西方社会价值取向的研究历程与发展趋势

作为一种相对稳定的人格特质,社会价值取向指个体对于自己和他人结果分配的特定偏好。西方社会价值取向的研究经历了从双维模型到整合模型的发展。这些研究证实了实验室情境以及现实情境下社会价值取向对个体的行为决策和社会认知的影响。人际取向命题的提出是该领域的最新理论进展,情境因素和平等取向在未来研究中将得到更多的关注     

Cooperation and coordination across cultures and contexts: Individual,sociocultural, and contextual factors jointly influence decision making in the volunteer's dilemma game

What factors promote or hinder volunteering within organizations and groups? This paper simultaneously explores the impact of individual, contextual, and sociocultural variables on decision making in a special type of social dilemma: the volunteer's dilemma game (VDG). The VDG provides a controlled experimental method for studying volunteering behaviors in an anonymous interactive environment. We developed six variations of the VDG and administered them to economics students in five different cultures (N_total = 603). Among other things, these VDGs varied whether the potential benefits of volunteering were certain or uncertain. Although the overall level of volunteering did not vary substantially across most cultural groups, we found that culture interacted with the size and (un)certainty of the benefits associated with volunteering, to influence volunteering decisions. We also found that religiosity (but not religious affiliation per se) increases volunteering and that men are less likely to volunteer when the returns to doing so are certain. These results extend our knowledge of behaviors in the VDG, and their potential drivers, with clear implications for understanding how culture, individual characteristics, and context jointly influence prosocial behavior and coordination.     

Commitment and self-control in a prisoner's dilemma game

Humans often make seemingly irrational choices in situations of conflict between a particular smaller-sooner reinforcer and a more abstract, temporally extended, but larger reinforcer. In two experiments, the extent to which the availability of commitment responses-self-imposed restrictions on future choices-might improve self-control in such situations was investigated. Participants played a prisoner's dilemma game against a computer that played a tit-for-tat strategy-cooperating after a participant cooperated, defecting after a participant defected. Defecting produced a small-immediate reinforcer (consisting of points convertible to gift cards) whereas cooperating increased the amount of subsequent reinforcers, yielding a greater overall reinforcer rate. Participants were normally free to cooperate or defect on each trial. Additionally, they could choose to make a commitment response that forced their choice for the ensuing five trials. For some participants, the commitment response forced cooperation; for others, it forced defection. Most participants, with either commitment response available, chose to commit repeatedly despite a minor point loss for doing so. After extended exposure to these contingencies, the commit-to-cooperate group cooperated significantly more than a control group (with no commitment available). The commit-to-defect group cooperated significantly less than the control group. When both commitment alternatives were simultaneously available-one for cooperation and one for defection-cooperation commitment was strongly preferred. In Experiment 2, the commitment alternative was removed at the end of the session; gains in cooperation, relative to the control group, were not sustained in the absence of the self-imposed behavioral scaffold.     

Larger reward values alone are not enough to entice more cooperation

Two experiments using an iterated prisoner's dilemma game examined under which conditions participants' cooperation rates would either change due to monetary value changes (e.g., 3 cents to 3 dollars) or not change due to numeric value changes (e.g., 3 dollars to 300 cents). A total of 102 university students played the game against a computer that employed one of four strategies across blocks. Results showed high rates of cooperation when participants played against a tit-for-tat strategy and low rates of cooperation against a random strategy. There was no change in cooperation rates due to changes in numeric value alone and a decrease in cooperation rates when large monetary values were at stake. Cooperation rates were higher and cooperation responses slower at earlier stages of the game. I argue that people's ability to strategize plays a key role in the changing rates and speed of cooperative behaviour in the prisoner's dilemma.     

A Description–Experience Gap in Social Interactions: Information about Interdependence and Its Effects on Cooperation

In social interactions, decision makers are often unaware of their interdependence with others, precluding the realization of shared long‐term benefits. In an experiment, pairs of participants played an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma under various conditions involving differing levels of interdependence information. Each pair was assigned to one of four conditions: “No‐Info” players saw their own actions and outcomes, but were not told that they interacted with another person; “Min‐Info” players knew they interacted with another person but still without seeing the other's actions or outcomes; “Mid‐Info” players discovered the other's actions and outcomes as they were revealed over time; and “Max‐Info” players were also shown a complete payoff matrix mapping actions to outcomes from the outset and throughout the game. With higher levels of interdependence information, we found increased individual cooperation and mutual cooperation, driven by increased reciprocating cooperation (in response to a counterpart's cooperation). Furthermore, joint performance and satisfaction were higher for pairs with more information. We discuss how awareness of interdependence may encourage cooperative behavior in real‐world interactions. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Cognitive Model of Dynamic Cooperation With Varied Interdependency Information

We analyze the dynamics of repeated interaction of two players in the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) under various levels of interdependency information and propose an instance‐based learning cognitive model (IBL‐PD) to explain how cooperation emerges over time. Six hypotheses are tested regarding how a player accounts for an opponent's outcomes: the selfish hypothesis suggests ignoring information about the opponent and utilizing only the player's own outcomes; the extreme fairness hypothesis weighs the player's own and the opponent's outcomes equally; the moderate fairness hypothesis weighs the opponent's outcomes less than the player's own outcomes to various extents; the linear increasing hypothesis increasingly weighs the opponent's outcomes at a constant rate with repeated interactions; the hyperbolic discounting hypothesis increasingly and nonlinearly weighs the opponent's outcomes over time; and the dynamic expectations hypothesis dynamically adjusts the weight a player gives to the opponent's outcomes, according to the gap between the expected and the actual outcomes in each interaction. When players lack explicit feedback about their opponent's choices and outcomes, results are consistent with the selfish hypothesis; however, when this information is made explicit, the best predictions result from the dynamic expectations hypothesis.     

MEDICAL MANAGEMENT OF INFANT INTERSEX: THE JURIDICO‐ETHICAL DILEMMA OF CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC LEGAL RESPONSE

Technological advances in the field of medicine and health sciences not only manipulate the normal human body and sex but also provide for surgical and hormonal management of hermaphroditism (intersexuality). Consequently, sex assignment surgery has not only become a standard care for babies born with genital abnormalities in the West but even in some Muslim states. On the positive side, it goes a long way in saving children born with abnormal genitalia from numerous legal interdictions of the pre‐sex corrective surgery. Nevertheless, the larger ethical and legal questions that medical management of genital abnormality raises to some extent have not been adequately appreciated by contemporary Muslim responses. This article, therefore, in principle argues against surgical management of intersexuality during early infancy from the Islamic legal perspective.     

Moral Dilemmas in Military Situations: Proportionality Principle,Religiosity, Political Attitudes,and Authoritarian Personality

The current study focuses on a moral dilemma in military situations: the amount of force to be used in order to neutralize a “most wanted” terrorist. This study examines the association between this moral dilemma with 4 independent variables: agreement with the proportionality principle (mediating variable), level of religiosity, authoritarian personality, and political attitudes. Three equal groups of participants (together, N = 357) were included: Israeli regular army combat soldiers, Israeli reserve combat soldiers, and Israeli students. In accordance with the study hypotheses, the 4 independent variables significantly correlated with each other and with moral decisions. Structural equation modeling indicated that agreement with the proportionality principle is the best predictor of moral decision, and mediated the association between level of religiosity and political attitudes and moral decisions.     

Accuracy in discrimination of self-reported cooperators using static facial information

People readily ascribe personality traits to others and believe that faces hold important guides to character. Here we examined the relationship between static facial appearance and self-reported cooperation/defection using the prisoner’s dilemma (N = 193). Study 1 combined face images of those self-reporting they would be most and least likely to cooperate. The composites of cooperators were seen as more cooperative than non-cooperators. Study 2 demonstrated accuracy with ratings of individual faces. Masculinity of face shape was negatively related to self-reported cooperation for men, but not women. Further, ratings of smile intensity were positively, but not significantly, related to self-reported cooperation. Overall, individuals appear able judge the potential of others to cooperate from static facial appearance alone at rates greater than chance.     

Legal realisms: on law and politics

The focus of this work is the issue of whether, and to what extent, the nature of the law is affected by politics, has been taken up by the American and Scandinavian legal realists. By the very fact of their being products of␣the socio-political conditions of the most recent century, the American and Scandinavian legal realisms are the movements that have most explicitly and systematically brought to the surface one particular characteristic phenomenon of contemporary Western legal systems: the existence of two basic forces simultaneously attracting and repelling, affecting the law in its relations with the political world.I would like to deeply thank Brian Bix, Laura Carlson, Roger Cotterrell and Jori Munukka for their many helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Any errors remaining are my own.