When senses meet functions: an amodal stage in conceptual processing

Research has shown that concepts are associated with modality-specific features widely distributed in the brain and that semantic hubs or convergence zones may exist to mediate or integrate distributed representations. Although much neuropsychological and neuroimaging literature has provided support for the existence of hubs/convergence zones from the spatial perspective, opinions differ as to whether the representations in the hubs/convergence zones are modality-specific or amodal. The current ERP study aimed to explore whether there is an amodal stage in conceptual processing from the temporal perspective. Participants were presented with prime-target pairs and were asked to judge whether the prime (a sensory or functional feature) could be an attribute of the target (a noun in a natural or artifactual category). The results revealed that a semantic hub or convergence zone may be reached no later than 350–450?ms in conceptual processing and that the representations in the hub may be amodal.     

Does anxiety-linked attentional bias to threatening information reflect bias in the setting of attentional goals,or bias in the execution of attentional goals?

Heightened anxiety vulnerability is characterised by an attentional bias that favours the processing of negative information. However, this anxiety-linked attentional bias is amenable to two quite different explanations. One possibility is that it reflects anxiety-linked bias in the setting of attentional goals that favours setting the goal of attending towards negative information over the alternative goal of attending away from such information. Another possibility is that it reflects anxiety-linked bias in the execution of attentional goals that enhances the execution of the former attentional goal compared to the latter. The present study introduces a novel methodology designed to discriminate the validity of these competing hypotheses, by examining anxiety-linked attentional bias under two conditions. One condition left attentional goals unconstrained. The other condition imposed the attentional goal of either attending towards more negative or more benign emotional stimuli. The finding that anxiety-linked attentional bias was observed only under the former condition supported the hypothesis that anxiety is characterised by a bias favouring the setting attentional goals involving vigilance rather than avoidance of negative information, while giving no support to the hypothesis that anxiety is characterised by a bias reflecting enhanced execution of the former attentional goal compared to the latter.     

The role of similarity in inattentional blindness: Selective enhancement,selective suppression,or both?†

When people selectively pay attention to one set of objects and ignore another, unexpected stimuli often go unnoticed. Noticing rates are higher when the unexpected object matches the features of the attended items and lower when it matches those of the ignored items. No prior studies have fully disentangled these aspects of similarity; in previous work, the unexpected object fell on a continuum between the attended and ignored objects, so increasing the similarity to one set of objects necessarily decreased it to the other. We designed an inattentional blindness task in which we held similarity to the attended set constant and varied it with respect only to the ignored set, or vice versa. In Experiment 1, objects that were more similar to the attended set were noticed more often and objects that were more similar to the ignored set were noticed less often. Experiment 2, using a different set of unexpected objects, replicated the result that similarity to the ignored set affected noticing, but showed no effect of similarity to the attended set. In both experiments, the pattern of noticing rates differed for similarity with respect to the attended and ignored items, suggesting that suppression of ignored objects functions independently of enhancement of attended objects.