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41.
Nano-ethics as NEST-ethics: Patterns of Moral Argumentation About New and Emerging Science and Technology 总被引:6,自引:3,他引:3
There might not be a specific nano-ethics, but there definitely is an ethics of new & emerging science and technology (NEST),
with characteristic tropes and patterns of moral argumentation. Ethical discussion in and around nanoscience and technology
reflects such NEST-ethics. We offer an inventory of the arguments, and show patterns in their evolution, in arenas full of
proponents and opponents. We also show that there are some nano-specific issues: in how size matters, and when agency is delegated
to smart devices. Our overall approach is a pragmatist ethics, and we conclude that struggle (and learning) might be more
productive than models emphasizing consensus.
相似文献
Tsjalling SwierstraEmail: |
42.
43.
R. Bodéüs 《Argumentation》1992,6(3):297-305
The main purpose of this paper is to explore the reasons Aristotle gives for being able to use rhetorical argumentation, which is obviously not a scientific mode of expression. This faculty which was condemned by Plato as lacking morality, is paradoxically regarded by Aristotle as necessary on moral grounds. For, according to him, it would be blameworthy to keep silent when being verbally assailed. The necessity of rhetoric is, however, more deeply founded. First, because justice has to be saved from its enemies in the City's courts of law. Secondly, because everyone has to be convicted to follow in practice the rules of the City's laws and such a conviction, in the case of the multitude, cannot be obtained by the means of scientific arguments. Thirdly and above all, because, in forensic disputes, characteristics of free political societies, the demagogic power, which regularly leads to tyrannical regimes, can only be avoided by the weapons of rhetoric. From these explanations, one does see that rhetoric, for Aristotle, seems to be the necessary substitute for ancient and traditional instruments securing obedience to legal justice, i.e. myths and pure constraint or coercion. In civilized and free political communities, rhetoric is required for civilization and freedom.
Des raisons d'être d'une argumentation rhétorique selon Aristote相似文献
44.
Douglas N. Walton 《Argumentation》1992,6(2):237-250
This paper looks around among the major traditional fallacies — centering mainly around the so-called gang of eighteen — to discuss which of them should properly be classified as fallacies of relevance. The paper argues that four of these fallacies are fallacies primarily because they are failures of relevance in argumentation, while others are fallacies in a way that is more peripherally related to failures of relevance. Still others have an even more tangential relation to failures of relevance. This paper is part of a larger research project on dialecical relevance in argumentative discourse, currently underway in collaboration with Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst. 相似文献
45.
Eileen A. Scallen 《Argumentation》1995,9(5):705-717
This essay discusses the most recent manifestations of the debate of the law and literature movement. The essay traces the evolution of the Law and Literature schools and identifies some of their adherents and conclusions, shows how these schools have influenced the conceptual development and teaching of American law, presents connections between the Critical Legal Studies and Law and Economics movements in the U.S., and raises questions about the Law and Literature movement. 相似文献
46.
James F. Klumpp 《Argumentation》1997,11(1):113-130
The current rationale for Freedom of Speech is entangled in Enlightenment assumptions about the relationship of discourse to public life. This article critiques those assumptions and proposes an alternative rationale for Freedom of Speech based in assumptions of contemporary rhetorical theory. 相似文献
47.
TIM HEYSSE 《Argumentation》1997,11(2):211-224
Philosophically, the study of argumentation is important because it holds out the prospect of an interpretation of rationality. For this we need to identify a transcendent perspective on the argumentative interaction. We need a normative theory of argumentation that provides an answer to the question: should the hearer accept the argument of the speaker. In this article I argue that formal logic implies a notion of transcendence that is not suitable for the study of argumentation, because, from a logical point of view, argumentation disappears from sight. We should therefore not expect formal logic to provide an interesting interpretation of the rationality intrinsic in argument and discussion. 相似文献
48.
ALVIN I. GOLDMAN 《Argumentation》1997,11(2):155-164
There are distinct but legitimate notions of both personal justification and interpersonal justification. Interpersonal justification is definable in terms of personal justification. A connection is established between good argumentation and interpersonal justification. 相似文献
49.
Alonso Tordesillas 《Argumentation》1990,4(1):109-124
Theoretical interest in Perelman's thought is linked, for the main part, to the place he accords to the notion of argumentation, defined in his work in reference to the Greek philosophy, as represented by Plato and Aristotle, in contrast to the assertions of the sophists and rhetors. He separates the notion of demonstration and that of argumentation and supports his position on an analysis of the debates which were common in the sophistic and rhetoric period.It is in different ways that the notion of argumentation comes into the work of Perelman. By taking up again the analysis of justice with the aim of removing the various strata of meaning which had accumulated on it as a result of the reductions of Plato and the dialectical analyses of Aristotle, Perelman showed that the theory of argumentation transcends the domain of right in which it is rooted and ought not be abandoned to lawyers only. Thus, he follows a train of thought to which he accords a certain nobilty in the name of the new rhetoric. This manner of considering the relationship of the moderns to the Greeks leads him to set up the notion of argumentation in his own texts, where it demonstrates a logical retreat which enables him to work back from Aristotle to Plato and from him to the rhetors and sophists, whose discourse is defined on the level of the self-referential.The exemplary character of Perelman's work is on account of this rehabilitation of argumentation in the old rhetoric which will be examined here.A slightly different version of this essay was presented at the Third Intenational Philosophy Symposium on Justice, Athens, 22–27 May 1987. 相似文献
50.
Steven J. Bartlett 《Argumentation》1988,2(2):221-232
Philosophers have not resisted temptation to transgress against the logic of their own conceptual structures. Self-undermining position-taking is an occupational hazard. Philosophy stands in need of conceptual therapy.The author describes three conceptions of philosophy: the narcissistic, disputatious, and therapeutic. (i) Narcissistic philosophy is hermetic, believing itself to contain all evidence that can possibly be relevant to it. Philosophy undertaken in this spirit has led to defensive, monadically isolated positions. (ii) Disputatious philosophies are fundamentally question-begging, animated by assumptions that philosophical adversaries reject. (iii) The intention of therapeutic philosophy is to study philosophical positions from the standpoint of their internal consistency, or lack of it. In particular, its interest is in positions that either compel assent, because they cannot be rejected without self-referential inconsistency, or self-destruct because self-referential inconsistency cannot be avoided. The article's focus is on the latter. Several examples of self-undermining positions are drawn from the history of philosophy, exemplifying two main varieties of self-referential inconsistency: pragmatical and projective. 相似文献