistic philosophy of science and that it can help form the basis of a plausible normative naturalism. In particular, this discussion shows that Laudan’s rejection of any a priori justification of methodological rules is unjustified and inconsistent with scientific practice. Finally, I point the way to a version of normative naturalism that includes MMT and accounts for the role of constitutive a priori principles within science. 相似文献
93.
94.
H. Rodney Holmes 《Zygon》1993,28(2):201-215
Abstract. Religious experiences, including mystical states and experience of the divine, are the ultimate reality of human existence that demand an account. Eugene d'Aquili weaves together that account using paradigms of thought which historically have made mutually exclusive claims about the nature of religious experience. While pointing out the deficiencies of the theory from a narrowly scientific point of view, this paper recognizes that neuroscience, or any other solitary discipline, is incompetent to explain religion. This paper emphasizes the significance and truth of d'Aquili's holistic theory, a religious vision which itself explains science and philosophy. 相似文献
95.
Robert Smithson 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2019,62(5):504-526
ABSTRACTAccording to many naturalists, our ordinary conception of the world is in tension with the scientific image: the conception of the world provided by the natural sciences. But in this paper, I present a critique of naturalism with precedents in the post-Kantian idealist tradition. I argue that, when we consider our actual linguistic behavior, there is no evidence that the truth of our ordinary judgments hinges on what the scientific image turns out to be like. I then argue that the best explanation of this result is that the norms and presuppositions operating in ordinary discourse are different from the norms and presuppositions operating in scientific discourse. So naturalistic attempts to undermine the manifest image are illegitimate attempts to critique a practice ‘from the outside’. 相似文献
96.
Nathan Sinclair 《Metaphilosophy》2012,43(5):551-566
One of the major historical effects of Quine's attacks upon the analytic‐ synthetic distinction has been to popularise the belief that philosophy is continuous with science. Currently, most philosophers believe that such continuity is an inevitable consequence of naturalism. This article argues that though Quine's semantic holism does imply that there is no sharp distinction between truths discoverable by scientific investigation and truths discoverable by philosophical investigation, it also implies that there is a perfectly sharp and natural distinction between natural science and naturalistic philosophy. 相似文献
97.
Bronwyn Finnigan 《Zygon》2014,49(1):231-241
Owen Flanagan's The Bodhisattva's Brain aims to introduce secular‐minded thinkers to Buddhist thought and motivate its acceptance by analytic philosophers. I argue that Flanagan provides a compelling caution against the hasty generalizations of recent “science of happiness” literature, which correlates happiness with Buddhism on the basis of certain neurological studies. I contend, however, that his positive account of Buddhist ethics is less persuasive. I question the level of engagement with Buddhist philosophical literature and challenge Flanagan's central claim, that a Buddhist version of eudaimonia is a common core conception shared by all Buddhists. I argue that this view is not only a rational reconstruction in need of argumentation but is in tension with competing Buddhist metaphysical theories of self, including the one Flanagan himself endorses. 相似文献
98.
Taede A. Smedes 《Zygon》2014,49(1):190-207
This article aims at a constructive and argumentative engagement between the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and philosophical and theological reflection on the imago Dei. The Swiss theologian Emil Brunner argued that the theological notion that humans were created in the image of God entails that there is a “point of contact” for revelation to occur. This article argues that Brunner's notion resonates quite strongly with the findings of the CSR. The first part will give a short overview of the CSR. The second part deals with Brunner's idea of the imago Dei and the “point of contact.” The third and final part of the article outlines a model of revelation that is in line with Brunner's thought and the CSR. The aim of this article is to show how the naturalistic methodology of the CSR provides a fertile new perspective on several theological issues and thereby enriches theological reflection. 相似文献
99.
Niels Henrik Gregersen 《Zygon》2014,49(2):419-429
The organic unity between the head and the vital arms of the octopus is proposed as a metaphor for science and religion as an academic field. While the specific object of the field is to pursue second‐order reflections on existing and possible relations between sciences and religions, it is argued that several aspects of realism and normativity are constitutive to the field. The vital arms of the field are related to engagements with distinctive scientific theories, specialized philosophy of science, representative theological proposals, and the input from the study of world religions. 相似文献
100.
Natasha Dagys 《Theology & Science》2013,11(1):79-81
AbstractIn his influential book “How to Relate Science and Religion,” Mikael Stenmark argues for the legitimateness of what he calls “partisan science”: “science that is aligned with or supports a particular ideology, religion, or worldview over another.” However, he maintains that we should make an exception: the justification phase of science (phase 3) requires neutral science. Thus, he argues for “non-partisan science3.” In this article, I assess his arguments for non-partisan science3. I find them wanting and I will argue for partisan science3 and maintain that we should adhere to “Augustinian” or “theistic science.” 相似文献