Epistemic Rationality

Many epistemologists and philosophers of science, especially those with “naturalist” inclinations, argue that if there is to be any such thing as normativity or rationality in these domains, it must be instrumental—roughly, a matter of goal satisfaction—rather than something involving normative “oughts” that are independent of the satisfaction of our epistemic, cognitive, or other ends. This paper argues that while such an instrumental conception of epistemic rationality is perfectly respectable, even insofar as it concerns specifically epistemic ends, it cannot be the whole story about such normativity. Rather, it must be accompanied by a “categorical,” goal‐independent sort of normativity that cannot be reduced to instrumental rationality, both because instrumental rationality itself depends on a noninstrumental relationship between a belief/claim/theory and the evidence that renders it rational, and because the epistemic rationality of many beliefs is independent of the goals of their believers.     

Scientific Naturalism, the Mind-Body Relation, and Religious Experience

Although attempts to explain religious experience in terms of brain processes usually presuppose the identification of scientific naturalism with the s ensationist, a theistic, m aterialist version of naturalism (naturalism_sam), this version is inadequate for science, and human experience more generally, for numerous reasons. An alternative version, based on p anexperientialism, p anentheism, and a p rehensive doctrine of perception (naturalism_ppp), not only avoids those problems but also allows for religious experience understood as the soul's direct experience of a Holy Reality.     

Religious Naturalism and the Religion-Science Dialogue: A Minimalist View

Although its roots go back at least to Spinoza, religious naturalism is once again becoming a self–conscious option in religious thinking. This article seeks to (1) provide a generic notion of religious naturalism, (2) sketch my own "minimalist" variety of religious naturalism, and (3) view the science–religion dialogue from both of these perspectives. This last will include reflection on the nature of scientific practices, the contributions of religious traditions to moral reflection, and Ursula Goodenough's "religiopoiesis."     

Theism, Evolutionary Epistemology, and Two Theories of Truth

In Michael Ruse's recent publications, such as Taking Darwin Seriously (1998) and Evolutionary Naturalism (1995), he has advocated a certain sort of evolutionary epistemology and has argued that it implies a rejection of metaphysical realism (MR) in favor of a position that he calls "internal realism" (IR). Additionally, he has maintained that, insofar as his evolutionary epistemology implies a rejection of MR in favor of IR, it escapes the kind of argument against naturalism that Alvin Plantinga makes in his Warrant and Proper Function (1993). In this article I explain the relevant views and arguments of Ruse and Plantinga, and I critically engage with Ruse's views, arguing that (1) his case for rejecting MR has no essential connection to evolutionary considerations; (2) his case for rejecting MR depends upon internalist assumptions about the nature of knowledge that are in need of some kind of defense; and (3) given his implicit internalism and his commitment to IR, his argument for rejecting MR can be used against his IR.     

Real intentionality

Intentionality is an essentially mental, essentially occurrent, and essentially experiential (conscious) phenomenon. Any attempt to characterize a notion of intentionality that detaches it from conscious experience faces two insuperable problems. First, it is obliged to concede that almost everything (if not everything) has intentionality—all the way down to subatomic particles. Second, it has the consequence that everything that has intentionality has far too much of it—perhaps an infinite amount. The key to a satisfactory and truly naturalistic theory of intentionality is (1) a realistic conception of naturalism and (2) a properly developed understanding of the phenomenon of cognitive experience.     

Picturing the Soul: Moral Psychology and the Recovery of the Emotions

This paper draws from the resources of Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy to analyze the ethical status of the emotions at two related levels of reflection. Methodologically, it argues that a recovery of the emotions requires a revised notion of moral theory which affirms the basic orientation of consciousness to some notion of value or the good. Such a theory challenges many of the rationalist premises which in the past have led moral theory to reject the role of emotions in ethics. In particular, it acknowledges the centrality of moral psychology to ethics and reclaims the notion of consciousness rather than the will as the primary mode of human moral being. At a second, more substantive level, the paper explores the relation between the emotions and consciousness. Specifically, it defends a cognitivist and reflexive theory of the emotions which affirms a strong relation between the emotions and our evaluative beliefs. On this view, the emotions reflexively mediate our relation to objective value. In order to earn their cognitive status, however, the emotions must be tested in relation to a critical principle in order to guard against the egoistic tendencies of consciousness to build up images of reality to serve its own purposes. Therefore, a theory of the Good must be part of the critical content of a reflexive theory of the emotions.     

On Naturalism in Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit

In recent years, philosophers have become increasingly interested in a Hegelian approach to Aristotelian non-reductive naturalism. This paper points out a challenge faced by naturalist readings of Hegel's conception of spirit. For Hegel, spirit and nature are essentially distinct and even related in an antagonistic way. It is difficult to do full justice to this thought while at the same time reading Hegel as a naturalist. The paper also seeks to suggest a response to this challenge. Drawing on Hegel's account of mechanism in his philosophy of spirit, it shows that processes which can count as natural – such as mechanical processes – constitute for Hegel an integral and indispensable part of spiritual activity. Against this background, it is possible to develop a form of Hegelian naturalism which does not lose sight of the essential distinction, even opposition of spirit and nature.     

AN EASTERN ORTHODOX CRITIQUE OF THE SCIENCE–THEOLOGY DIALOGUE

On the basis of both philosophical arguments and the theological perspectives of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, a critique of two beliefs that are common within the mainstream science–theology dialogue is outlined. These relate to critical realism in understanding language usage and to naturalistic perspectives in relation to divine action. While the naturalistic perspectives on the history of the cosmos that are predominant within the dialogue are seen as generally acceptable from an Orthodox perspective, it is argued that they require theological expansion. This expansion suggests an understanding other than the “causal joint” model commonly adopted in relation to “special” divine action. This alternative model renders the distinction between “special” and “general” divine action redundant, and is based on what has been called a “teleological‐Christological” understanding of the cosmos, rooted in the fourth gospel's notion of the divine Logos. The relevance of this critique to scholars outside of the Orthodox community is urged.     

TWO TYPES OF “EXPLAINING AWAY” ARGUMENTS IN THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

This article discusses “explaining away” arguments in the cognitive science of religion (CSR). I distinguish two rather different ways of explaining away religion, one where religion is shown to be incompatible with scientific findings (EA1) and one where supernatural entities are rendered superfluous by scientific explanations (EA2). After discussing possible objections to both varieties, I argue that the latter way offers better prospects for successfully explaining away religion but that some caveats must be made. In a second step, I spell out how CSR can be used to spell out an argument of the second kind. One argument (“Bias Explaining Away”) renders religion superfluous by claiming that it results from a cognitive bias and one (“Adaptationist Explaining Away”) does the same by claiming religion was (is) a useful evolutionary adaptation. I discuss some strengths and weaknesses of both arguments.     

THE HYBRIDITY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE: A RESPONSE TO LEONARDO AMBASCIANO

This article responds to Leonardo Ambasciano's review of The Scientification of Religion: An Historical Study of Discursive Change, 1800–2000 by Kocku von Stuckrad. It criticizes a narrative that presents naturalism and science as the ultimate system of knowledge. Contesting this rhetoric, the article underscores the plurality and hybridity of knowledge systems, which is the main topic of the book under review.