Selection of Decision Strategies After Conscious and Unconscious Thought

It is commonly assumed that the use of simple, non‐compensatory strategies is especially pronounced in memory‐based decisions, where information costs are high. At the same time, there is evidence that in memory‐based decisions, a compensatory processing of attributes is facilitated when the processing occurs unconsciously rather than consciously. We applied a strategy classification approach—developed in research on non‐compensatory heuristics—to test two key tenets of unconscious thought theory: the capacity principle and the weighting principle. Participants memorized attribute information about cars and were subsequently either directed to or diverted from thinking consciously about their preferences between the cars (conscious versus unconscious thought). Then, participants indicated in pair‐wise choices which car they would prefer and were classified (based on their choices) as using either one of two compensatory strategies (equal weight or weighted additive) or a non‐compensatory strategy (lexicographic heuristic). In line with the capacity principle, the number of participants best described by a compensatory strategy (the equal‐weight strategy) tended to be higher after unconscious thought than after conscious thought, whereas the number of participants best described by the lexicographic heuristic tended to be lower. Inconsistent with the weighting principle, participants in the unconscious thought condition were better described by the equal‐weight strategy than by the weighted‐additive strategy. In Experiment 2, in which participants were not instructed to form an impression while learning the attribute information, the use of the equal‐weight strategy was not more prevalent after unconscious thought. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Application of Cognitive Load Theory to Develop a Measure of Team Cognitive Efficiency

Improving human systems integration through technologically advanced training and performance aids has become increasingly important to military transformation. Measures of improved cognitive and coordination processes arising from the employment of transformational tools are necessary to guide the refinement and future development of such technologies. In this article, we describe a cognitive load theory approach to developing a combinatory measure of individual workload and team performance following an experimental intervention involving training and a decision support system. We discuss how indicators of what we term team cognitive efficiency can improve assessing the effectiveness of transformational processes and technologies.     

Normative and Descriptive Models of Military Decisions to Deploy Precision Strike Capabilities

Precision strike capabilities represent a significant and highly controversial part of present day military operations. And yet, there is a surprising dearth of empirical research on military decision making in this domain. In this article, we therefore review different psychological perspectives on how these decisions can be made. Specifically, we compare the application of normative models of judgment and choice against the empirical research on human decision making, which suggests that people are more likely to employ heuristic strategies. We suggest that several features of decision tasks in the precision strike domain evoke the use of intuitive (heuristic) decision making whereas other features such as the sometimes unfamiliar (or novel) nature of the decision task requires analytic strategies to generate good solutions. Therefore, decisions about precision strike capabilities are best made with a mixture of intuitive and analytic thought, a mode of thinking known as quasirationality.     

Cognitive deficits of executive functions and decision‐making in obsessive‐compulsive disorder

The nature of cognitive deficits in obsessive‐compulsive disorder (OCD) is characterized by contradictory findings in terms of specific neuropsychological deficits. Selective impairments have been suggested to involve visuospatial memory, set shifting, decision‐making and response inhibition. The aim of this study was to investigate cognitive deficits in decision‐making and executive functioning in OCD. It was hypothesized that the OCD patients would be less accurate in their responses compared to the healthy controls in rational decision‐making on a version of the Cambridge gambling task (CGT) and on the color‐word interference test and on a version of the Tower of Hanoi test (tower test) of executive functioning. Thirteen participants with OCD were compared to a group of healthy controls (n = 13) matched for age, gender, education and verbal IQ. Results revealed significant differences between the OCD group and the healthy control group on quality of decision‐making on the CGT and for achievement score on the tower test. On these two tasks the OCD group performed worse than the healthy control group. The symptom‐dimension analysis revealed performance differences where safety checking patients were impaired on the tower test compared to contamination patients. Results are discussed in the framework of cognition and emotion processing and findings implicate that OCD models should address, specifically, the interaction between cognition and emotion. Here the emotional disruption hypothesis is forwarded to account for the dysfunctional behaviors in OCD. Further implications regarding methodological and inhibitory factors affecting cognitive information processing are highlighted.     

Goal‐Proximity Decision‐Making

Reinforcement learning (RL) models of decision‐making cannot account for human decisions in the absence of prior reward or punishment. We propose a mechanism for choosing among available options based on goal‐option association strengths, where association strengths between objects represent previously experienced object proximity. The proposed mechanism, Goal‐Proximity Decision‐making (GPD), is implemented within the ACT‐R cognitive framework. GPD is found to be more efficient than RL in three maze‐navigation simulations. GPD advantages over RL seem to grow as task difficulty is increased. An experiment is presented where participants are asked to make choices in the absence of prior reward. GPD captures human performance in this experiment better than RL.     

Enhanced Cardiac Perception Is Associated With Increased Susceptibility to Framing Effects

Previous studies suggest in line with dual process models that interoceptive skills affect controlled decisions via automatic or implicit processing. The “framing effect” is considered to capture implicit effects of task‐irrelevant emotional stimuli on decision‐making. We hypothesized that cardiac awareness, as a measure of interoceptive skills, is positively associated with susceptibility to the framing effect. Forty volunteers performed a risky‐choice framing task in which the effect of loss versus gain frames on decisions based on identical information was assessed. The results show a positive association between cardiac awareness and the framing effect, accounting for 24% of the variance in the framing effect. These findings demonstrate that good interoceptive skills are linked to poorer performance in risky choices based on ambivalent information when implicit bias is induced by task‐irrelevant emotional information. These findings support a dual process perspective on decision‐making and suggest that interoceptive skills mediate effects of implicit bias on decisions.     

Work strain and the post-discharge adjustment of patients following a heart attack

Abstract

The role of work characteristics in determining return to work after an acute coronary event was examined. One hundred and forty nine patients were enrolled. One year post-discharge, 74 had returned to work. Work characteristics (decision latitude, and opportunity for social interaction at work), together with age, depression, and medical prognosis, correctly classified work status in 78% of cases. At 12 months post-discharge, patients who had not returned to work recorded significantly poorer levels of adjustment compared to those who had returned to work. A better quality of life is associated with a lower level of depression pre-hospitalization, ownership of a larger home, being male, and having a more positive work environment. The findings suggest that the pre-illness work environment of the patient is a factor influencing return to work, which needs to be considered in rehabilitation programmes.     

Decision Making with Uncertain Reinforcement in Children with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)

Reward-related processes are impaired in children with ADHD. Whether these deficits can be ascribed to an aversion to delay or to an altered responsiveness to magnitude, frequency, valence, or the probability of rewards still needs to be explored. In the present study, children with ADHD and normal controls aged 7 to 10 years performed a simple probabilistic discounting task. They had to choose between alternatives where the magnitude of rewards was inversely related to the probability of outcomes. As a result, children with ADHD opted more frequently for less likely but larger rewards than normal controls. Shifts of the response category after positive or negative feedback, however, occurred as often in children with ADHD as in control children. In children with ADHD, the frequency of risky choices was correlated with neuropsychological measures of response time variability but unrelated to measures of inhibitory control. It is concluded that the tendency to select less likely but larger rewards possibly represents a separate facet of dysfunctional reward processing, independent of delay aversion or altered responsiveness to feedback.     

Developmental changes of win-stay and loss-shift strategies in decision making

This study aims to clarify the developmental changes in real-life decision making when strategy is adjusted using both positive and negative feedback, that is, whether strategic adjustment evolves with age. A total of 84 participants divided into three age groups (children, adolescents, and adults) performed the standard version of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). Children and adolescents showed a strong bias in favor of disadvantageous choices whereas adults learned to decide advantageously during the course of the task. Interestingly, the results clearly demonstrate that children did not switch differently following gains and losses whereas adolescents and adults switched more often after a loss than after a gain, corresponding to the “loss-shift” and the “win-stay” strategies, respectively. The results also revealed that adults switched less often after losses compared to children and adolescents and, thus, used the loss-stay strategy more often than the 2 youngest groups. These new findings suggest that successful completion of the IGT by adults requires fine feedback monitoring and more frequent use of the win-stay and loss-stay strategic adjustments.     

Characterization of Children's Decision Making: Sensitivity to Punishment Frequency,Not Task Complexity

On a gambling task that models real-life decision making, children between ages 7 and 12 perform like patients with bilateral lesions of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), opting for choices that yield high immediate gains in spite of higher future losses (Crone &; Van der Molen, 2004 Crone, E. A. and Van der Molen, M. W. 2004. Developmental changes in decision-making: Performance on a gambling task previously shown to rely on ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Developmental Neuropsychology, 25(3): 251–279. [PUBMED][INFOTRIEVE][CROSSREF][Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). The current study set out to characterize developmental changes in decision making by varying task complexity and punishment frequency. Three age groups (7–9 years, 10–12 years, 13–15 years) performed two versions of a computerized variant of the original Iowa gambling task. Task complexity was manipulated by varying the number of choices participants could make. Punishment frequency was manipulated by varying the frequency of delayed punishment. Results showed a developmental increase in the sensitivity to future consequences, which was present only when the punishment was presented infrequently. These results could not be explained by differential sensitivity to task complexity, hypersensitivity to reward, or failure to switch response set after receiving punishment. There was a general pattern of boys outperforming girls by making more advantageous choices over the course of the task. In conclusion, 7–12-year-old children—like VMPFC patients—appear myopic about the future except when the potential for future punishment is high.