Illusory Control and Motives for Control: The Role of Connection and Intentionality

An experiment was done to examine the control heuristic perspective on illusory control and the effects of motives on control judgments, using a computer task similar to the light onset task used in previous research. Desire for the outcome and reinforcement were manipulated. As predicted from a control heuristic perspective, the effect of level of reinforcement on judgments of personal control was mediated by the measure of perceived connection: the perception of the number of positive confirming cases. Motives increased illusions of control, but only in the high reinforcement condition. A mediational analysis that examined how motives affect control judgments found that when the motive to get the outcomes was high, participants had higher estimates of having acted intentionally and these estimates partially mediated the relationship between the motivation manipulation and judgments of control. It appears that perceptions of connection mediate the relationship between reinforcement and illusory control, while judgments of intentionality partially mediate the effect of motives for control and illusory control.     

工作记忆容量和加工速度在归纳推理能力老化中的作用

利用结构方程模型考察了工作记忆容量和加工速度在归纳推理老化中的作用。样本为217名社区老人。结果发现：(1)工作记忆容量在归纳推理老化中具有重要作用．语音环路和视空问初步加工系统在推理过程巾参与程度相当。(2)在年龄和归纳推理能力之问存在年龄——加工速度——工作记忆容量——归纳推理这样一条层级关系。年龄、加工速度和工作记忆容量共同解释归纳推理中57％的变异。     

Connecting instances to promote children's relational reasoning

The practice of learning from multiple instances seems to allow children to learn about relational structure. The experiments reported here focused on two issues regarding relational learning from multiple instances: (a) what kind of perceptual situations foster such learning and (b) how particular object properties, such as complexity and similarity, interact with relational learning. Two kinds of perceptual situations were of interest here: simultaneous view, where instances are viewed at once, and sequential view, where instances are viewed one at a time (one right after the other). We examined the influence of particular perceptual situations and object properties using two tests of relational reasoning: a common match-to-sample task, where new instances are compared with a common sample, and a variable match-to-sample task, where new instances are compared with a sample that varies on each trial. Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that simultaneous presentation of even highly dissimilar instances, one simple and one complex, effectively connects them together and improves relational generalization in both match-to-sample tasks. Experiment 3 shows that simple samples are more effective than complex ones in the common match-to-sample task. However, when one instance is not used a common sample and various pairs of instances are simply compared, as in Experiment 4, simple and rich instances are equally effective at promoting relational learning. These results bear on our understanding of how children connect instances and how those initial connections affect learning and generalization.     

Learning the form of causal relationships using hierarchical bayesian models

People learn quickly when reasoning about causal relationships, making inferences from limited data and avoiding spurious inferences. Efficient learning depends on abstract knowledge, which is often domain or context specific, and much of it must be learned. While such knowledge effects are well documented, little is known about exactly how we acquire knowledge that constrains learning. This work focuses on knowledge of the functional form of causal relationships; there are many kinds of relationships that can apply between causes and their effects, and knowledge of the form such a relationship takes is important in order to quickly identify the real causes of an observed effect. We developed a hierarchical Bayesian model of the acquisition of knowledge of the functional form of causal relationships and tested it in five experimental studies, considering disjunctive and conjunctive relationships, failure rates, and cross-domain effects. The Bayesian model accurately predicted human judgments and outperformed several alternative models.     

Infants' Physical World

Abstract— Investigations of infants' physical world over the past 20 years have revealed two main findings. First, even very young infants possess expectations about physical events. Second, these expectations undergo significant developments during the first year of life, as infants form event categories, such as occlusion, containment, and covering events, and identify the variables relevant for predicting outcomes in each category. A new account of infants' physical reasoning integrates these findings. Predictions from the account are examined in change-blindness and teaching experiments.     

Casuistry as methodology in clinical ethics

This essay focuses on how casuistry can become a useful technique of practical reasoning for the clinical ethicist or ethics consultant. Casuistry is defined, its relationship to rhetorical reasoning and its interpretation of cases, by employing three terms that, while they are not employed by the classical rhetoricians and casuists, conform, in a general way, to the features of their work. Those terms are (1) morphology, (2) taxonomy, (3) kinetics. The morphology of a case reveals the invariant structure of the particular case whatever its contingent features, and also the invariant forms of argument relevant to any case of the same sort: these invariant features can be called topics. Taxonomy situates the instant case in a series of similar cases, allowing the similarities and differences between an instant case and a paradigm case to dictate the moral judgment about the instant case. This judgment is based, not merely on application of an ethical theory or principle, but upon the way in which circumstances and maxims appear in the morphology of the case itself and in comparison with other cases. Kinetics is an understanding of the way in which one case imparts a kind of moral movement to other cases, that is, different and sometimes unprecedented circumstances may move certain marginal or exceptional cases to the level of paradigm cases. In conclusion, casuistry is the exercise of prudential or practical reasoning in recognition of the relationship between maxims, circumstances and topics, as well as the relationship of paradigms to analogous cases.     

Fuzzy-trace theory and framing effects in choice: Gist extraction,truncation, and conversion

In the first section of this paper, we analyze classic framing effects according to principles of fuzzy-trace theory. The key principle of the theory is that reasoning prefers to operate on simple gist, as opposed to exact details. Then, we introduce new data in three experiments designed to test this fuzzy-processing assumption. In the first experiment, framing effects were conserved when numerical information was omitted from standard problems, arguing against a critical role for numerical processing. In the second experiment, evidence is presented that some subjects simplified framing problems by mentally truncating linguistically redundant complements in gambles. Experimentally deleting parts of gambles mimiced such effects, and choices varied depending on the information that remained explicit. In the third experiment, truncation effects were also demonstrated for mixed-frame problems, in which one option is positive and the other is negative. The data disconfirmed a ‘halo’ hypothesis that subjects merely selected the positive option over the negative one. Instead, choices were accounted for by conversion, that is, transforming problems into uniformly positive representations to avoid the complexity of negation. In all three experiments, choices could be explained as a consequence of radically simplifying decision information.     

Rules for Reasoning from Knowledge and Lack of Knowledge

In this paper, the traditional view that argumentum ad ignorantiam is a logical fallacy is challenged, and lessons are drawn on how to model inferences drawn from knowledge in combination with ones drawn from lack of knowledge. Five defeasible rules for evaluating knowledge-based arguments that apply to inferences drawn under conditions of lack of knowledge are formulated. They are the veridicality rule, the consistency of knowledge rule, the closure of knowledge rule, the rule of refutation and the rule for argument from ignorance. The basic thesis of the paper is that knowledge-based arguments, including the argument from ignorance, need to be evaluated by criteria for epistemic closure and other evidential rules that are pragmatic in nature, that need to be formulated and applied differently at different stages of an investigation or discussion. The paper helps us to understand practical criteria that should be used to evaluate all arguments based on knowledge and/or ignorance.

Differential involvement of left prefrontal cortex in inductive and deductive reasoning

While inductive and deductive reasoning are considered distinct logical and psychological processes, little is known about their respective neural basis. To address this issue we scanned 16 subjects with fMRI, using an event-related design, while they engaged in inductive and deductive reasoning tasks. Both types of reasoning were characterized by activation of left lateral prefrontal and bilateral dorsal frontal, parietal, and occipital cortices. Neural responses unique to each type of reasoning determined from the Reasoning Type (deduction and induction) by Task (reasoning and baseline) interaction indicated greater involvement of left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44) in deduction than induction, while left dorsolateral (BA 8/9) prefrontal gyrus showed greater activity during induction than deduction. This pattern suggests a dissociation within prefrontal cortex for deductive and inductive reasoning.     

The effects of interpersonal relationship and character gender on adolescents' resolutions of moral dilemmas

An experimental study using two forms of the Defining Issues Test [Rest, J. R. (1979). Revised manual for the Defining Issues Test. Minneapolis: Moral Research Project, University of Minnesota.], modified to present either a high degree of relationship among characters or a low degree of relationship among characters, was conducted with 114 college students. The gender of the characters in the dilemmas was also systematically varied. Both male and female students evidenced principled (Stages 5 and 6) reasoning more often when dilemma characters were male than when story characters were female. Participant gender and relationship condition were significant factors in the frequency of Stage 4 reasoning. Male students in the low-relationship condition evidenced Stage 4 (“Law and order”) reasoning most often when story characters were male, while male students, like female students in all conditions, showed Stage 4 reasoning more often when female characters were presented in the high-relationship condition. The degree to which moral decisions were supportive of an affected character revealed more support when story characters were female than when they were male. Results indicate that even in hypothetical situations, moral judgments vary with the gender of the person being judged and to some degree with the relationships among those involved in the dilemma. These findings are consistent with a view that multiple, equally valid approaches to moral judgment might exist and affect the development of male and female students differently.