Word age-of-acquisition and lexical decision making

This paper reports two experiments concerning the effects of word age-of-acquisition and other word attributes on speed of lexical decision. Analyses of group average data indicated that word length, frequency and familiarity were the major determinants of decision speed. Previous reports of age-of-acquisition effects on lexical decision are attributed to failures to control for word familiarity.     

Attribution and reconstructive memory

Two experiments were conducted to test the effects of making an attribution on later memory for the event that gave rise to the attribution. Subjects in Experiment 1 observed a scenario in which an actor's behavior was associated with high or low variance (distinctiveness) across situations, and high or low congruence (consensus) to the actions of others. Subjects either made attributions for the actor's behavior immediately following the scenario or not. One week later, subjects were asked to recall consensus and distinctiveness for the actor's original behavior. Subjects who made attributions were significantly better at estimating the high-high and low-low combinations of consensus and distinctiveness than were their no-attribution counterparts. It was suggested that making an attribution may allow for a reconstructed memory for the original event, but not enhance direct access to the original event information. A second experiment tested this concept further by having subjects view an edited version of the scenario in which either the distinctiveness or the consensus information was deleted and having subjects make attributions or not. One week later, subjects were asked to indicate their certainty that consensus and distinctiveness information was a part of the original scenario and to estimate the levels of consensus and distinctiveness. Subjects who made attributions were more confident and accurate in estimating the level of consensus or distinctiveness that was given in the original scenario than were no-attribution subjects. However, attribution subjects were also more confident that consensus information or distinctiveness information was contained in the scenario (when it was not) than were the noattributio subjects. Results of the two experiments suggest that eliciting attributions can distort subsequent memory for the event on which the attributions were based.     

Operating principles in repetitive babbling: A cognitive continuity approach

A case study of the period of repetitive babbling in one child (Dutch) is reported. A cognitive continuity theory is presented, which views repetitive babbling as a systematic, continuous and largely self-directed process of exploration, during which the child uses certain operating principles in the construction of his own ‘springboard’ to speech.Two operating principles identified are: a combination principle, consisting of the combining of articulatory acts which previously have been exercised separately, and a variation principle, consisting of the trying out of the same type of articulatory act in different articulatory contexts.Four stages are distinguished in the development of repetitive babbling. In the first stage no combinations occur, in the second stage combination mainly takes the form of repetition and in the third stage it takes the form of concatenating different babbling types as well. In the fourth stage the concatenations grow more varied and less repetitive in character. The subsequent stages of jargon babbling and first words are discussed shortly and their continuity with repetitive babbling is pointed out.     

The development of alertness

Two experiments explored variation in the alerting process across age and warning interval as well as the effects of alertness on subsequent processing. Experiment 1 obtained alertness functions for a group of 5-year-olds, 8-year-olds, and adults. Results revealed strong age differences in speed of alerting and in maintenance of alertness over a 1-sec interval. Five-year-olds alerted more slowly than older groups and sustained optimal alertness less well. Both groups of children showed more variability in alerting functions compared with adults. Experiment 2 examined the degree to which age differences in processing speed were attributable to differential speed and maintenance of alerting. Masking functions obtained across variations in the alerting interval revealed that when level of alertness was optimal in both 5-year-olds and adults, minimal age differences in processing speed were observed. During short, nonoptimal alerting intervals, speed of processing in adults was faster than in 5-year-old children. The pattern of results across studies suggested that alertness can fluctuate over time in young children, that level of alertness affects subsequent perceptual processing speed, and that developmental variation in speed and maintenance of alertness can partly explain observed age differences in processing speed. The potential role of alertness in more complex cognitive tasks is discussed.     

Communicative gestures of the hand and arm when 4-year-old sons and their mothers interact

This study investigated a wide range of communicative hand/arm gestures of 4-year-old males when interacting with their mothers. The types of gesture categories observed were in keeping with the predicted encoding ability of this aged child. Pantomimic and deictic gestures were observed in significantly greater numbers than semantic modifying and relational gestures. Although it was found that the mothers' gestural usage reflected the type of gesture categories seen in the children's group, no correlation was found between gesture usage of individual mother-child pairs.     

On the role of the anterior cingulate cortex in phonation: A case report

A 41-year-old male patient is presented with a lesion in the anterior cingulate cortex, medial orbital cortex, and rostral striatum bilaterally and supplementary motor area on the left side. The patient first exhibited a state of akinetic mutism which lasted about 6 weeks. During this state, no volitional vocal utterances were made; there were, however, occasional groans of pain. During recovery, the mute phase was replaced by a state in which the patient could whisper but not phonate verbal utterances. About 10 weeks after the accident, phonation was restored. The speech was characterized, however, by monotonous intonation and a very low frequency of spontaneous utterances. While the frequency of spontaneous speech improved noticeably during the following months, emotional intonation remained permanently defective. A comparison of the present case with other cases from the literature as well as experimental monkey data suggest that the anterior cingulate cortex is involved in the volitional control of emotional vocal utterances.     

The demonstration of capacity limitation

The study of divided attention has produced many apparent demonstrations of “capacity limitation.” Possible ambiguities in such demonstrations are considered for three major types of experimental situation: simultaneous inputs with separate responses; choice; and classification. Two issues emerge. First, demonstrations always rest on assumptions about process set, i.e., the set of internal processes by which the task actually is performed. Alternative process sets are considered for situations of each type. Second, a demonstration of capacity limitation is made either by increasing the number of simultaneous processes, or by changing the bias between them. In either case effects unrelated to capacity limitation may influence the results. If several processes contribute to a single response, some performance decrement must accompany an increase in their number, simply through the increased overall chance for error. If the subject is biased toward one alternative in a choice or classification situation, the benefits enjoyed by this alternative may reflect not a preferential allocation of attentional capacity, but simply a willingness to decide in favor of this alternative with relatively little evidence.     

The purposes of laboratory experimentation and the virtues of deliberate artificiality

Critics of the laboratory experiment have maintained that artificiality (the intrusion into the experiment of “unrealistic” conditions) vitiates any possibility of generalizability beyond the confines of the laboratory. It is argued here that such artificiality in laboratory experimentation is a defect or flaw only within the context of verification and may be a distinct virtue in the context of discovery. Indeed it is argued that social psychological experiments may not be artificial enough when contrasted with the most fruitful experiments in the natural sciences. One purpose of an experiment may be to maximize artificiality deliberately so as to discover regularities that do not presently obtain under the “real” conditions outside the laboratory but which are capable of existing. When such observed laboratory regularities produce potentially beneficial outcomes, an attempt may be made to create the specific artificial laboratory conditions outside the laboratory to benefit mankind. This logic, exceedingly common in the natural sciences, has been virtually ignored in social psychology, even in the laboratory experiment, in favor of “realistic” reproduction of existing or reasonably plausible situations. Theoretical benefits of this additional modality of experimentation are illustrated by two recent developments in psychology.     

An in depth, astute, comprehensive, and erudite attempt at categorization of stuttering theorists

The purpose of this paper is to make the reader aware of the various theoretical categories into which people who have been productive in the area of stuttering can be “slotted.” Readers are encouraged to read the characteristics, as I conceive of them, of each group of people and then see where their favorite “authorities” (which in many cases will undoubtedly include themselves) fit.     

Reaction times and speed-of-processing: Their relationship to timed and untimed measures of intelligence

Eighty-one university students were given a battery of reaction time tests, measuring the speed with which they performed various elementary cognitive processes, and a group test of intelligence which yielded timed and untimed scores. Multiple regression analyses indicated that speed of information-processing was an equally good predictor of timed and untimed intelligence test performance, and that various combinations of speed-of-processing variables accounted for as much as 48% of the variance in intelligence test scores. Different speed-of-processing variables varied relatively systematically in the extent to which they correlated with the individual subtests and scales of the intelligence test.