Prediction of valency and productivity: An empirical study of longterm group psychotherapy

With reference to W. R. Bion's theory about individual's reactions to group stimuli the main hypothesis was formulated thus: individual's Valency (V) and Productivity (W) undergo changes in certain (definable) directions under the influence of longterm group psychotherapy. The main hypothesis was refined into seven sub-hypotheses. These were measured by four projective tests: Reaction Group Situation Test (RGST), Self Perceptual Q-sort (SPQ), Q-SORT(overt) and Q-SORT(covert). 48.0% of the total number of modalities, 120 out of 252, developed in a predicted and eligible direction. 29.0%, 74 modalities out of 252, remained unchanged whereas 23.0%, 58 modalities out of 252, developed in an opposite to predicted and non-eligible direction. Group members' Productivity (W) developed most of all the modalities in a predicted (eligible) direction. Group members' Valency and Productivity pattern (VP) changed least of all the modalities. The group members Valency (V) for the basic assumption Dependency (baD) developed most of all the modalities in an opposite to predicted, i.e. non-eligible direction.     

The empirical relevance of Perelman's New Rhetoric

Perelman's work has been very influential in various disciplines, among them philosophy, rhetoric and law. Especially the typology of argumentative schemes which he developed together with L. Olbrechts-Tyteca has been considered as an excellent classification of arguments in natural language. There are, however, some weaknesses of this typology which make its application to empirical research quite difficult, namely, the lack of explicitness and the absence of clear criteria of demarcation. Still, the typology is highly relevant for empirical research, if these weaknesses are removed. This is illustrated with an example: the scheme called the division of the whole into its parts by Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca is described explicitly and then applied to the analysis of a sample of everyday arguments (mostly taken from newspapers).     

A “new rhetoric” for a “new dialectic”: Prolegomena to a responsible public argument

This essay offers, as a counterpart to pragma-dialectical argument, a “new rhetoric” produced in the situated discourse of a public forum when a community addresses matters of common urgency and undertakes informed action. Such a rhetoric takes the principles of discourse ethics as its informing dialectic by identifying an interlocutor as one who is obligatedboth to argue effectively,and also to hold open, even reinforce, norms of communicative reason. Implications concerning the study of fallacies and theethos obligations of communicative reasoning are discussed.     

Ethnocentrism,Social Contract Liberalism and Positivistic-Conservatism: Rorty's Three Theses on Politics

In this article I argue that Rorty has three separatearguments for liberalism. The pragmatic-ethnocentric argument for liberalism,as a system which works for `us liberals', is rejectedfor entailing relativism. The social contract argument results in an extreme formof individualism. This renders politics redundantbecause there is no need for the (liberal) state toprotect poetic individuals, who are capable ofdefending themselves. Even if the less able areharmed, the state could not prevent this, givenRorty's arguments about discursive enrichment withina language game. Finally, the positivistic-conservative argument legitimisesliberal politics by fiat, and makes normativediscussion about the status quo illegitimate. Herethe argument is that politics is a matter of reactivetechnical piecemeal problem-solving, to restore theharmony of the status quo. As politics deals with`facts', normative `problematisations' of thefunctional status quo are illegitimate (in the public/political sphere). So, either anything goes, andpolitics is redundant, or discussion of politics isdepoliticised and confined to the private sphere.Consequently, Rorty has no way to explore issues ofpower, or normative contestation. Therefore he isunable to address issues of social justice withinliberal democracies, such as feminist arguments aboutan ascribed gender status limiting equalityof opportunity.     

I am I:A/M—The Therapist as Personification of Hopper's Fourth Basic Assumption

The group therapist often and perhaps necessarily personifies Incohesion and displays its predominant defenses of contact-shunning Aggregation, and merger-hungry Massification. Hence, I am I:A/M. In Hopper's group example, and in each of three of this author's groups, the therapist displayed aggregative and massified defenses, countertansferential duals of basic assumptive transferences. In any therapeutic interaction, it is possible to find elements of incohesion, dependency, pairing, and fight/flight. The incohesion concept has significant clinical utility. A theoretical question remains, whether Hopper's proposed axis of experience and defense merits the special status, basic assumption, or whether incohesion may be collapsed into the existing triad of basic assumptions.     

Scharffs' Application of Hopper's Concept: “Incohesion: Aggregation/Massification”

We begin by stating our understanding of the concepts presented in Hopper's paper, then comment on the clinical illustration, and conclude by describing two group situations in which we have applied the concepts we have taken from Hopper's paper. Hopper's fourth basic assumption applies to our work as individual psychoanalysts, family therapists, and group leaders because it integrates psychoanalytic and social understanding. We demonstrate how and why we find Hopper's idea to be a useful advance.     

Phenomenological Argumentative Structure

The nontechnical ability to identify or match argumentative structure seems to be an important reasoning skill. Instruments that have questions designed to measure this skill include major standardized tests for graduate school admission, for example, the United States-Canadian Law School Admission Test (LSAT), the Graduate Record Examinations (GRE), and the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT). Writers and reviewers of such tests need an appropriate foundation for developing such questions – they need a proper representation of phenomenological argumentative structure – for legitimacy, and because these tests affect people's lives. This paper attempts to construct an adequate and appropriate representation of such structure, that is, the logical structure that an argument is perceived to have by mature reasoners, albeit ones who are untrained in logic.     

Argument Structure and Disciplinary Perspective

Many in the informal logic tradition distinguish convergent from linked argument structure. The pragma-dialectical tradition distinguishes multiple from co-ordinatively compound argumentation. Although these two distinctions may appear to coincide, constituting only a terminological difference, we argue that they are distinct, indeed expressing different disciplinary perspectives on argumentation. From a logical point of view, where the primary evaluative issue concerns sufficient strength of support, the unit of analysis is the individual argument, the particular premises put forward to support a given conclusion. Structure is internal to this unit. From a dialectical point of view, where the focus concerns how well a critical discussion comes to a reasoned conclusion of some disputed question, the argumentation need not constitute a single unit of argument. The unit of dialectical analysis will be the entire argumentation made up of these several arguments. The multiple/co-ordinatively compound distinction is dialectical, while the linked/convergent distinction is logical. Keeping these two pairs of distinctions separate allows us to see certain attempts to characterize convergent versus linked arguments as rather characterizing multiple versus co-ordinatively compound arguments, in particular attempts of Thomas, Nolt, and Yanal, and to resolve straightforwardly conflicts, tensions, or anomalies in their accounts. Walton's preferred Suspension/Insufficient Proof test to identify linked argument structure correctly identifies co-ordinatively compound structure. His objection to using the concept of relevance to explicate the distinction between linked and convergent structure within co-ordinatively compound argumentation can be met through explicating relevance in terms of inference licenses. His counterexample to the Suspension/No Support test for identifying linked structure which this approach supports can itself be straightforwardly dealt with when the test is explicated through inference licenses.