Inference and the taking condition

It has recently been argued that inference essentially involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion and drawing his conclusion because of this fact. However, this Taking Condition has also been criticized: If taking is interpreted as believing, it seems to lead to a vicious regress and to overintellectualize the act of inferring. In this paper, I examine and reject various attempts to salvage the Taking Condition, either by interpreting inferring as a kind of rule‐following, or by finding an innocuous role for the taking‐belief. Finally, I propose an alternative account of taking, according to which it is not a separate belief, but rather an aspect of the attitude of believing: Believing that p implies not only taking p to be true and taking oneself to believe that p, but also taking one's reasons q to support p, when the belief in question is held on account of an inference.     

Occurrent states

The distinction between occurrent and non-occurrent mental states is frequently appealed to by contemporary philosophers, but it has never been explicated in any significant detail. In the literature, two accounts of the distinction are commonly presupposed (and occasionally stated explicitly). One is that occurrent states are conscious states. The other is that non-occurrent states are dispositional states, and thus that occurrent states are manifestations of dispositions. I argue that neither of these accounts is adequate, and therefore that another account is needed. I propose that occurrent states are active states.     

Iranian Psychotherapists’ Behaviors and Beliefs Toward Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

The aim of this study is to investigate Iranian psychotherapists’ behaviors and beliefs toward sexual orientation and gender identity. The sample consisted of 358 Iranian psychotherapists, of whom 29.3% (n = 105) were male and 67% (n = 24) were female. Results from the chi-square analyses showed that more male participants reported accepting homosexual clients and treating them as having a pathological disorder than their female counterparts; and licensed respondents reported engaging more in accepting only male or female clients, accepting more homosexual and transgender clients for treatment, and treating them as having a pathological disorder when compared with their unlicensed counterparts. Furthermore supervised respondents reported accepting more homosexual clients than their unsupervised counterparts. However results from the multivariate analysis of variance has indicated that the female participants reported “accepting homosexuals or transgender clients for treatment” more often than the male participants; unsupervised participants reported “accepting homosexual or transgender clients for treatment” and “treating homosexuality per se as a pathological disorder” more often than their supervised counterparts.     

成人在错误信念任务上的表现

考察成人在错误信念(FB)任务上是否存在"知识偏差"效应。实验1重复Birch等的实验程序并未得到与之一致的结果,成人在FB任务上的表现不理想,且无"知识偏差"效应存在。实验2排除琴盒位置及颜色的突出性影响后,结果与实验1相似。成人在FB任务上的不佳表现与成人具有心理理论的事实相悖,说明把通过FB任务作为衡量心理理论的唯一评定标准有待商榷。     

心理理论和语言发展的关系

大量的研究表明心理理论和语言之间存在着密切的关系,但具体关系如何,一直存在争议。文章介绍了心理理论和语言关系的新近研究,着重阐述了目前关于二者关系的两种观点： （1）心理理论和语言发展之间不仅是早期揭示的一般相关关系,而是可能存在着因果关系——或以语言为因,或以心理理论为因;（2）心理理论和语言都受第三种因素影响,如执行功能和生长环境,但这些因素是究竟如何影响心理理论和语言发展的,还需深入探讨。文章最后对该领域今后的研究提出了新的见解和思路,包括对不同语言能力间的比较研究,对二者关系的跨文化研究和毕生取向研究等     

多个视角看自杀

鉴于自杀问题本身的极端复杂性及其深远的负面影响,从元认知、强迫信念、内在狂妄以及选择人生不能4个角度尝试对自杀风险因素进行了探析,并从近端救治需关注早发现及对方痛苦被看见,远端防控应强调生命体验的重要性, 外围工作应加强对死者亲人的抚慰3个方面对自杀防控进行了探究,以期对自杀危机干预提供一些新思路。此外,倡导教育在生命意义救治方面应担负更大职责且一刻不能或缺。关注个体的心理因素,同时重视人的社会属性,综合施策、多方努力,自杀问题定会得到更好解决。

     

逻辑训练对不同理性思维方式大学生三段论推理的影响

采用理性—经验思维方式量表对105名大学生进行测量,选出高、低理性思维方式各35名大学生进行实验,探讨了逻辑训练对不同理性思维方式大学生三段论推理的影响。结果表明：(1)高理性思维方式个体三段论推理的平均反应时快于低理性思维方式个体;非冲突类型题目推理的平均正确率高于冲突类型题目;逻辑训练可以提高个体三段论推理的平均反应时和正确率;(2)逻辑训练后非冲突任务类型题目的平均正确率高于冲突任务类型题目;(3)逻辑训练对低理性思维方式个体冲突任务类型题目平均正确率的提高效果更明显。这意味着逻辑训练可以显著提升个体的推理成绩,但不能完全消除信念偏差对推理的影响,而且逻辑训练对低理性思维方式个体推理成绩的提升效果更加明显。     

Did she mean to do it? Acquiring a folk theory of intentionality

The ability to both identify and explain others’ intentional acts is fundamental for successful social interaction. In two cross-sectional studies, we investigated 3- to 9-year-olds’ (n = 148) understanding of the folk concept of intentionality, using three types of intentionality measures. The relationship between this type of reasoning and false belief and interpretive mind understanding was also examined. Judgment of the appropriateness of an explanation was based on adult responses (n = 20). Overall, the results indicated that the ability to both identify and appropriately explain a range of intentional acts does not fully emerge until 7 years of age or later. The pattern of explanations revealed the gradual development of a folk concept of intentionality. Preschool- and early school-age children focused on the protagonists’ desires and actions, whereas 8- and 9-year-olds and adults were more likely to reference the protagonists’ awareness and skills.     

Personal and general belief in a just world as judgement norms

Research on the belief in a just world (BJW) has focused on its intra-individual functions (e.g., psychological well-being) and its inter-individual consequences (e.g., derogation of victims). Recent theorizing, however, has indicated that the BJW may also have more societal functions and consequences, serving as a legitimizing device of the status quo. The studies in the current paper focus on this latter view and are based on Alves and Correia's ( 2008 ) research which found that the expression of high personal and general belief in a just world is injunctively normative. Two experimental studies aimed at ascertaining three issues: (1) the dimension(s) of social value (social utility and/or social desirability) on which the BJW normativity anchors; (2) whether the expression of moderate BJW is also injunctively normative; and (3) whether the injunctive normativity of the BJW is related to perceptions of truth. Results indicate that moderate and high personal and general BJW are normative. Yet, whereas the normativity of personal BJW anchors both on social utility and social desirability, that of general BJW anchors only on social utility. We discuss personal and general BJW as judgement norms, whose normativity may not be personally acknowledged (in the case of general BJW) and does not necessarily derive from being perceived as true, but from the fact that such norms carry social value at least in individualistic societies.