Argument Structure,Argument Content,and Cognitive Change in Children's Peer Interaction

In this experimental study, the author examined whether children's conversations play a role in the processes of influence between peers. Children, aged 8 to 10 years, who were at different levels of moral development participated. The conversations of 120 children were coded and analyzed in terms of argument structure and content. Results indicated that the differences in structure between boys' and girls' arguments are stylistic and do not influence conversation outcomes. The children's use of the structural features of conversations suggested that when a more advanced position is adopted, the arguments themselves appear to inspire cognitive change. However, when a less advanced position is adopted, the children who influence their peers invoke a particular and insistent conversational style. Results are discussed in terms of transmission and constructivist accounts of the role of social interaction in cognitive development.     

Should inter-collegiate football be eliminated? Assessing the arguments philosophically

Recently, there have been discussions about whether or not inter-collegiate football should be eliminated in the US. This article philosophically assesses the arguments for its elimination as well as the arguments proffered against its elimination. While a variety of arguments are discussed, a new one is brought into the foray of philosophical investigation, one that combines the unfairness and economic arguments: the health care and medical costs to others argument. It is believed that this argument is sufficient to justify the elimination of inter-collegiate football.     

Positism: The Unexplored Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem

As we trace a chain of reasoning backward, it must ultimately do one of four things: (i) end in an unjustified belief, (ii) continue infinitely, (iii) form a circle, or (iv) end in an immediately justified basic belief. This article defends positism—the view that, in certain circumstances, type‐(i) chains can justify us in holding their target beliefs. One of the assumptions that generates the epistemic regress problem is: (A) Person S is mediately justified in believing p iff (1) S has a doxastic reason q for p and (2) S is justified in believing q. Assumption (A) presupposes that reasoning is only justification transmitting, not justification generating. The article rejects (A) and argues that, in certain circumstances, reasoning itself is justification generating, even if that from which one is reasoning is not itself justified. It concludes by comparing positism with its infinitist, coherentist, and foundationalist rivals, acknowledging what is right about these other views.     

Murdering an Accident Victim: A New Objection to the Bare-Difference Argument

Many philosophers, psychologists, and medical practitioners believe that killing is no worse than letting die on the basis of James Rachels's Bare-Difference Argument. I show that his argument is unsound. In particular, a premise of the argument is that his examples are as similar as is consistent with one being a case of killing and the other being a case of letting die. However, the subject who lets die has both the ability to kill and the ability to let die while the subject who kills lacks the ability to let die. Modifying the latter example so that the killer has both abilities yields a pair of cases with morally different acts. The hypothesis that killing is worse than letting die is the best explanation of this difference.     

Locke's theory of reflection

This paper examines the nature of ‘reasonable’ (eulogos) argumentation in Generation of Animals III.10. Its aim is to develop an alternative to the dialectical construal of reasonable argumentation in Aristotle recently favoured by Robert Bolton. On the basis of a close textual analysis I show that the reasonable arguments deployed in Generation of Animals III.10 do not appeal to endoxa or reputable beliefs per se. Instead, they rely upon general facts (sumbainonta) about animals established by empirical induction. This implies that, contra Bolton, not all reasonable arguments in Aristotle are dialectical; some, in fact, are thoroughly empirical and scientific. I conclude by suggesting that such empirical reasonable arguments even have a place in the De Caelo, the treatise that Bolton primarily focused upon when developing his interpretation.     

Intrinsic Explanation and Field’s Dispensabilist Strategy

Abstract

Hartry Field defended the importance of his nominalist reformulation of Newtonian Gravitational Theory, as a response to the indispensability argument, on the basis of a general principle of intrinsic explanation. In this paper, I argue that this principle is not sufficiently defensible, and can not do the work for which Field uses it. I argue first that the model for Field’s reformulation, Hilbert’s axiomatization of Euclidean geometry, can be understood without appealing to the principle. Second, I argue that our desires to unify our theories and explanations undermines Field’s principle. Third, the claim that extrinsic theories seem like magic is, in this case, really just a demand for an account of the applications of mathematics in science. Finally, even if we were to accept the principle, it would not favor the fictionalism that motivates Field’s argument, since the indispensabilist’s mathematical objects are actually intrinsic to scientific theory.     

NATURAL SELECTION AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH APPLICATION TO AN ANCIENT DEBATE

Abstract. Since Darwin, scholars have contemplated what our growing understanding of natural selection, combined with the fact that great suffering occurs, allows us to infer about the possibility that a benevolent God created the universe. Building on this long line of thought, I develop a model that illustrates how undesirable characteristics of the world (stylized “evils”) can influence long‐run outcomes. More specifically, the model considers an evolutionary process in which each generation faces a risk from a “natural evil” (e.g., predation, disease, or a natural disaster) subsequent to a basic resource allocation game. This allows both resource allocation and the natural evil to influence the number of surviving offspring. As the model shows, when the risk from the natural evil can be mitigated through the benevolent behavior of neighbors, the population may have increasing benevolence as a result of (1) greater risk from the natural evil and (2) a greater degree to which selfish individuals transfer resources to themselves in the resource allocation game. The main implication is that a world with evolutionary processes (in contrast to a world of static design) can allow two factors that have traditionally been considered “evils”—namely, the indiscriminate cruelty of the natural world and the capacity for humans to harm each other—to promote desirable long‐run outcomes.     

Image Events, the Public Sphere, and Argumentative Practice: The Case of Radical Environmental Groups

Operating from the assumption that a primary dynamic of contemporary public argument involves the use of visual images the authors explore the argumentative possibilities of the `image events' (staged protests designed for media dissemination) employed by radical ecology groups. In contextualizing their discussion, the authors offer an analysis of the contemporary conditions for argumentation by describing the character and operation of public communication, social problem creation, and public opinion formation in a mass-mediated public sphere. The authors argue that image events are a form of postmodern argumentative practice, a kind of oppositional argument that creates social controversy, and animates and widens possibilities for debate. They further suggest that image events are a postmodern form of argument involving acts of protest which deliver images as argumentative fragments. Employing the tools of traditional argument theory the authors describe how images are capable of offering unstated propositions and advancing indirect and incomplete claims in ways that function to block enthymemes and advance alternatives. In concluding, the authors discuss the implications of image events for our understanding of the public sphere and the possibilities for argumentation in a postmodern age.     

跨物种感染是伦理上无关的吗？

目前没有确定的证据表明异种移植是安全的还是危险的。考察了关于跨物种感染的科学和哲学争论,总结出关于“跨物种感染是伦理上无关的”正反论证,提出自己的反论证。最后得出结论:跨物种感染不是伦理上无关的。并且,由于跨物种感染蕴藏的对公众的潜在的巨大风险,新的全球生命伦理学研究范式和涉及人体研究的新的伦理框架需要进一步研究。