Preadolescent Decision‐Making Competence Predicts Interpersonal Strengths and Difficulties: A 2‐Year Prospective Study

Recent research has demonstrated that decision‐making competence (DMC), a latent construct reflecting individual differences in rational thought, is predictive of real‐world decision outcomes at various stages of life. This construct has been shown to be associated with concurrent and retrospective accounts of health‐risking behavior, but its predictive validity has yet to be demonstrated. In the present study, we examine this issue using a 2‐year prospective, multiple‐informant design. Specifically, we tested the degree to which preadolescent DMC (PA‐DMC) obtained at ages 10–11 years (Time 1; N = 101) predicted both self‐reports and caregiver reports of emotional, behavioral, and peer‐related difficulties obtained 2 years later (Time 2; N = 76). Holding variables such as numeracy and inhibitory control constant, lower Time 1 PA‐DMC scores predicted greater reported Time 2 psychosocial difficulties (i.e. peer, conduct, emotional, and hyperactivity/inattention problems). Additionally, higher PA‐DMC scores were associated with greater self‐reported prosocial behaviors at Time 2. These results highlight the utility of testing individual differences in rational responding. We discuss the potential for improving children's decision‐making processes. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Individual differences in emotional reactivity moderate the strength of the relationship between attentional and implicit-memory biases towards threat-related stimuli

The study investigated whether the strength of the relationship between attentional and implicit-memory biases for threat-related material can be moderated by individual differences in temperament and personality. A spatial cueing task, where task-irrelevant angry, happy, and neutral faces acted as spatial cues preceding a target, was immediately followed by an unexpected “old/new” task involving previously presented faces. Temperament-based emotional reactivity (ER; one's typical response strength to emotional stimuli) predicted improved memory performance for angry faces in the “old/new” task. Critically, the relationship between the attentional bias towards threat (indexed by a cue validity index, i.e., a difference in response times on trials where cues with angry expression were presented in the same versus different location to the subsequent target) and enhanced implicit-memory for previously presented task-irrelevant threat-related information was found to be moderated by ER. The current findings provide the first evidence that temperament traits can offer novel insights into the mechanisms enhancing cognitive biases towards threat in the typical population.     

Ethics in Publication

Summary

This article highlights ethical issues in publication. It addresses the provenance of ideas, problems with joint authorship, plagiarism, and the practice of duplicate submission of material for publication. Confidentiality and privacy matters, and the protection of human subjects in publication of research and clinical case studies are also discussed. The article further examines biases in literature reviews, and in the biased selection of one's best results for publication, intentional misinterpretation of data and the slanting of discussion, summary, and conclusions. Finally, the article deals with ethical problems that can arise in the publication of sponsored research, and the ethical responsibilities of editors and readers.     

Motivational determinants of reasoning about social relations: The role of need for cognitive closure

The role of need for cognitive closure (NFCC) in reasoning about social relations was investigated. Participants learned pairwise liking/disliking relations between people who could also be categorised on the basis of nationality and then had to group them into social cliques. The social clique structures were either consistent or inconsistent with the nationality categorisation, and the diagnostic information that was necessary to determine the number of cliques appeared either early or late in the information sequence. We expected participants under conditions of high (vs low) NFCC to rely more on heuristic processing. As predicted, high (vs low) NFCC participants were less accurate in their representations of cliques when the clique structure was inconsistent with the nationality category (Study 1 and 2) and when the diagnostic information was presented late (Study 1). The implications regarding the influence of NFCC on reasoning and the role of specific NFCC manipulations are discussed.     

Developmental changes in probabilistic reasoning: The role of cognitive capacity,instructions, thinking styles,and relevant knowledge

In three experiments we explored developmental changes in probabilistic reasoning, taking into account the effects of cognitive capacity, thinking styles, and instructions. Normative responding increased with grade levels and cognitive capacity in all experiments, and it showed a negative relationship with superstitious thinking. The effect of instructions (in Experiments 2 and 3) was moderated by level of education and cognitive capacity. Specifically, only higher-grade students with higher cognitive capacity benefited from instructions to reason on the basis of logic. The implications of these findings for research on the development of probabilistic reasoning are also discussed.     

Feelings of error in reasoning—in search of a phenomenon

Recent research shows that in reasoning tasks, subjects usually produce an initial intuitive answer, accompanied by a metacognitive experience, which has been called feeling of rightness. This paper is aimed at exploring the complimentary experience of feeling of error (FOE), that is, the spontaneous, subtle sensation of cognitive uneasiness arising from conflict detection during thinking. We investigate FOE in two studies with the “bat-and-ball” (B&B) reasoning task, in its standard and isomorphic control versions. Study 1 is a generation study, in which participants are asked to generate their own response. Study 2 is an evaluation study, in which participants are asked to choose between two conflicting answers (normative vs. intuitive). In each study, the FOE is measured by the FOE questionnaire. Results show that the FOE is significantly present in the standard B&B task when participants give a wrong answer, that our questionnaire can measure it, and furthermore, that it is diagnostic of genuine error.     

The effort heuristic

The research presented here suggests that effort is used as a heuristic for quality. Participants rating a poem (Experiment 1), a painting (Experiment 2), or a suit of armor (Experiment 3) provided higher ratings of quality, value, and liking for the work the more time and effort they thought it took to produce. Experiment 3 showed that the use of the effort heuristic, as with all heuristics, is moderated by ambiguity: Participants were more influenced by effort when the quality of the object being evaluated was difficult to ascertain. Discussion centers on the implications of the effort heuristic for everyday judgment and decision-making.     

Egocentrism and focalism in unrealistic optimism (and pessimism)

People tend to overestimate their comparative likelihood of experiencing a rosy future. The present research suggests that one reason for this error is that when people compare their likelihood of experiencing an event with that of the average person, they focus on their own chances of experiencing the event and insufficiently consider the likelihood of the average person experiencing the event. As a consequence, people tend to think that they are more likely than the average person to experience common events and less likely than the average person to experience rare events. This causes unrealistic optimism in the case of common desirable events and rare undesirable events, but unrealistic pessimism in the case of rare desirable events and common undesirable events (Studies 1 and 2). Study 2 further suggests that both egocentrism and focalism underlie these biases. These results suggest that unrealistic optimism is not as ubiquitous as once thought.     

Turning quickly on myself: Automatic interpretation biases in dysphoria are self-referent

Cognitive theories emphasise automatic interpretation biases (AIB) in the development and maintenance of depression. The current study examined AIB using the word sentence association paradigm for depression (WSAP-D) via endorsement rates and reaction time indices. We directly tested the importance of self-relevance for AIB by modifying the WASP-D task to include self-referent ambiguous stimuli and contrasting them with other-referent ambiguous stimuli. We hypothesised that the dysphoric group, but not the non-dysphoric group, would demonstrate AIB only for self-referent ambiguous stimuli. Consistent with our main hypotheses, dysphoric individuals endorsed negative interpretations more often and faster than non-dysphoric individuals, only for self-referent ambiguous stimuli. Self-relevance may be a critical aspect of AIB in dysphoric populations.