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951.
学前儿童时期是各种推理能力产生和发展的重要时期。本研究采用Frye和Zelazo等(1996)所设计的“二进二出”装置,设置了规则顺序、规则类型的规则推理任务,采用个别实验法,研究了90名3~4岁儿童规则推理能力的发展。在本研究条件下,结果发现:1.当规则呈现顺序不同时,儿童规则推理成绩差异显著,先呈现哪个规则,则利用这个规则进行推理的成绩就较好;2.不同规则类型下儿童的推理成绩差异极其显著,竖直规则下的推理任务更容易;3.3.5~4岁是儿童二维合取规则推理能力发展的快速期。 相似文献
952.
Summary This contribution offers an evaluation of e contrario reasoning in which the interpretation of a legal rule is based on the
context of the law system (contextual e contrario reasoning). A model is presented which will show all the explicit and implicit
elements of the argument at work and will also point out how these distinct parts are interrelated. By questioning the content
and justificatory power of these elements, the weak spots in the argument can be laid bare. It will be argued that e contrario
reasoning inevitably requires a dubious argumentative step, which renders the argument intrinsically weak. The model is applied
to a European lawsuit on French cheese. 相似文献
953.
In this paper the argument from coherence is submitted to a critical analysis. First, it is argued to be a complex form of
coordinative argumentation, structured on various argumentative levels. Then, using the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation
a distinction is brought out between two basic forms of the argument from coherence: in one use this argument occurs as a
sequence of two symptomatic arguments; in the other use we have a main symptomatic argument supported by a subordinate pragmatic
argument. Finally, from an evaluative point of view it is assessed whether the argument from coherence can be found acceptable
as a tool for settling disputes. It is claimed that in general, we can welcome this argumentative structure as sound and fully
acceptable provided that we are aware of the interpretative discretion its use implies.
A preliminary version of this essay was presented at the symposium organised by the Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation
Theory, and Rhetoric at the University of Amsterdamon the 27/02/04. I wish to express my indebtedness to Dora Achourioti,
Francesco Belvisi, Frans van Eemeren, Eveline Feteris, Bart Garssen, Jean Wagemans, Peter Houtlosser, and Henrike Jansen for
their helpful remarks. Needless to say, the responsibility for the views expressed herein as well as for any errors of form
or content rests solely with me. 相似文献
954.
基于三重加工心智模型,以大学生为被试,采用经典贝叶斯推理的文本范式,通过操纵自变量:因果信息(有或无)与提示指导语(提供或不提供),试图探讨激发反省心智,消解理性障碍的情况下,因果贝叶斯框架的作用机制。估计正确率和准确性的结果都表明因果信息显著提高了贝叶斯推理成绩,准确性的结果也说明指导语可以提示被试放下既有观念,以无偏见的方式进行推理,从而有效促进了贝叶斯推理表现。而在提示条件下增加因果信息并没有促进作用,表明对于较高元认知的被试因果信息作用是有限的。 相似文献
955.
Differential involvement of left prefrontal cortex in inductive and deductive reasoning 总被引:8,自引:0,他引:8
While inductive and deductive reasoning are considered distinct logical and psychological processes, little is known about their respective neural basis. To address this issue we scanned 16 subjects with fMRI, using an event-related design, while they engaged in inductive and deductive reasoning tasks. Both types of reasoning were characterized by activation of left lateral prefrontal and bilateral dorsal frontal, parietal, and occipital cortices. Neural responses unique to each type of reasoning determined from the Reasoning Type (deduction and induction) by Task (reasoning and baseline) interaction indicated greater involvement of left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44) in deduction than induction, while left dorsolateral (BA 8/9) prefrontal gyrus showed greater activity during induction than deduction. This pattern suggests a dissociation within prefrontal cortex for deductive and inductive reasoning. 相似文献
956.
Young children spend a large portion of their time pretending about non‐real situations. Why? We answer this question by using the framework of Bayesian causal models to argue that pretending and counterfactual reasoning engage the same component cognitive abilities: disengaging with current reality, making inferences about an alternative representation of reality, and keeping this representation separate from reality. In turn, according to causal models accounts, counterfactual reasoning is a crucial tool that children need to plan for the future and learn about the world. Both planning with causal models and learning about them require the ability to create false premises and generate conclusions from these premises. We argue that pretending allows children to practice these important cognitive skills. We also consider the prevalence of unrealistic scenarios in children's play and explain how they can be useful in learning, despite appearances to the contrary. 相似文献
957.
Heather C. Lench Darren Domsky Rachel Smallman Kathleen E. Darbor 《British journal of psychology (London, England : 1953)》2015,106(2):272-287
Belief in moral luck is represented in judgements that offenders should be held accountable for intent to cause harm as well as whether or not harm occurred. Scores on a measure of moral luck beliefs predicted judgements of offenders who varied in intent and the outcomes of their actions, although judgements overall were not consistent with abstract beliefs in moral luck. Prompting participants to consider alternative outcomes, particularly worse outcomes, reduced moral luck beliefs. Findings suggest that some people believe that offenders should be punished based on the outcome of their actions. Furthermore, prompting counterfactuals decreased judgements consistent with moral luck beliefs. The results have implications for theories of moral judgement as well as legal decision making. 相似文献
958.
David Horst 《European Journal of Philosophy》2017,25(1):47-67
An enkratic agent is someone who intends to do A because she believes she should do A. Being enkratic is usually understood as something rationality requires of you. However, we must distinguish between different conceptions of enkratic rationality. According to a fairly common view, enkratic rationality is solely a normative requirement on agency: it tells us how agents should think and act. However, I shall argue that this normativist conception of enkratic rationality faces serious difficulties: it makes it a mystery how an agent's thinking and acting can be guided by the enkratic requirement, which, as I shall further argue, is something that an adequate conception of enkratic rationality must be able to explain. This, I suggest, motivates exploring a different account of enkratic rationality. On this view, enkratic rationality is primarily a constitutive requirement on agency: it is a standard internal to agency, i.e., a standard that partly spells out what it is to exercise one's agential powers well. 相似文献
959.
960.
Abraham A Werning M Rakoczy H von Cramon DY Schubotz RI 《Consciousness and cognition》2008,17(2):438-Consciousness
Mental state reasoning or theory-of-mind has been the subject of a rich body of imaging research. Although such investigations routinely tap a common set of regions, the precise function of each area remains a contentious matter. With the help of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we sought to determine which areas are involved when processing mental state or intentional metarepresentations by focusing on the relational aspect of such representations. Using non-intentional relational representations such as spatial relations between persons and between objects as a contrast, the results ascertained the involvement of the precuneus, the temporal poles, and the medial prefrontal cortex in the processing of intentional representations. In contrast, the anterior superior temporal sulcus and the left temporo-parietal junction were implicated when processing representations that refer to the presence of persons in relational contexts in general. The right temporo-parietal junction, however, was specifically activated for persons entering spatial relations. The level of representational complexity, a previously unexplored factor, was also found to modulate the neural response in some brain regions, such as the medial prefrontal cortex and the right temporo-parietal junction. These findings highlight the need to take into account the critical roles played by an extensive network of neural regions during mental state reasoning. 相似文献