A Propositional Dynamic Logic with Qualitative Probabilities

This paper presents an -completeness theorem for a new propositional probabilistic logic, namely, the dynamic propositional logic of qualitative probabilities (D Q P), which has been introduced by the author as a dynamic extension of the logic of qualitative probabilities (Q P) introduced by Segerberg.     

Prolegomena of a Logic of Causality and Dynamism

We present in this article a new logical system inspired from linear logic. This system is designed in order to express causality and dynamism. The cut elimination theorem holds for this logic. Examples of applications are given.     

《易经》:人类科学思维和审美思维方式的精典阐释

一本诞生于五千年前的中国古书《易经》,已经包含着深刻的现代科学数理逻辑原理,且与美学的审美逻辑原理互为支持、互为表里,使这两大类本来被认为水火不相容的领域及其独具的思维方式得到了高度完善统一的阐释。从这样的角度来看《易经》,也许会有助于目前心理学界对思维方式及逻辑问题的研究,拓开一条崭新的思路。     

Combining Possibilities and Negations

Combining non-classical (or sub-classical) logics is not easy, but it is very interesting. In this paper, we combine nonclassical logics of negation and possibility (in the presence of conjunction and disjunction), and then we combine the resulting systems with intuitionistic logic. We will find that Kracht's results on the undecidability of classical modal logics generalise to a non-classical setting. We will also see conditions under which intuitionistic logic can be combined with a non-intuitionistic negation without corrupting the intuitionistic fragment of the logic.     

The Greatest Extension of S4 into which Intuitionistic Logic is Embeddable

This paper gives a characterization of those quasi-normal extensions of the modal system S4 into which intuitionistic propositional logic Int is embeddable by the Gödel translation. It is shown that, as in the normal case, the set of quasi-normal modal companions of Int contains the greatest logic, M*, for which, however, the analog of the Blok-Esakia theorem does not hold. M* is proved to be decidable and Halldén-complete; it has the disjunction property but does not have the finite model property.     

Führt Der Physikalismus Zu Absurden Konsequenzen?

Does Physicalism lead to absurd results? Franz von Kutschera argued in his book ?Grundfragender Erkenntnistheorie” that the weakest version of physicalism, i. e. the thesis that physical facts determine all the facts there are, leads to the absurd result that events in a remote future determine the present brain states of a person. It is shown that the argument is flawed in several respects and that the absurd result is not a consequence of physicalism but of an auxiliary premiss of Kutschera's.