Chinese Buddhist Religious Disputation

From about the fourth to the tenth century Buddhist monks in China engaged in formal, semi-public, religious disputation. I describe the Indian origins of this disputation and outline its settings, procedures, and functions. I then propose that this disputation put its participants at risk of performative contradiction with Buddhist tenets about language and salvation, and I illustrate how some chinese Buddhists attempted to transcend these contradictions, subverting disputation through creative linguistic and extra- linguistic strategies.     

The Genesis of Possible Worlds Semantics

This article traces the development of possible worlds semantics through the work of: Wittgenstein, 1913–1921; Feys, 1924; McKinsey, 1945; Carnap, 1945–1947; McKinsey, Tarski and Jónsson, 1947–1952; von Wright, 1951; Becker, 1952; Prior, 1953–1954; Montague, 1955; Meredith and Prior, 1956; Geach, 1960; Smiley, 1955–1957; Kanger, 1957; Hintikka, 1957; Guillaume, 1958; Binkley, 1958; Bayart, 1958–1959; Drake, 1959–1961; Kripke, 1958–1965.     

A Simple Incomplete Extension of T which is the Union of Two Complete Modal Logics with f.m.p.

I present here a modal extension of T called KTLM which is, by several measures, the simplest modal extension of T yet presented. Its axiom uses only one sentence letter and has a modal depth of 2. Furthermore, KTLM can be realized as the logical union of two logics KM and KTL which each have the finite model property (f.m.p.), and so themselves are complete. Each of these two component logics has independent interest as well.     

A Proof of Standard Completeness for Esteva and Godo's Logic MTL

In the present paper we show that any at most countable linearly-ordered commutative residuated lattice can be embedded into a commutative residuated lattice on the real unit interval [0, 1]. We use this result to show that Esteva and Godo's logic MTL is complete with respect to interpretations into commutative residuated lattices on [0, 1]. This solves an open problem raised in.     

人格特质与认知操作关系的初步研究

本研究采用NEO PI R测试 ,以逻辑推理为认知操作指标 ,初步考察了人格特质与大学生认知操作的关系。结果表明 :①神经质、外倾性与逻辑推理有显著负相关 ,开放性则与之呈正相关 ;②人格特质和认知操作关系的偏相关分析与相关分析的结果基本一致 ;③多元逐步回归分析显示 ,外倾性与逻辑推理有负性预测关系 ,开放性及严谨性则与逻辑推理有正性预测关系 ;④人格特质与认知操作的关系受操作难度、认知任务和兴趣类型等因素制约。     

A First Order Nonmonotonic Extension of Constructive Logic

Certain extensions of Nelson's constructive logic N with strong negation have recently become important in arti.cial intelligence and nonmonotonic reasoning, since they yield a logical foundation for answer set programming (ASP). In this paper we look at some extensions of Nelson's .rst-order logic as a basis for de.ning nonmonotonic inference relations that underlie the answer set programming semantics. The extensions we consider are those based on 2-element, here-and-there Kripke frames. In particular, we prove completeness for .rst-order here-and-there logics, and their minimal strong negation extensions, for both constant and varying domains. We choose the constant domain version, which we denote by QN^c₅, as a basis for de.ning a .rst-order nonmonotonic extension called equilibrium logic. We establish several metatheoretic properties of QN^c₅, including Skolem forms and Herbrand theorems and Interpolation, and show that the .rst-oder version of equilibrium logic can be used as a foundation for answer set inference.     

Socratic Proofs and Paraconsistency: A Case Study

This paper develops a new proof method for two propositional paraconsistent logics: the propositional part of Batens' weak paraconsistent logic CLuN and Schütte's maximally paraconsistent logic Φ_v. Proofs are de.ned as certain sequences of questions. The method is grounded in Inferential Erotetic Logic.     

Speaking Your Mind: Large Inarticulateness Constitutional and Circumstantial

When someone is asked to speak his mind, it is sometimes possible for him to furnish what his utterance appears to have omitted. In such cases we might say that he had a mind to speak. Sometimes, however, the opposite is true. Asked to speak his mind, our speaker finds that he has no mind to speak. When it is possible to speak one's mind and when not is largely determined by the kinds of beings we are and by the kinds of resources we are able to draw upon. In either case, not speaking one's mind is leaving something out whose articulation would or could matter for the purposes for which one was speaking in the first place. Inarticulation is no fleetingly contingent and peripheral phenomenon in human thinking and discourse. It is a substantial and dominant commonplace. In Part One I attempt to say something about what it is about the human agent that makes inarticulateness so rife. In Part Two, I consider various strategies for making the unarticulated explicit, and certain constraints on such processes. I shall suggest, among other things, that standard treatments of enthymematic reconstruction are fundamentally misconceived.