The Relevance of Intention in Argument Evaluation

The paper discusses intention as a rhetorical key term and argues that a consideration of rhetor’s intent should be maintained as relevant to both the production and critique of rhetorical discourse. It is argued that the fact that the critic usually has little or no access to the rhetor’s mind does not render intention an irrelevant factor. Rather than allowing methodological difficulties to constrain critical inquiry, I suggest some ways in which the critic can incorporate the rhetor’s intention in evaluating argumentation. To this end, a standard of fairness is presented. The paper was presented at the 6th International Conference on Argumentation in Amsterdam, June 27–30, 2006.     

Dispensability in the Indispensability Argument

One of the most influential arguments for realism about mathematical objects is the indispensability argument. Simply put, this is the argument that insofar as we are committed to the existence of the physical objects existentially quantified over in our best scientific theories, we are also committed to the mathematical objects existentially quantified over in these theories. Following the Quine–Putnam formulation of the indispensability argument, some proponents of the indispensability argument have made the mistake of taking confirmational holism to be an essential premise of the argument. In this paper, I consider the reasons philosophers have taken confirmational holism to be essential to the argument and argue that, contrary to the traditional view, confirmational holism is dispensable.     

Externalism and the Content of Moral Motivation

In his fetishist argument, Michael Smith raises an important question: What is the content of the motivational states that constitute moral motivation? Although the argument has been widely discussed, this question has not received the attention it deserves. In the present paper, I use Smith’s argument as a point of departure for a discussion of how advocates of externalism as regards moral judgements can account for moral motivation. More precisely, I explore various explanations of moral motivation that externalists can employ to answer the question Smith poses.     

More on Putnam’s models: a reply to Belloti

In an earlier paper, I claimed that one version of Putnam's model-theoretic argument against realism turned on a subtle, but philosophically significant, mathematical mistake. Recently, Luca Bellotti has criticized my argument for this claim. This paper responds to Bellotti's criticisms.     

Reliability of job satisfaction measures

In this paper, we evaluate consistency in answers to subjective questions about job satisfaction and explore the implications of any inconsistencies. We do this by analyzing a cross-country data set for 6 EU countries where respondents were posed the same question about overall job satisfaction twice within the same questionnaire. We find that, on a 0–10 point ordered utility scale, 80% either classify themselves identically or in the immediate adjacent and that the differences in classification are symmetric around zero. Furthermore, we find that highly satisfied workers report most consistently. When job satisfaction is used as an explanatory variable, we show how OLS-parameter estimates provide a lower bound and IV-estimates an upper bound of the true estimate – and that the bounds are fairly tight. When job satisfaction is used as dependent variable, we generally find high consistency when parameters are highly significant in both models, while less significant or insignificant parameter estimates may change considerably. This indicates that higher significance standards may be advisable in analyses with satisfaction measures as dependent variable compared to more traditional models that are not based on subjective data.     

人格结构的中西方差异与中国人的人格特点

该文旨在通过对中西方人格结构的比较和分析揭示文化与人格结构的关系,并探寻中国人人格结构的文化意义。根据词汇学假设进行的中西方人格结构的研究结果表明,人格结构的形成是建立在对行为归类的基础之上的,中西方人格结构的差异最直接的原因就在于中西方对行为归类的差别。中国文化比较强调整体性、联系性以及评价性是造成中国人与西方人行为归类差异的原因,而更深层次的原因则是中西方文化中对人性看法的差异。中国人人格量表有着比较理想的预测效度,而且与西方大五人格量表相比更高的预测效度,这些均表明中国人人格结构的合理性。文中还提出了进一步研究的展望     

aPRIDIT Unsupervised Classification with Asymmetric Valuation of Variable Discriminatory Worth

Abstract

Sometimes one needs to classify individuals into groups, but there is no available grouping information due to social desirability bias in reporting behavior like unethical or dishonest intentions or unlawful actions. Assessing hard-to-detect behaviors is useful; however it is methodologically difficult because people are unlikely to self-disclose bad actions. This paper presents an unsupervised classification methodology utilizing ordinal categorical predictor variables. It allows for classification, individual respondent ranking, and grouping without access to a dependent group indicator variable. The methodology also measures predictor variable worth (for determining target behavior group membership) at a predictor variable category-by-category level, so different variable response categories can contain different amounts of information about classification. It is asymmetric in that a “0” on a binary predictor does not have a similar impact toward signaling “membership in the target group” as a “1” has for signaling “membership in the non-target group.” The methodology is illustrated by identifying Spanish consumers filing fraudulent insurance claims. A second illustration classifies Portuguese high school student’s propensity to alcohol abuse. Results show the methodology is useful when it is difficult to get dependent variable information, and is useful for deciding which predictor variables and categorical response options are most important.     

PROSPECTS FOR SKEPTICAL FOUNDATIONALISM

Abstract: Properly understood, foundationalism as a meta‐epistemic theory is consistent with skepticism. This article outlines five possible points of overlap between the two views, and shows that arguments against foundationalism posited on its inability to refute skepticism are improperly framed.     

Nested diagnostic classification models for multiple-choice items

This study proposes and evaluates a diagnostic classification model framework for multiple-choice items. Models in the proposed framework have a two-level nested structure which allows for binary scoring (for correctness) and polytomous scoring (for distractors) at the same time. One advantage of these models is that they can provide distractor information while maintaining the statistical properties of the correct response option. We evaluated parameter recovery through a simulation study using Hamiltonian Monte Carlo algorithms in Stan. We also discussed three approaches to implementing the proposed modelling framework for different purposes and testing scenarios. We illustrated those approaches and compared them with a binary model and a traditional nominal model through an operational study.     

Discussions

Summary  In their paper, ‘When are thought experiments poor ones?’ (Peijnenburg and David Atkinson, 2003, Journal of General Philosophy of Science 34, 305-322.), Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson argue that most, if not all, philosophical thought experiments are “poor” ones with “disastrous consequences” and that they share the property of being poor with some (but not all) scientific thought experiments. Noting that unlike philosophy, the sciences have the resources to avoid the disastrous consequences, Peijnenburg and Atkinson come to the conclusion that the use of thought experiments in science is in general more successful than in philosophy and that instead of concocting more “recherché” thought experiments, philosophy should try to be more empirical. In this comment I will argue that Peijnenburg’s and Atkinson’s view on thought experiments is based on a misleading characterization of both, the dialectical situation in philosophy as well as the history of physics. By giving an adequate account of what the discussion in contemporary philosophy is about, we will arrive at a considerably different evaluation of philosophical thought experiments.

For I am convinced that we now find ourselves at an altogether decisive turning point in philosophy, and that we are objectively justified in considering that an end has come to the fruitless conflict of systems. We are already at the present time, in my opinion, in possession of methods which make any such conflict in principle unnecessary. What is now required is their resolute application. (Schlick, ‘The Turning Point in Philosophy’, 1930/1959, p. 54).