I blush, therefore I will be judged negatively: influence of false blush feedback on anticipated others’ judgments and facial coloration in high and low blushing-fearfuls

In the present study, we investigate whether people attribute costs to displaying a blush. Individuals with and without fear of blushing were invited to have a short conversation with two confederates. During the conversation, half of the individuals received the feedback that they were blushing intensely. The study tested whether the belief that one is blushing leads to the anticipation that one will be judged negatively. In addition, the set-up permitted the actual physiological blush response to be investigated. In line with the model that we propose for erythrophobia, participants in the feedback condition expected the confederates to judge them relatively negatively, independent of their fear of blushing. Furthermore, sustaining the idea that believing that one will blush can act as a self-fulfilling prophecy, high-fearfuls showed relatively intense facial coloration in both conditions, whereas low-fearfuls only showed enhanced blush responses following false blush feedback.     

Older (but not younger) preschoolers understand that knowledge differs between people and across time

We examined 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds' understanding of general knowledge (e.g., knowing that clocks tell time) by investigating whether (1) they recognize that their own general knowledge has changed over time (i.e., they knew less as babies than they know now), and (2) such intraindividual knowledge differences are easier/harder to understand than interindividual differences (i.e., Do preschoolers understand that a baby knows less than they do?). Forty‐eight 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds answered questions about their current general knowledge (‘self‐now’), the general knowledge of a 6‐month‐old (‘baby‐now’), and their own general knowledge at 6 months (‘self‐past’). All age groups were significantly above chance on the self‐now questions, but only 5‐year‐olds were significantly above chance on the self‐past and baby‐now questions. Moreover, children's performance on the baby‐now and self‐past questions did not differ. Our findings suggest that younger preschoolers do not fully appreciate that their past knowledge differs from their current knowledge, and that others may have less knowledge than they do. We situate these findings within the research on knowledge understanding, more specifically, and cognitive development, more broadly.     

Trust and Missed Opportunities in International Relations

With the end of the Cold War, we must wonder whether there were missed opportunities to regulate the arms race and global competition, which nearly bankrupted the United States and contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. A missed opportunity for agreement is a situation where there was at least one alternative that the parties to a conflict preferred or would have preferred to nonagreement. Hard-core Realists argue that states compete for territory, arms, and influence because they have conflicting national interests. Soft-core Realists maintain that such conflicts are effects of international anarchy and uncertainty, and that states can cooperate contingent on reciprocity. I argue that states often fail to cooperate even when they have compatible preferences because policy-makers make incorrect inferences about the opponent's motives and intentions, a process that can be illuminated by social psychology. I present three alternative explanations of trust and distrust in international relations—rational choice, domestic structures, and social psychology. If policy-makers are prudent, they will assess the other's interests in observing an agreement as well as its reputation. Often, domestic political structures encourage leaders to promote distrust of an external enemy to legitimize their internal rule or foreign policy. Finally, distrust may lead policy-makers to dismiss the other side's cooperative signals or proposals. Distrust can be overcome by making a series of step-by-step agreements in which each side can test the other's good faith at limited cost, or through unilateral concessions as part of a consistent policy.     

社会判断偏差的分化研究：人物因素的影响

实验采用投射的方法,利用图片和问题材料,考察了128名本科生对物、事、人的社会判断偏差的分化现象。实验结果表明：1）社会判断内在的宽大效应存在局限性,它是有条件限制的,受到所介入的人物因素的影响而出现分化现象;2）对物与事的评价中,突出了对性别判断标准的差异;3）在社会人的对比中,容貌、性别、背景在对同一事件的判断中发挥着重要作用,使社会判断出现偏差分化。     

Sad people are more accurate at face recognition than happy people

Mood has varied effects on cognitive performance including the accuracy of face recognition (Lundh & Ost, 1996). Three experiments are presented here that explored face recognition abilities in mood-induced participants. Experiment 1 demonstrated that happy-induced participants are less accurate and have a more conservative response bias than sad-induced participants in a face recognition task. Using a remember/know/guess procedure, Experiment 2 showed that sad-induced participants had more conscious recollections of faces than happy-induced participants. Additionally, sad-induced participants could recognise all faces accurately, whereas, happy- and neutral-induced participants recognised happy faces more accurately than sad faces. In Experiment 3, these effects were not observed when participants intentionally learnt the faces, rather than incidentally learnt the faces. It is suggested that happy-induced participants do not process faces as elaborately as sad-induced participants.     

Asymptotic biases in exploratory factor analysis and structural equation modeling

Formulas for the asymptotic biases of the parameter estimates in structural equation models are provided in the case of the Wishart maximum likelihood estimation for normally and nonnormally distributed variables. When multivariate normality is satisfied, considerable simplification is obtained for the models of unstandardized variables. Formulas for the models of standardized variables are also provided. Numerical examples with Monte Carlo simulations in factor analysis show the accuracy of the formulas and suggest the asymptotic robustness of the asymptotic biases with normality assumption against nonnormal data. Some relationships between the asymptotic biases and other asymptotic values are discussed.The author is indebted to the editor and anonymous reviewers for their comments, corrections, and suggestions on this paper, and to Yutaka Kano for discussion on biases.     

Need for Cognition and Choice Framing Effects

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that framing biases in decision making would affect more strongly individuals with relatively low levels of need for cognition (NC). Participants were classified as high or low NC based on responses to a standard scale and subsequently were exposed to one of two framings of a choice problem. Different choice problems were used in each experiment, modeled after those developed by Kahneman and Tversky. Experiment 1 employed a monetary task and Experiment 2 a medical decision-making task. Consistent with expectations, framing effects on choice were observed in both experiments, but only for low NC participants. High NC participants were unaffected by problem framing, showing that they were less susceptible to attempts to alter their frame of reference.     

Social and Cognitive Aspects of the Vulnerability to Political Misinformation

In the last few years, especially after the Brexit referendum and the 2016 U.S. elections, there has been a surge in academic interest for misinformation and disinformation. Social, cognitive, and political scientists' work on these phenomena has focused on two main aspects:

• Individuals' (and by extension societies') vulnerability to misinformation;
• Factors and interventions that can increase individuals' (and societies') resistance to misinformation.

In this article, we offer a critical review of the psychological research pertaining to these two aspects. Drawing on this review, we highlight an emerging tension in the relevant literature. Indeed, the current state of the art of the political misinformation literature reflects the combined operation of two opposing psychological constructs: excess gullibility on the one hand and excess vigilance on the other. We argue that this conceptualization is important in both advancing theories of individuals' and societies' vulnerability to misinformation and in designing prospective research programs. We conclude with proposing what, in our view, are the most promising avenues for future research in the field.     

Information repetition in evaluative judgments: Easy to monitor,hard to control

The sampling approach [Fiedler, K. (2000a). Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling approach to judgment biases. Psychological Review, 107(4), 659–676.] attributes judgment biases to the information given in a sample. Because people usually do not monitor the constraints of samples and do not control their judgments accordingly, systematic judgment biases occur. Three experiments demonstrate this for an obvious sampling constraint, the emptiness of merely repeated information. When evaluating stock market shares, participants did not correct for the repetition of positive or negative information about a share. Although original and repeated information was reliably distinguished in estimates of occurrence (successful monitoring), preferences were misled by mere repetition of success and failure reports (unsuccessful control). This effect could even override a share’s actual success rate. Explicit instructions to ignore repetitions provided no remedy; however, a cognitive load manipulation reduced repetition’s undue influence. Possible reasons for and benefits of this lack of direct metacognitive control are discussed.     

The breadth and mnemonic consequences of the youth bias

We have recently demonstrated the existence of the youth bias, referring to a tendency to favour adolescence and early adulthood over other lifetime periods when making inferences about the timing of important public events across the lifespan of a typical individual within one's culture. The youth bias integrates two discrete lines of research, that is, the literature on the privileged status of adolescence and early adulthood in human memory and cognition, and the literature on cognitive biases. Here we first examined whether the youth bias holds for specific categories of public events (i.e., deaths of public figures, United States presidential elections, and sporting events). We then investigated the possible role of the youth bias in structuring recall for public events, by probing, within subjects, for the relation between: (1) these expectations of the timing, in a typical person's life, of the most important exemplar from each public event category, and (2) the age at which the cited event occurred on a recall question asking participants to cite the most important exemplar, in their own lifetime, from each category. We found a youth bias for each category. Additionally, responses to the youth bias question were correlated with the age at which the recalled event occurred, but only where particularly salient historical events did not play a central role in driving recall (i.e., for sporting events). We conclude that the youth bias holds across different types of public events and provides a default structure for organizing recall of public events.