Mind-reading in strategic interaction: The impact of perceived similarity on projection and stereotyping

In social dilemmas, negotiations, and other forms of strategic interaction, mind-reading—intuiting another party’s preferences and intentions—has an important impact on an actor’s own behavior. In this paper, we present a model of how perceivers shift between social projection (using one’s own mental states to intuit a counterpart’s mental states) and stereotyping (using general assumptions about a group to intuit a counterpart’s mental states). Study 1 extends prior work on perceptual dilemmas in arms races, examining Americans’ perceptions of Chinese attitudes toward military escalation. Study 2 adapts a prisoner’s dilemma, pairing participants with outgroup targets. Study 3 employs an ultimatum game, asking male and female participants to make judgments about opposite sex partners. Study 4 manipulates perceived similarity as well as counterpart stereotype in a principal–agent context. Across the studies, we find evidence for our central prediction: higher levels of perceived similarity are associated with increased projection and reduced stereotyping.     

The Temporal Dynamics of Cooperation

Parties in real-world conflicts often attempt to punish each other's behavior. If this strategy fails to produce mutual cooperation, they may increase punishment magnitude. The present experiment investigated whether delay-reduction - potentially less harmful than magnitude increase - would generate mutual cooperation as interactions are repeated. Participants played a prisoner's dilemma game against a computer that played a tit-for-tat strategy, cooperating after a participant cooperated, defecting after a participant defected. For half of the participants, the delay between their choice and the computer's next choice was long relative to the delay between the computer's choice and their next choice. For the other half, long and short delays were reversed. The tit-for-tat contingency reinforces the other player's cooperation (by cooperating) and punishes the other player's defection (by defecting). Both rewards and punishers are discounted by delay. Consistent with delay discounting, participants cooperated more when the delay between their choice and the computer's cooperation (reward) or defection (punishment) was relatively short. These results suggest that, in real-world tit-for-tat conflicts, decreasing delay of reciprocation or retaliation may foster mutual cooperation as effectively as (or more effectively than) the more usual tactic of increasing magnitude of reciprocation or retaliation.     

Moral Stress in International Humanitarian Aid and Rescue Operations: A Grounded Theory Study

Humanitarian aid professionals frequently encounter situations in which one is conscious of the morally appropriate action but cannot take it because of institutional obstacles. Dilemmas like this are likely to result in a specific kind of stress reaction at the individual level, labeled as moral stress. In our study, 16 individuals working with international humanitarian aid and rescue operations participated in semistructured interviews, analyzed in accordance with a grounded theory approach. A theoretical model of ethical decision making from a moral stress perspective was developed. The practical implications of the study are discussed.     

Scheduling Scaffolding: The Extent and Arrangement of Assistance During Training Impacts Test Performance

Various kinds of assistance, including prompts, worked examples, direct instruction, and modeling, are widely provided to learners across educational and training programs. Yet, the effectiveness of assistance during training on long-term learning is widely debated. The authors examined how the extent and schedule of assistance during training on a novel mouse movement task impacted unassisted test performance. Learners received different schedules of assistance during training, including constant assistance, no assistance, probabilistic assistance, alternating assistance, and faded assistance. Constant assistance led to better performance during training than no assistance. However, constant assistance during training resulted in the worst unassisted test performance. Faded assistance during training resulted in the best test performance. This suggests that fading may allow learners to create an internal model of the assistance without depending on the assistance in a manner that impedes successful transfer to unassisted circumstances.     

A motivational perspective on punishment in social dilemmas

In social dilemma situations, individuals benefit from uncooperative behaviour while exploiting resources of the collective. One prominent solution to prevent uncooperative behaviour and to increase cooperation is to establish a sanction system in that private resources are invested by individuals to punish uncooperative interaction partners. The present review is intended to provide an overview concerning motivational determinants of punishment in social dilemma situations. Specifically, we (a) outline that fairness concerns and revenge motivate individuals to punish uncooperative other individuals, (b) show that this is done especially when they possess the basic motivational orientation of a prevention focus. We (c) illustrate that individuals do not punish to acquire a good reputation in the eyes of others, and (d) elaborate on whether individuals punish to regulate satisfaction. Finally, we present empirically neglected motivational factors in studies on punishment in social dilemmas and discuss limitations and possible future directions in this field of research.     

社会价值取向和反馈方式对公共物品困境中决策行为的影响

本研究通过模拟投资实验和问卷来探讨重复型公共物品困境中社会价值取向（SVO）与信息反馈方式对决策行为的影响。结果表明：(1)合作型SVO的个体比非合作型个体表现出更多的合作行为;(2)SVO与信息反馈方式的交互作用岁实验轮次越来越显著,非合作型的个体会受信息反馈方式的影响,而合作型个体则不易受反馈方式的影响;(3)与无反馈的条件相比,集体反馈倾向于促进个体的合作行为,个体反馈倾向于抑制合作行为,但反馈所造成的适应性改变使情况更为复杂。     

Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria

The Berge equilibrium concept formalizes mutual support among players motivated by the altruistic social value orientation in games. We prove some basic results for Berge equilibria and their relations to Nash equilibria, and we provide a straightforward method for finding Berge equilibria in n-player games. We explore some specific examples, and we explain how the Berge equilibrium provides a compelling model of cooperation in social dilemmas. We show that the Berge equilibrium also explains coordination in some common interest games and is partially successful in explaining the payoff dominance phenomenon, and we comment that the theory of team reasoning provides alternative solutions to these problems.     

囚徒困境决策中分离效应验证性与机制研究

Savage于1954年提出"确定事件原则"这一概念,Tversky和Slafir(1992)通过实验发现,人们在不确定条件下的决策过程中,会出现违背确定事件原则的现象,并把这种现象称为"分离效应"。尽管已经有很多对于二次赌博中分离效应的机制研究并产生很多分歧,但对于囚徒困境范式中是否存在分离效应以及其机制并没有一致的结果。本文对囚徒困境中的分离效应进行了验证性实验,虽然整体结果上与Shafir与Tversky(1992)的结论相吻合,但被试专业背景对结果有显著效应。同时,按照Lambdin和Burdsal(2007)对分离效应的操作定义,结果发现分离效应没有出现,文章对其原因进行了讨论。     

Comparisons of Australians and Japanese on group-based cooperation

A cross-societal experiment with 49 Australian and 56 Japanese participants examined if the group heuristic account of ingroup-favoring behavior in a Prisoner's Dilemma game can be extended beyond the minimal group situation to a situation involving an enduring social category (i.e. participant's nationality). Participants played a Prisoner's Dilemma game five times, each time with a different partner. Two of the five partners were ingroup members, two were outgroup members, and the nationality of one partner was not known. Furthermore, one of the two ingroup (or outgroup) partners knew that the participant was a member of the same (or the other) nationality, and the other did not know it. The results indicated that the knowledge that the partner had about the nationality of the participant exerted an effect only when the partner was an ingroup member. No major difference was found between Australian and Japanese participants. An outgroup-favoring cooperation pattern was observed, but that pattern was shown to be a result of fairness concerns among Australian participants and of positive stereotypes of Australians among Japanese participants.     

The Economic, Political, Strategic, and Rhetorical Uses of Simple Constructive Dilemma in Legal Argument

The author argues that simple constructive dilemma is a valuable argument form for reasoning under relative conditions of uncertainty. When applied to legal argument this value of simple constructive dilemma is shown in its political, strategic, rhetorical, and especially economic, uses by lawyers and judges. After considering some examples of the use of the form by trial lawyers, the author gives examples of the more interesting use of the form by appellate courts. Research into the use of simple constructive dilemma by appellate courts helps us to understand how those courts distribute judicial resources. It also helps us to understand the political role of the appellate courts with respect to the doctrine of the separation of powers. Given some of the specific examples of legal reasoning used by the appellate courts presented in this article, and given the discussion of the doctrine of precedent, the article’s focus is on common law legal systems of the Anglo-American-type.