Ranking Theory and Conditional Reasoning

Ranking theory is a formal epistemology that has been developed in over 600 pages in Spohn's recent book The Laws of Belief, which aims to provide a normative account of the dynamics of beliefs that presents an alternative to current probabilistic approaches. It has long been received in the AI community, but it has not yet found application in experimental psychology. The purpose of this paper is to derive clear, quantitative predictions by exploiting a parallel between ranking theory and a statistical model called logistic regression. This approach is illustrated by the development of a model for the conditional inference task using Spohn's (2013) ranking theoretic approach to conditionals.     

When will is not the same as should: The role of modals in reasoning with legal conditionals

Naïve reasoners reject logically valid conclusions from conditional rules if they can think of exceptions in which the antecedent is true, but the consequent is not. However, when reasoning with legal conditionals (e.g., “If a person kills another human, then this person should be punished for manslaughter”) people hardly consider exceptions but evaluate conclusions depending on their own sense of justice. We show that participants’ reluctance to consider exceptions in legal reasoning depends on the modal auxiliary used. In two experiments we phrased legal conditionals either with the modal “should” (i.e., “ . . . then this person should be punished”), or with “will” (i.e., “ . . . then this person will be punished”) and presented them as modus ponens or modus tollens inferences. Participants had to decide whether the offender should or will be punished (modus ponens) or whether the offender indeed committed the offence (modus tollens). For modus ponens inferences phrased with “should” we replicate previous findings showing that participants select conclusions on the basis of their own sense of justice (Experiments 1 and 2). Yet, when the legal conditional is phrased with the modal “will” this effect is attenuated (Experiments 1 and 2), and exceptions are considered (Experiment 1). The modal auxiliary did not affect modus tollens inferences.     

Considering too few alternatives: The mental model theory of extensional reasoning

When solving a simple probabilistic problem, people tend to build an incomplete mental representation. We observe this pattern in responses to probabilistic problems over a set of premises using the conjunction, disjunction, and conditional propositional connectives. The mental model theory of extensional reasoning explains this bias towards underestimating the number of possibilities: In reckoning with different interpretations of the premises (logical rules, mental model theoretical, and, specific to conditional premises, conjunction and biconditional interpretation) the mental model theory accounts for the majority of observations. Different interpretations of a premise result in a build-up of mental models that are often incomplete. These mental models are processed using either an extensional strategy relying on proportions amongst models, or a conflict monitoring strategy. The consequence of considering too few possibilities is an erroneous probability estimate akin to that faced by decision makers who fail to generate and consider all alternatives, a characteristic of bounded rationality. We compare our results to the results published by Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, and Caverni [Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 62 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]–88 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. doi:10 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].1037 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]/0033 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]-295X Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].106 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].1 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].62 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]], and we observe lower performance levels than those in the original article.     

Explanation,updating, and accuracy

There is evidence that people update their credences partly on the basis of explanatory considerations. Philosophers have recently argued that to minimise the inaccuracy of their credences, people's updates also ought to be partly based on such considerations. However, there are many ways in which explanatory considerations can factor into updating, not all of which minimise inaccuracy. It is an open question whether in their updating, people take explanatory considerations into account in a way that philosophers would deem recommendable. To address this question, we re-analyse data from an experiment reported in Douven and Schupbach, “The role of explanatory considerations in updating” (Cognition, 2015).     

材料模式与认知负荷对小学生类比学习的影响

探讨学习材料不同模式和学习过程不同的认知负荷对小学生类比推理学习迁移的影响.包括两个分实验.实验1探讨学习材料的不同组织模式对小学生类比推理学习迁移的影响,两组小学生分别学习模式化与非模式化的材料,然后完成迁移程度远近不同的四类测题.结果表明,非模式化条件下完成远迁移题目的成绩显著优于模式化条件下的成绩.实验2探讨小学生在不同认知负荷条件下类比推理学习的迁移效果,两组小学生分别在高认知负荷与低认知负荷情况下学习类比推理的材料,然后完成上述四类测题.结果表明,高认知负荷条件下完成远迁移题目的成绩显著优于低认知负荷条件下的成绩.本实验结果表明,对于小学生类比推理的学习来说,非模式化、高负荷的学习更有利于促进迁移,支持了积极反应理论.     

Mass Response to the Lewinsky Scandal: Motivated Reasoning or BayesianUpdating?

This study attempts to account for the vastly different trajectories taken by mass andelite opinion in the wake of the Lewinsky affair. Data from a panel study, collected before andjust after the scandal broke, suggest that Clinton's prior popularity indelibly colored massresponse to the scandal, thereby constraining citizens' reactions. As would be predicted bytheories of "motivated reasoning," the influence of various considerations (like thecredibility and importance of the allegations) on reactions to the scandal was conditional uponprior affect for the president. Such findings are difficult to accommodate within the more rational"Bayesian updating" perspective. These data shed light on mass response to theLewinsky scandal in particular and citizen reaction to presidential behavior more generally, aswell as on the cognitive mechanisms that facilitate motivated reasoning in candidate evaluation.     

3～5岁幼儿反事实思维的发展研究

该研究采用结果和前提反事实推理任务,选取58名3-5岁幼儿为被试,考察了其反事实思维能力的发展。结果表明:1.3岁儿童在结果反事实推理中的得分显著低于4岁和5岁儿童,而4岁和5岁儿童的得分并不存在显著差异;2.幼儿的前提反事实推理因结构和方向不同而表现出不同的年龄变化趋势;3.幼儿产生的上行和下行反事实论断之间不存在显著差异。如成人一样,幼儿较少产生减法反事实。     

大学生的认知风格与逻辑推理的关系

以大学生为被试,探讨认知风格与逻辑推理的关系。结果表明：（1）在三段论推理中,场依存型学生和场独立型学生推理成绩不存在显著差异,学过和未学过逻辑学的学生推理成绩也不存在显著差异,但男生和女生推理成绩差异显著,女生比男生更易受“气氛”的影响。（2）在命题推理中,对抽象材料构成的命题,场独立型学生和场依存型学生的推理存在显著差异,场独立型学生表现出更强的证伪倾向,场依存型学生表现出更强的换位倾向;对具体材料构成的命题,场独立型学生和场依存型学生的推理不存在显著差异。     

文本阅读中回指推理发生的整合性因素

探讨回指距离、干扰词的精细描述、干扰词的典型性 对回指推理（先行词通达）的影响。包括2个实验,被试是华南师范大学一二年级本科生164名。采用移动窗口技术,要求被试阅读一定篇数（如,实验1a每个被试阅读15篇）的文章,对不同条件的探测词的反应时进行统计。实验1探讨干扰词精细描述类型（精细描述高和精细描述低）对回指推理的影响。结果表明,干扰的精细描述并非是影响回指推理的主要因素。实验2探讨干扰词和先行词的典型性类型的相对变化对回指推理的影响。结果表明高典型干扰在不同回指距离条件下都会对回指推理产生影响。本研究结果初步证明在影响回指推理的干扰典型性和干扰精细描述的二个因素中,起主要作用的是干扰的典型性     

工作－家庭冲突的前因、后果及干预策略

随着劳动力结构与工作特点的巨大变化,工作－家庭冲突问题日益突出。国内外研究主要从工作、家庭与个体三个层面对工作－家庭冲突的前因变量、后果变量及干预策略进行了深入探讨。前因变量主要包括工作与家庭层面的压力、特点,性别等;后果变量主要涉及个体的工作家庭满意感、组织承诺、离职和心身健康;干预策略涉及家庭友好政策和个体应对方式等。作者认为今后研究可以在工作－家庭冲突积极面、跨文化研究等方面进行突破