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161.
Larry Wright 《Argumentation》2002,16(1):33-46
When regimented in a certain natural way, the concepts of explanation and justification manifest a pattern of interrelations connected more or less systematically to their object. Besides its intrinsic interest, this pattern may give us some insight into the nature, source, and limits of the concept of argument. 相似文献
162.
Ralph H. Johnson 《Argumentation》2002,16(3):311-331
In this paper, I respond to papers on my Manifest Rationality (2000) by Leo Groarke, Hans Hansen, David Hitchcock, and Christopher Tindale presented at the meetings of the Ontario Philosophical Society, October 2000. From the many useful challenges they have directed at my position, I have chosen to focus on two. The dominant issue raised by their papers concerns my definition of argument, and particularly problems with the idea of a dialectical tier. I have selected that as the first strand. Second, several have raised questions that deal with the relationship between logic, rhetoric and dialectic. That is the second strand. 相似文献
163.
Justin Morton 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2019,97(2):265-280
Some proponents of the evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism believe that replies that assume substantive moral claims beg the question. In this paper, I give a new account of what's wrong with such replies. On this account, many realists beg the question when they rely on substantive moral claims in their replies to the argument, but naturalists do not. While this account generalizes to some other domains, it allows perceptual and inductive realism to remain undebunked. 相似文献
164.
Nicolas Espinoza 《Synthese》2008,165(1):127-139
It is commonly assumed that moral deliberation requires that the alternatives available in a choice situation are evaluatively
comparable. This comparability assumption is threatened by claims of incomparability, which is often established by means
of the small improvement argument (SIA). In this paper I argue that SIA does not establish incomparability in a stricter sense.
The reason is that it fails to distinguish incomparability from a kind of evaluative indeterminacy which may arise due to
the vagueness of the evaluative comparatives ‘better than,’ ‘worse than,’ and ‘equally as good as.’ 相似文献
165.
Robert K. Fleck 《Zygon》2011,46(3):561-587
Abstract. Since Darwin, scholars have contemplated what our growing understanding of natural selection, combined with the fact that great suffering occurs, allows us to infer about the possibility that a benevolent God created the universe. Building on this long line of thought, I develop a model that illustrates how undesirable characteristics of the world (stylized “evils”) can influence long‐run outcomes. More specifically, the model considers an evolutionary process in which each generation faces a risk from a “natural evil” (e.g., predation, disease, or a natural disaster) subsequent to a basic resource allocation game. This allows both resource allocation and the natural evil to influence the number of surviving offspring. As the model shows, when the risk from the natural evil can be mitigated through the benevolent behavior of neighbors, the population may have increasing benevolence as a result of (1) greater risk from the natural evil and (2) a greater degree to which selfish individuals transfer resources to themselves in the resource allocation game. The main implication is that a world with evolutionary processes (in contrast to a world of static design) can allow two factors that have traditionally been considered “evils”—namely, the indiscriminate cruelty of the natural world and the capacity for humans to harm each other—to promote desirable long‐run outcomes. 相似文献
166.
Mylan Engel Jr. 《Metaphilosophy》2014,45(2):146-160
As we trace a chain of reasoning backward, it must ultimately do one of four things: (i) end in an unjustified belief, (ii) continue infinitely, (iii) form a circle, or (iv) end in an immediately justified basic belief. This article defends positism—the view that, in certain circumstances, type‐(i) chains can justify us in holding their target beliefs. One of the assumptions that generates the epistemic regress problem is: (A) Person S is mediately justified in believing p iff (1) S has a doxastic reason q for p and (2) S is justified in believing q. Assumption (A) presupposes that reasoning is only justification transmitting, not justification generating. The article rejects (A) and argues that, in certain circumstances, reasoning itself is justification generating, even if that from which one is reasoning is not itself justified. It concludes by comparing positism with its infinitist, coherentist, and foundationalist rivals, acknowledging what is right about these other views. 相似文献
167.
Lieven Decock 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2002,33(2):231-250
Quine's views on indispensability arguments in mathematics are scrutinised. A weak indispensability argument is distinguished
from a strong indispensability thesis. The weak argument is the combination of the criterion of ontological commitment, holism
and a mild naturalism. It is used to refute nominalism. Quine's strong indispensability thesis claims that one should consider
all and only the mathematical entities that are really indispensable. Quine has little support for this thesis. This is even
clearer if one takes into account Maddy's critique of Quine's strong indispensability thesis. Maddy's critique does not refute
Quine's weak indispensability argument. We are left with a weak and almost unassailable indispensability argument.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
168.
Leo Groarke 《Argumentation》2002,16(3):277-286
This paper responds to two aspects of Ralph Johnson's Manifest Rationality (2000). The first is his critique of deductivism. The second is his failure to make room for some species of argument (e.g., visual and kisceral arguments) proposed by recent commentators. In the first case, Johnson holds that argumentation theorists have adopted a notion of argument which is too narrow. In the second, that they have adopted one which is too broad. I discuss the case Johnson makes for both claims, and possible objections to his analysis. 相似文献
169.
In this essay I characterize arguments by analogy, which have an important role both in philosophical and everyday reasoning. Arguments by analogy are different from ordinary inductive or deductive arguments and have their own distinct features. I try to characterize the structure and function of these arguments. It is further discussed that some arguments, which are not explicit arguments by analogy, nevertheless should be interpreted as such and not as inductive or deductive arguments. The result is that a presumed outcome of a philosophical dispute will have to be reconsidered. 相似文献
170.
Beebe J 《The Journal of analytical psychology》2006,51(3):329-356