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101.
Pluhar EB 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2006,27(4):333-355
In this article, I argue that it is wrong to conduct any experiment on a nonhuman which we would regard as immoral were it to be conducted on a human, because such experimentation violates the basic moral rights of sentient beings. After distinguishing the rights approach from the utilitarian approach, I delineate basic concepts. I then raise the classic “argument from marginal cases” against those who support experimentation on nonhumans but not on humans. After next replying to six important objections against that argument, I contend that moral agents are logically required to accord basic moral rights to every sentient being. I conclude by providing criteria for distinguishing ethical from unethical experimentation. 相似文献
102.
Although the genetic argument is a widely used interpretative argument, what it amounts to does not seem to be altogether
clear. Basic forms of the genetic argument that are distinguished are often too rough to provide an adequate basis for the
evaluation of an interpretative decision. In this article I attempt to provide a more detailed analysis of the genetic argument
by making use of pragma-dialectical insights. The analysis clarifies the character and the structure of different forms of
the genetic argument and thus the elements that are relevant for the evaluation of the argument.*
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at 21st IVR World Congress (Lund, 2003). 相似文献
103.
Pragma-dialectical approaches to legal argumentation seem to be rather different from traditional approaches appealing to
standards of propositional logic. Pragma-dialectical analysis of arguments by analogy and e contrario seem to fall foul to the rigors of logical analysis, in which problems or even concepts of analogy and e contrario seem to
disappear. The brunt of both types of special legal argumentation appears to be borne by often implicit general principles
and an appeal to the system of the law as a whole. Still, pragma-dialectics and logical analysis of legal argument are best
seen as fruitfully supplementing each other in ongoing research of ever evolving legal argument. 相似文献
104.
This article sets up a graph-theoretical framework for argumentation-analysis (dialectical analysis) which expands classical argument-analysis. Within this framework, a main theorem on the existence of inconsistencies in debates is stated and proved: the vicious circle theorem. Subsequently, two corollaries which generalize the main theorem are derived. Finally, a brief outlook is given on further expansions and possible applications of the developed framework. 相似文献
105.
Joseph M. ycínski 《Zygon》1996,31(1):115-130
Abstract. The design argument for God's existence was critically assessed when in the growth of modern science the cognitive value of ideological categories was called into question. In recent discussions dealing with anthropic principles there has appeared a new version of the design argument, in which cosmic design is described without the use of ideological terms. The weak anthropic principle (WAP), a most critical version of all these principles, describes the fine-tuning of physical parameters necessary lo the genesis of carbon-based life. It defines no physical mechanisms of the observed coordination between physical parameters. If in a future unified physical theory such mechanisms are discovered, the weak anthropic principle should be replaced by the strong anthropic principle, which asserts the physical necessity of fine-tuning. Neither of the versions can be regarded as physically trivial unless one accepts strong assumptions of the existence of parallel universes. Consequently, a new version of the philosophical design argument can be developed on the basis of the weak anthropic principle. 相似文献
106.
Herbert W. Simons 《Argumentation》1995,9(1):225-250
In the face of widespread cynicism as regards the possibilities for reasoned and reasonable adjudication of ethical differences in the postmodern age, this essay proposes a dialogic, reconstructive rhetoric as a vehicle for jointly arguing about the ethics of past actions, and looks to the friendship circle as a model arena for the playing out of such a rhetoric. Analyzed by way of illustration is a conversation among four good friends about the ethics of another, surreptitiously taped, conversation between two of those friends.The author wishes to thank Barbie Zeltzer and Micheal Krippondorf, both of Temple University, fot thier comments. Abridged versions of this paper were presented at the Iowa Conference on Narrative in the Human Sciences,1990 and at the England Symposium in Narratives in the Social Sciences. Commentaries at these conferences were also very useful. 相似文献
107.
This empirical investigation examined how ordinary language users resolved disagreements over the solutions to categorical syllogisms. Forty-six participants completed puzzles in logic. After completing the puzzles, participants were then randomly paired into 23 to compare their answers and to resolve 159 disagreements. Results indicate that the most frequently used strategies for resolving disagreements centered on: (a) arguing over the merits of the position (47% of the time) and (b) appealing to past solutions as a means of addressing current disputes (28% of the time). In addition, the data revealed that the most frequently used strategy (arguing the merits of the positions) was no more effective than random choice (52% increase in correct solutions) while the strategy of appealing to past solutions significantly aided dyads in reaching correct solutions (70% increase in correct solutions). 相似文献
108.
John Hoaglund 《Argumentation》1993,7(3):291-311
A concept of critical thinking is developed based on the Socratic method and called accordingly a Socratic model. First the features of critical thinking stressed in this model are stated and illustrated. The Socratic method is presented and interpreted, then taken to yield a model of critical thinking. The process of internalization by which the Socratic model helps us to become critical thinkers is described. Argument analysis is considered as a widely used instructional strategy adaptable for teaching critical thinking on the Socratic model. This Socratic model is advanced as one helpful way of organizing our ideas about critical thinking, helpful in unifying disparate factors and anchoring them in the humanist tradition. 相似文献
109.
George Bowles 《Argumentation》1993,7(3):237-246
I first support Alec Fisher's thesis that premises and conclusions in arguments can be unasserted first by arguing in its favor that only it preserves our intuition that it is at least possible that two arguments share the same premises and the same conclusion although not everything that is asserted in the one is also asserted in the other and second by answering two objections that might be raised against it. I then draw from Professor Fisher's thesis the consequence that in suppositional arguments the falsity (or unacceptability) of a supposition does not tell unfavorably in the evaluation of the argument, because the falsity (or unacceptability) of a (nonredundant) premise counts against an argument if and only if that premise is asserted. Finally, I observe that, despite the fact that they are neither expressed nor even alluded to, implicit assumptions in arguments are always asserted, unless the conclusion, but none of the explicit premisses, is unasserted. Hence, apart from an exceptional case of the kind just mentioned, the falsity (or unacceptability) of implicit assumptions always counts against an argument.I am indebted to Thomas E. Gilbert and Alec Fisher for their criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper. 相似文献
110.
Jonathan E. Adler 《Argumentation》1993,7(3):263-272
An epistemic account of fallacies is one which takes it as a necessary condition for a fallacy that it has a tendency to produce false or unwarranted beliefs. The most sophisticated form of this account occurs in an article by Robert J. Fogelin and Timothy J. Duggan (Fallacies,Argumentation 1, 1987, pp. 255–262). I criticize the Fogelin and Duggan proposal, in particular, and epistemic accounts, more generally. Though an epistemic approach is attractive, it enlarges the class of fallacies, beyond what would be permitted by traditional accounts. I also question thenecessity of fallacies leading to unwarranted beliefs. Some fallacies are fallacious due to their expected harm to argument practices. This position touches on a theme in the work of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, though I criticize their notion of rules of argument as too broad. 相似文献