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101.
Amos Yong 《Theology & Science》2013,11(2):203-221
This review essay surveys 14 recent texts on theology and science published by six different evangelical (conservative Protestant) publishing houses since 1999. The spectrum of evangelical-theological approaches to evolution, natural history, and origins-of-life issues are presented in these texts, as are evangelical-theological perspectives on the Intelligent Design phenomenon, on theological and scientific method, and on the philosophy of science. Summary observations about the status quaestiones of the theology-and-science discussion in the evangelical world at the beginning of the twenty-first century are provided, and future developments anticipated among conservative Protestants in their engagements with the sciences. 相似文献
102.
Benjamin D. Crowe 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(6):1141-1161
While the last several decades have seen a renaissance of scholarship on J. G. Herder (1744–1804), his moral philosophy has not been carefully examined. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap, and to point the way for further research, by reconstructing his original and systematically articulated views on morality. Three interrelated elements of his position are explored in detail: (1) his perfectionism, or theory of the human good; (2) his sentimentalism, which includes moral epistemology and a theory of moral education; and (3) his theism, which deepens and justifies these other elements. 相似文献
103.
Matthew Meyer 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(1):138-160
This essay seeks to overcome the divide that has emerged in recent scholarship between Alexander Nehamas’s reading of Nietzsche as an aestheticist who eschews the dogmatism implicit in the scientific project and Brian Leiter's reading of Nietzsche as a hard-nosed naturalist whose project is continuous with the natural sciences. It is argued that Nietzsche turns to the natural sciences to justify a relationalist ontology that not only eliminates metaphysical concepts such as ‘being’ and ‘things-in-themselves’, but also can be linked to key components of the aestheticist reading. As a result, Nietzsche's naturalism should not be understood as opposing important features of his aestheticism. Instead, Nietzsche's project should be understood in terms of a naturalized aestheticism that rejects the metaphysical-moral interpretation of existence espoused by philosophers such as Plato, Kant, and Schopenhauer. 相似文献
104.
ALEXANDER PASEAU 《Metaphilosophy》2010,41(5):642-648
Abstract: This article presents and solves a puzzle about methodological naturalism. Trumping naturalism is the thesis that we must accept p if science sanctions p, and biconditional naturalism the apparently stronger thesis that we must accept p if and only if science sanctions p. The puzzle is generated by an apparently cogent argument to the effect that trumping naturalism is equivalent to biconditional naturalism. It turns out that the argument for this equivalence is subtly question‐begging. The article explains this and shows more generally that there are no scientific arguments for biconditional naturalism. 相似文献
105.
Carlo Cellucci 《Metaphilosophy》2015,46(2):213-234
The view that the subject matter of epistemology is the concept of knowledge is faced with the problem that all attempts so far to define that concept are subject to counterexamples. As an alternative, this article argues that the subject matter of epistemology is knowledge itself rather than the concept of knowledge. Moreover, knowledge is not merely a state of mind but rather a certain kind of response to the environment that is essential for survival. In this perspective, the article outlines an answer to four basic questions about knowledge: What is the role of knowledge in human life? What is the relation between knowledge and reality? How is knowledge acquired? Is there any a priori knowledge? 相似文献
106.
Ali Hossein Khani 《Zygon》2020,55(4):1011-1040
What does it take for Islam and science to engage in a genuine conversation with each other? This essay is an attempt to answer this question by clarifying the conditions which make having such a conversation possible and plausible. I will first distinguish between three notions of conversation: the trivial conversation (which requires sharing a common language and the meaning of its ordinary expressions), superficial conversation (in which although the language is shared, the communicators fail to share the meaning of their theoretical terms), and genuine conversation (which implies sharing the language and the meaning of ordinary as well as theoretical terms). I will then argue that our real concern with regard to the exchange between Islam and science is to be to specify the conditions under which their proponents can engage in a genuine conversation with each other and that such a conversation to take place essentially requires sharing a common ontology. Following Quine, I will argue that Muslims, like the followers of any religion, would have no other choice but to work from within science. Doing so, however, would not prevent Muslims from having a genuine conversation with the proponents of other worldviews because when the shared ontology fails to offer any potentially testable answer to our remaining questions about the world, the Islamic viewpoint can appear as a genuine alternative among other underdetermined ones, deciding between which would be a matter of pragmatic criteria. 相似文献
107.
James K. A. Smith 《Zygon》2008,43(4):879-896
Given the enchanted worldview of pentecost‐alism, what possibility is there for a uniquely pentecostal intervention in the science‐theology dialogue? By asserting the centrality of the miraculous and the fantastic, and being fundamentally committed to a universe open to surprise, does not pentecostalism forfeit admission to the conversation? I argue for a distinctly pentecostal contribution to the dialogue that is critical of regnant naturalistic paradigms but also of a naive supernaturalism. I argue that implicit in the pentecostal social imaginary is a distinct conception of nature that is amenable to science but in conflict with naturalism. 相似文献
108.
Jeffrey Koperski 《Zygon》2008,43(2):433-449
Four arguments are examined in order to assess the state of the Intelligent Design debate. First, critics continually cite the fact that ID proponents have religious motivations. When used as criticism of ID arguments, this is an obvious ad hominem. Nonetheless, philosophers and scientists alike continue to wield such arguments for their rhetorical value. Second, in his expert testimony in the Dover trial, philosopher Robert Pennock used repudiated claims in order to brand ID as a kind of pseudoscience. His arguments hinge on the nature of methodological naturalism as a metatheoretic shaping principle. We examine the use of such principles in science and the history of science. Special attention is given to the demarcation problem. Third, the scientific merits of ID are examined. Critics rightly demand more than promissory notes for ID to move beyond the fringe. Fourth, although methodological naturalism gets a lot of attention, there is another shaping principle to contend with, namely, conservatism. Science, like most disciplines, tends to change in an incremental rather than revolutionary manner. When ID is compared to other non‐ or quasi‐Darwinian proposals, it appears to be a more radical solution than is needed in the face of the anomalies. 相似文献
109.
Andrea Viggiano 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(2):213-224
In order to rebut G. E. Moore’s open question argument, ethical naturalists adopt a theory of direct reference for our moral
terms. T. Horgan and M. Timmons have argued that this theory cannot be applied to moral terms, on the ground that it clashes
with competent speakers’ linguistic intuitions. While Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment shows that our linguistic intuitions
confirm the theory of direct reference, as applied to ‘water’, Horgan and Timmons devise a parallel thought experiment about
moral terms, in order to show that this theory runs against our linguistic intuitions about such terms. My claim is that the
Horgan–Timmons argument does not work. I concede that their thought experiment is a good way to test the applicability of
the theory of direct reference to moral terms, and argue that the upshot of their experiment is not what they claim it is:
our linguistic intuitions about Moral Twin Earth are parallel to, not different from, our intuitions about Twin Earth.
相似文献
Andrea ViggianoEmail: |
110.