Probability and conspiratorial thinking

Conspiracy theories as alternative explanations for events and states of affairs enjoy widespread popularity. We test one possible explanation for why people are prone to conspiratorial thinking: We hypothesize that conspiratorial thinking as an explanation for events increases as the probability of those events decreases. In order to test this hypothesis, we have conducted five experiments in which participants were exposed to different information about probabilities of fictional events. The results of all experiments support the hypothesis: The lower the probability of an event, the stronger participants embrace conspiratorial explanations. Conspiratorial thinking, we conclude, potentially represents a cognitive heuristic: A coping mechanism for uncertainty.     

Situation-Specific Scripts for Threat in Blood Fearful and Nonfearful Individuals

Self-schemata for threatening situations were examined in blood fearful and nonfearful individuals. In the context of 5 scenarios involving blood, injections, hospitals, or injury, participants listed events that they typically experience in these situations or events that occur when they witness another individual in these situations. Blood fearful and nonfearful individuals generally listed sequences of events corresponding to a similar macrostructure. However, blood fearful individuals included more negative emotional and physiological events than nonfearful individuals, and several of their sequences reflected higher levels of fear and lower levels of positive affect. These results suggest that the self-schemata of blood fearful individuals for situations involving harm or threat consist of both normal and maladaptive elements.     

行为金融学研究的崛起与新发展

行为金融理论充分考虑了市场参与者的心理因素对市场的作用,以心理学的研究成果为依据．以现实中人们的决策心理为出发点,讨论了投资者的投资决策对市场的影响．本文回顾了行为金融学的发展历程,并介绍了2002年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者、心理学家卡恩曼提出的预期理论,同时阐述了行为金融学家们指出的投资者中常见的几种认知偏差。     

Activating a mental simulation mind-set through generation of alternatives: Implications for debiasing in related and unrelated domains

Encouraging people to consider multiple alternatives appears to be a useful debiasing technique for reducing many biases (explanation, hindsight, and overconfidence), if the generation of alternatives is experienced as easy. The present research tests whether these alternative generation procedures induce a mental simulation mind-set (cf. Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), such that debiasing in one domain transfers to debias judgments in unrelated domains. The results indeed demonstrated that easy alternative generation tasks not only debiased judgments in the same domain but also generalized to debias judgments in unrelated domains, provided that participants were low in the need for structure. The alternative generation tasks (even when they were easy to perform) showed no evidence of activating a mental simulation mind-set in individuals high in need for structure, as these individuals displayed no transfer effects. Implications of the results for understanding the role of the need for structure, ease of generation, and mental simulation mind-set activation for debiasing are discussed.