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711.
We model the forgetting of propositional variables in a modal logical context where agents become ignorant and are aware of
each others’ or their own resulting ignorance. The resulting logic is sound and complete. It can be compared to variable-forgetting
as abstraction from information, wherein agents become unaware of certain variables: by employing elementary results for bisimulation,
it follows that beliefs not involving the forgotten atom(s) remain true.
The work for this publication was mainly carried out while Hans van Ditmarsch was associated to: Institut de Recherche en
Informatique, Université Paul Sabatier, France. 相似文献
712.
Mehrnoosh Sadrzadeh 《Synthese》2009,167(2):391-408
What is the minimal algebraic structure to reason about information flow? Do we really need the full power of Boolean algebras with co-closure and de Morgan dual operators? How much can we weaken and still be able to reason about multi-agent scenarios in a tidy compositional way? This paper provides some answers. 相似文献
713.
We introduce a deontic action logic and its axiomatization. This logic has some useful properties (soundness, completeness, compactness and decidability), extending the properties usually associated with such logics. Though the propositional version of the logic is quite expressive, we augment it with temporal operators, and we outline an axiomatic system for this more expressive framework. An important characteristic of this deontic action logic is that we use boolean combinators on actions, and, because of finiteness restrictions, the generated boolean algebra is atomic, which is a crucial point in proving the completeness of the axiomatic system. As our main goal is to use this logic for reasoning about fault-tolerant systems, we provide a complete example of a simple application, with an attempt at formalization of some concepts usually associated with fault-tolerance. 相似文献
714.
WANG Lu 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2008,3(1):83-98
Research into logical syntax provides us the knowledge of the structure of sentences, while logical semantics provides a window
into uncovering the truth of sentences. Therefore, it is natural to make sentences and truth the central concern when one
deals with the theory of meaning logically. Although their theories of meaning differ greatly, both Michael Dummett’s theory
and Donald Davidson’s theory are concerned with sentences and truth and developed in terms of truth. Logical theories and
methods first introduced by G. Frege underwent great developments during the past century and have played an important role
in expanding these two scholars’ theories of meaning.
Translated by Ma Minghui from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Research), 2006, (7): 53–61 相似文献
715.
López-Astorga Miguel 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2016,11(2):279-297
Johnson-Laird and Byrne distinguished ten kinds of conditionals. Their framework was the mental models theory and they attributed different combinations of semantic possibilities to those ten types of conditionals. Based on such combinations, the mental models theory has clear predictions for reasoning tasks, including those kinds of conditionals and involving reasoning schemata such as Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens, the affirming the consequent fallacy, and the denying the antecedent fallacy. My aim in this paper is to show that the predictions of the mental logic theory for those reasoning tasks are exactly the same as those of the mental models theory, and that, therefore, such tasks are not useful to decide which of the two theories is correct. 相似文献
716.
Philippe Balbiani Andreas Herzig Nicolas Troquard 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2008,37(4):387-406
We propose two alternatives to Xu’s axiomatization of Chellas’s STIT. The first one simplifies its presentation, and also
provides an alternative axiomatization of the deliberative STIT. The second one starts from the idea that the historic necessity
operator can be defined as an abbreviation of operators of agency, and can thus be eliminated from the logic of Chellas’s
STIT. The second axiomatization also allows us to establish that the problem of deciding the satisfiability of a STIT formula
without temporal operators is NP-complete in the single-agent case, and is NEXPTIME-complete in the multiagent case, both
for the deliberative and Chellas’s STIT. 相似文献
717.
Antoni Torrens 《Studia Logica》2008,88(3):349-383
In a classical paper [15] V. Glivenko showed that a proposition is classically demonstrable if and only if its double negation
is intuitionistically demonstrable. This result has an algebraic formulation: the double negation is a homomorphism from each
Heyting algebra onto the Boolean algebra of its regular elements. Versions of both the logical and algebraic formulations
of Glivenko’s theorem, adapted to other systems of logics and to algebras not necessarily related to logic can be found in
the literature (see [2, 9, 8, 14] and [13, 7, 14]). The aim of this paper is to offer a general frame for studying both logical
and algebraic generalizations of Glivenko’s theorem. We give abstract formulations for quasivarieties of algebras and for
equivalential and algebraizable deductive systems and both formulations are compared when the quasivariety and the deductive
system are related. We also analyse Glivenko’s theorem for compatible expansions of both cases.
Presented by Jacek Malinowski 相似文献
718.
In this paper, we present a generic format for adaptive vague logics. Logics based on this format are able to (1) identify
sentences as vague or non-vague in light of a given set of premises, and to (2) dynamically adjust the possible set of inferences
in accordance with these identifications, i.e. sentences that are identified as vague allow only for the application of vague
inference rules and sentences that are identified as non-vague also allow for the application of some extra set of classical
logic rules. The generic format consists of a set of minimal criteria that must be satisfied by the vague logic in casu in
order to be usable as a basis for an adaptive vague logic. The criteria focus on the way in which the logic deals with a special
⊡-operator. Depending on the kind of logic for vagueness that is used as a basis for the adaptive vague logic, this operator
can be interpreted as completely true, definitely true, clearly true, etc. It is proven that a wide range of famous logics for vagueness satisfies these criteria when extended with a specific
⊡-operator, e.g. fuzzy basic logic and its well known extensions, cf. [7], super- and subvaluationist logics, cf. [6], [9],
and clarity logic, cf. [13]. Also a fuzzy logic is presented that can be used for an adaptive vague logic that can deal with
higher-order vagueness. To illustrate the theory, some toy-examples of adaptive vague proofs are provided. 相似文献
719.
First we show that the classical two-player semantic game actually corresponds to a three-valued logic. Then we generalize
this result and give an n-player semantic game for an n + 1-valued logic with n binary connectives, each associated with a player. We prove that player i has a winning strategy in game if and only if the truth value of is t
i
in the model M, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n; and none of the players has a winning strategy in if and only if the truth value of is t
0 in M. 相似文献
720.
Dorota Leszczyńska-Jasion 《Studia Logica》2008,89(3):365-399
The aim of this paper is to present the method of Socratic proofs for seven modal propositional logics: K5, S4.2, S4.3, S4M, S4F, S4R and G. This work is an extension of [10] where the method was presented for the most common modal propositional logics: K, D, T, KB, K4, S4 and S5.
Presented by Jacek Malinowski 相似文献