The Effects of Personal Agency on Regret

In this paper, we examine the role of personal agency as a key antecedent of regret that individuals experience when the outcome of their decision is unfavorable. In contrast to previous research that documents its exacerbating role, we find that personal agency mitigates regret under certain circumstances. A series of experimental studies show that personal responsibility for the decision may attenuate subjective perceptions of the extent of failure and mitigate regret. However, when the superior outcome of the foregone option is known and the failure of the chosen option is irreversible, personal agency may amplify regret. We also find that subjective failure perceptions mediate the relationship between personal agency and regret levels. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

自尊与模糊决策中的决策偏好

从自尊的角度出发,与是否需要承担决策结果的责任相结合,探讨了低自尊、中等自尊和高自尊水平下的被试在模糊决策中的决策偏好。结果发现：角色差异对决策偏好没有影响;自尊水平的高低对决策偏好有影响,高自尊被试与中等、低自尊被试相比,更容易模糊规避。支持了高自尊个体比低自尊个体更具有防御反应的理论。     

Regret Causes Ego-Depletion and Finding Benefits in the Regrettable Events Alleviates Ego-Depletion

ABSTRACT. This study tested the hypotheses that experiencing regret would result in ego-depletion, while finding benefits (i.e., “silver linings”) in the regret-eliciting events counteracted the ego-depletion effect. Using a modified gambling paradigm (Experiments 1, 2, and 4) and a retrospective method (Experiments 3 and 5), five experiments were conducted to induce regret. Results revealed that experiencing regret undermined performance on subsequent tasks, including a paper-and-pencil calculation task (Experiment 1), a Stroop task (Experiment 2), and a mental arithmetic task (Experiment 3). Furthermore, finding benefits in the regret-eliciting events improved subsequent performance (Experiments 4 and 5), and this improvement was mediated by participants’ perceived vitality (Experiment 4). This study extended the depletion model of self-regulation by considering emotions with self-conscious components (in our case, regret). Moreover, it provided a comprehensive understanding of how people felt and performed after experiencing regret and after finding benefits in the events that caused the regret.     

Morally,We Should Prefer to Exist: A Response to Smilansky

In a recent article [AJP, 2013], Saul Smilansky argues that our own existence is regrettable and that we should prefer not to have existed at all. I show why Smilansky's argument is fallacious, if we understand terms like ‘regrettable’ and ‘prefer’ in a straightforward non-deviant way.     

The transience of constructed preferences

A large body of research suggests that preferences are constructed rather than merely accessed in the course of making decisions. The current research examines the stability of constructed preferences over time. Preferences for various factors relevant to a job choice were measured prior to presentation of the job‐choice task, at the point of decision, and again following a delay. It was found that relative to baseline pre‐decision levels, preferences shifted to provide stronger support for the emerging decision. Preference changes proved to be transient, receding to baseline after 1 week (Experiment 1), and even within 15 minutes (Experiment 2). These findings, which can be interpreted in terms of decision‐making by constraint satisfaction, suggest that preferences are constructed to serve the decision at hand, without constraining the decision maker in future decisions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

作为效应的象征性与利益性影响因素:后悔理论的经济心理学分析

在许多有关后悔的研究中,作为效应是一个研究的热点.一些研究结果发现面对坏结果,作为之后产生的后悔程度大于不作为(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Landman, 1987).但是以往的研究很少考虑到具体的情境因素.本研究考察被试在象征性和利益性的情境中的行为选择以及后悔程度是否存在着差异.结果发现在象征性的情境中,被试倾向于选择作为(65.6%),而在利益性的情境中,被试则倾向于选择不作为(72.0%, χ2= 36.230, p= .000).由此可见,作为效应的产生具有一定的情境性.     

The impact of past behaviour normality on regret: replication and extension of three experiments of the exceptionality effect

Norm theory (Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives. Psychological Review, 93, 136–153) described a tendency for people to associate stronger regret with a negative outcome when it is a result of an exception (abnormal behaviour) compared to when it is a result of routine (normal behaviour). In two pre-registered studies, we conducted a replication and extension of three classic experiments on past behaviour exception/routine contrasts (N?=?684). We successfully replicated Kahneman and Miller’s (1986) experiments with the classic hitchhiker-scenario (Part 1) and car accident-scenario (Part 2). In both cases, participants examined negative outcomes and tended to indicate a protagonist who deviated from own past behaviour as more regretful than another who followed routine. Pre-registered extensions also showed effects for ratings of social norms, negative affect, and perceived luck. We did not find support for the Miller, D. T., and McFarland, C. [(1986). Counterfactual thinking and victim compensation: A test of norm theory. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 12, 513–519] experiment robbery scenario (Part 3) using a compensation measure, in that compensation to a victim of a robbery was not significantly different comparing exceptional and routine circumstances. However, a pre-registered extension showed that robbery under exceptional circumstances was perceived as more regretful than robbery under routine circumstances. We discuss implications for current and future research.     

决策理由、行动和后果对决策后悔的影响

探讨决策理由(合理与不合理)、行动(做与不做)和后果(严重与轻微)对决策后悔的影响,以2×2×2被试内设计,设置8个决策情境进行实验。结果:不合理决策的后悔体验比合理决策更高,严重的后果导致的后悔比轻微的后果更高,行动无主效应,但在后果轻微,理由不正当条件下,行动也就是“做”导致更多的后悔情绪。结论:决策理由的合理性与后果的严重性是影响决策后悔的重要因素; 只有理由不正当且后果轻微时,才存在“做效应”。     

Hypothetical Retrospection

Moral theory has mostly focused on idealized situations in which the morally relevant properties of human actions can be known beforehand. Here, a framework is proposed that is intended to sharpen moral intuitions and improve moral argumentation in problems involving risk and uncertainty. Guidelines are proposed for a systematic search of suitable future viewpoints for hypothetical retrospection. In hypothetical retrospection, a decision is evaluated under the assumption that one of the branches of possible future developments has materialized. This evaluation is based on the deliberator’s present values, and each decision is judged in relation to the information available when it was taken. The basic decision rule is to choose an alternative that comes out as morally acceptable (permissible) from all hypothetical retrospections.