Effects of social context, reinforcer probability, and reinforcer magnitude on humans' choices to compete or not to compete.

In the first two experiments, subjects' choices to earn points (exchangeable for money) either by competing with a fictitious opponent or by not competing were studied. Buskist, Barry, Morgan, and Rossi's (1984) competitive fixed-interval schedule was modified to include a second response option, a noncompetitive fixed-interval schedule. After choosing to enter either option, the opportunity for reinforcers became available after the fixed-interval's duration had elapsed. Under the no-competition condition, points were always available after the interval had elapsed. Under the competition condition, points were available based on a predetermined probability of delivery. Experiments 1 and 2 examined how reinforcer probabilities and reinforcer magnitudes affected subjects' choices to compete. Several general conclusions can be made about the results: (a) Strong preferences to compete were observed at high and moderate reinforcer probabilities; (b) competing was observed even at very low reinforcer probabilities; (c) response rates were always higher in the competition component than in the no-competition component; and (d) response rates and choices to compete were insensitive to reinforcer-magnitude manipulations. In Experiment 3, the social context of this choice schedule was removed to determine whether the high levels of competing observed in the first two experiments were due to a response preference engendered by the social context provided by the experimenters through instructions. In contrast to the first two experiments, these subjects preferred the 60-s fixed-interval schedule (formerly the no-competition option), indicating that the instructions themselves were responsible for the preference to compete. This choice paradigm may be useful to future researchers interested in the effects of other independent variables (e.g., drugs, social context, instructions) on competitive behavior.     

Reinforcement contingencies as discriminative stimuli: II. Effects of changes in stimulus probability.

Three pigeons were trained on a matching procedure involving a sample component and a choice component. Responding in the sample component, according to either a differential-reinforcement-of-low-rate schedule on some trials or a differential-reinforcement-of-other-behavior schedule on other trials, produced access to the choice component in which each of two keys was illuminated with a unique color. The correct choice response was defined by the contingency that was met to produce the choice. The food hopper operated for 1.5 seconds following an appropriate sample response and for 3 seconds following a correct choice response. A signal-detection analysis showed that variations in the probability of presentation of the different contingencies systematically affected response bias but not sensitivity to the contingencies as stimuli. Substitution of a blackout for food at the end of the sample component did not differentially affect performance, but elimination of the delay between sample and choice components generally increased the sensitivity measure. The findings suggest a role for reinforcement contingency discrimination in schedule-controlled responding.     

Binary action based estimation of propensities

An observer is to make inference statements about a quantityp, called apropensity and bounded between 0 and 1, based on the observation thatp does or does not exceed a constantc. The propensityp may have an interpretation as a proportion, as a long-run relative frequency, or as a personal probability held by some subject. Applications in medicine, engineering, political science, and, most especially, human decision making are indicated. Bayes solutions for the observer are obtained based on prior distributions in the mixture of beta distribution family; these are then specialized to power-function prior distributions. Inference about logp and log odds is considered. Multiple-action problems are considered in which the focus of inference shifts to theprocess generating the propensitiesp, both in the case of a process parameter known to the subject and unknown. Empirical Bayes techniques are developed for observer inference aboutc when is known to the subject. A Bayes rule, a minimax rule and a beta-minimax rule are constructed for the subject when he is uncertain about.This research was partially supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense and was monitored by ONR under Contract No. N00014-77-C-0095. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Office of Naval Research, or Carnegie-Mellon University.     

A lower bound to the probability of choosing the optimal passing score for a mastery test when there is an external criterion

Recently there has been interest in the problem of determining an optimal passing score for a mastery test when the purpose of the test is to predict success or failure on an external criterion. For the case of constant losses for the two error types, a method of determining an optimal passing score is readily derived using standard techniques. The purpose of this note is to describe a lower bound to the probability of identifying an optimal passing score based on a random sample ofN examinees.The work upon which this publication is based was performed pursuant to a grant [contract] with the National Institute of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Points of view or opinions stated do not necessarily represent official NIE position or policy.     

The role of intermittent food in the induction of attack in pigeons

The present experiments evaluated whether transitions in reinforcer probability are necessary to induce attack in pigeons. In Experiment I, three of six pigeons exposed to response-contingent constant-probability food schedules and a photograph of a conspecific as a target exhibited sustained postreinforcement attack on the target. The postreinforcement pattern of attack developed over the course of the experiment and was accompanied by a reduction in the rate of postreinforcement key pecking and an increase in the postreinforcement pause in key pecking. These effects on key pecking resulted in unprogrammed variations in the probability of reinforcement which may have been responsible for the induction of attack. In Experiment II, the attack-inducing properties of a constant-probability response-independent food schedule were compared to a periodic food schedule matched for overall rate of food delivery and to a no-food condition. In addition to attack, the spatial location of the subjects was monitored during each interfood interval. The periodic and aperiodic food schedules generated very different patterns of spatial location. Postfood attack was induced by both food schedules, although the constant-probability schedule induced attack in fewer birds. The no-food condition was not effective in inducing attack in any birds. These experiments indicate that intermittent food schedules without reductions in reinforcer probability are sufficient to induce attack in some pigeons, although not as effective as schedules with transitions in reinforcer probability.     

Choice with probabilistic reinforcement: effects of delay and conditioned reinforcers.

Two experiments measured pigeons' choices between probabilistic reinforcers and certain but delayed reinforcers. In Experiment 1, a peck on a red key led to a 5-s delay and then a possible reinforcer (with a probability of .2). A peck on a green key led to a certain reinforcer after an adjusting delay. This delay was adjusted over trials so as to estimate an indifference point, or a duration at which the two alternatives were chosen about equally often. In all conditions, red houselights were present during the 5-s delay on reinforced trials with the probabilistic alternative, but the houselight colors on nonreinforced trials differed across conditions. Subjects showed a stronger preference for the probabilistic alternative when the houselights were a different color (white or blue) during the delay on nonreinforced trials than when they were red on both reinforced and nonreinforced trials. These results supported the hypothesis that the value or effectiveness of a probabilistic reinforcer is inversely related to the cumulative time per reinforcer spent in the presence of stimuli associated with the probabilistic alternative. Experiment 2 tested some quantitative versions of this hypothesis by varying the delay for the probabilistic alternative (either 0 s or 2 s) and the probability of reinforcement (from .1 to 1.0). The results were best described by an equation that took into account both the cumulative durations of stimuli associated with the probabilistic reinforcer and the variability in these durations from one reinforcer to the next.     

Hyperbolic modeling and assessment of hypothetical health behaviors during a viral outbreak using crowdsourced samples

The COVID-19 pandemic provided an opportunity to investigate factors related to public response to public health measures, which could help better prepare implementation of similar measures for inevitable future pandemics. To understand individual and environmental factors that influence likelihood in engaging in personal and public health measures, three crowdsourced convenience samples from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) completed likelihood-discounting tasks of engaging in health behaviors given a variety of hypothetical viral outbreak scenarios. Experiment 1 assessed likelihood of mask wearing for a novel virus. Experiment 2 assessed vaccination likelihood based on efficacy and cost. Experiment 3 assessed likelihood of seeking health care based on number of symptoms and cost of treatment. Volume-based measures and three-dimensional modeling were used to analyze hypothetical decision making. Hypothetical public and personal health participation increased as viral fatality increased and generally followed a hyperbolic function. Public health participation was moderated by political orientation and trust in science, whereas treatment-seeking was only moderated by income. Analytic methods used in this cross-sectional study predicted population-level outcomes that occurred later in the pandemic and can be extended to various health behaviors.     

Decision by sampling

We present a theory of decision by sampling (DbS) in which, in contrast with traditional models, there are no underlying psychoeconomic scales. Instead, we assume that an attribute's subjective value is constructed from a series of binary, ordinal comparisons to a sample of attribute values drawn from memory and is its rank within the sample. We assume that the sample reflects both the immediate distribution of attribute values from the current decision's context and also the background, real-world distribution of attribute values. DbS accounts for concave utility functions; losses looming larger than gains; hyperbolic temporal discounting; and the overestimation of small probabilities and the underestimation of large probabilities.     

Novel metaphors appear anomalous at least momentarily: evidence from N400

This study addresses a central question in perception of novel figurative language: whether it is interpreted intelligently and figuratively immediately, or only after a literal interpretation fails. Eighty sentence frames that could plausibly end with a literal, truly anomalous, or figurative word were created. After validation for meaningfulness and figurativeness, the 240 sentences were presented to 11 subjects for event related potential (ERP) recording. ERP's first 200 ms is believed to reflect the structuring of the input; the prominence of a dip at around 400 ms (N400) is said to relate inversely to how expected a word is. Results showed no difference between anomalous and metaphoric ERPs in the early window, metaphoric and literal ERPs converging 300-500 ms after the ending, and significant N400s only for anomalous endings. A follow-up study showed that the metaphoric endings were less frequent (in standardized word norms) than were the anomalous and literal endings and that there were significant differences in cloze probabilities (determined from 24 new subjects) among the three ending types: literal > metaphoric > anomalous. It is possible that the low frequency of the metaphoric element and lower cloze probability of the anomalous one contributed to the processes reflected in the early window, while the incongruity and near-zero cloze probability of the anomalous endings produced an N400 effect in them alone. The structure or parse derived for metaphor during the early window appears to yield a preliminary interpretation suggesting anomaly, while semantic analysis reflected in the later window renders a plausible figurative interpretation.     

Chances and frequencies in probabilistic reasoning: rejoinder to Hoffrage,Gigerenzer, Krauss,and Martignon

Do individuals unfamiliar with probability and statistics need a specific type of data in order to draw correct inferences about uncertain events? Girotto and Gonzalez (Cognition 78 (2001) 247) showed that naive individuals solve frequency as well as probability problems, when they reason extensionally, in particular when probabilities are represented by numbers of chances. Hoffrage, Gigerenzer, Krauss, and Martignon (Cognition 84 (2002) 343) argued that numbers of chances are natural frequencies disguised as probabilities, though lacking the properties of true probabilities. They concluded that we failed to demonstrate that naive individuals can deal with true probabilities as opposed to natural frequencies. In this paper, we demonstrate that numbers of chances do represent probabilities, and that naive individuals do not confuse numbers of chances with frequencies. We conclude that there is no evidence for the claim that natural frequencies have a special cognitive status, and the evolutionary argument that the human mind is unable to deal with probabilities.