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541.
Garry Sparks 《The Journal of religious ethics》2018,46(1):88-123
Toward the end of the twentieth century, Highland Maya intellectuals and activists in Guatemala began to argue for the recognition of indigenous customary law, rooted in traditional Maya moral and ritual discourse. Such law is often in tension with the Western notion of rights (grounded in the idea of universal reason) that undergirds national and international treatises regarding indigenous peoples. This essay identifies three distinct but mutually engaged pairs of moral concepts—hot/cold, left/right (or positive/negative), and favorable/not favorable—articulated through K'iche' Maya quotidian and ceremonial practices and speech. It also identifies the extent to which they do not necessarily align with Western (Abrahamic and religious) notions of good and bad. These three pairs of moral terms, specifically as conserved through the high‐register of Maya discourse used by traditional ceremonial specialists, illustrate a normative means by which Highland Maya discern understandings of justice, and ground their advocacy for restorative (rather than retributive or punitive) justice. 相似文献
542.
543.
MARGARET URBAN WALKER 《Metaphilosophy》2010,41(4):525-545
Abstract: International instruments now defend a “right to the truth” for victims of political repression and violence and include truth telling about human rights violations as a kind of reparation as well as a form of redress. While truth telling about violations is obviously a condition of redress or repair for violations, it may not be clear how truth telling itself is a kind of reparations. By showing that concerted truth telling can satisfy four features of suitable reparations vehicles, I defend the idea that politically implemented modes of truth telling to, for, and by those who are victims of gross violation and injustice may with good reason be counted as a kind of reparations. Understanding the doubly symbolic character of reparations, however, makes clearer why truth telling is unlikely to be sufficient reparation for serious wrongs and is likely to be sensitive to the larger context of reparative activity and its social, political, and historical background. 相似文献
544.
A number of theorists have tried to resolve the tension between a western-oriented liberal scheme of human rights and an account
that accommodates different political systems and constitutional ideals than the liberal one. One important way the tension
has been addressed is through a “neutral” or tolerant, notion of human rights, as present in the work of Rawls, Scanlon and
Buchanan. In this paper I argue that neutrality cannot by itself explain the difference between rights considered appropriate
for liberal states and rights considered to be human rights proper. The central arguments used by neutralist theorists presuppose,
rather than justify, this differential treatment. Instead, that difference can be understood only by reference to the purpose
of human rights as distinct from the constitutional rights of a liberal state. This requires us to reassess the point and
purpose of a theory of international justice, in contrast to justice for a domestic and politically separate society. In the
case of a theorist like Rawls, human rights represent guides to the foreign policy of a liberal state, rather than to principles by which all states are expected to abide. That is because of Rawls’ acceptance
that no common, authoritative, third-party, institutions capable of imposing duties on all agents uniformly exist or can exist.
This also makes his theory inherently conservative about human rights, given that they are simply to act as a guide to which
states can be treated as legitimate when it comes to liberal foreign policy: those that possess institutions that can be said
to represent a peoples, rather than being imposed through violence. This standard is lower than the ideal set of rights extended to all
in a liberal society.
This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
545.
Jake Earl 《The American journal of bioethics : AJOB》2019,19(6):7-18
Innovative practice occurs when a clinician provides something new, untested, or nonstandard to a patient in the course of clinical care, rather than as part of a research study. Commentators have noted that patients engaged in innovative practice are at significant risk of suffering harm, exploitation, or autonomy violations. By creating a pathway for harmful or nonbeneficial interventions to spread within medical practice without being subjected to rigorous scientific evaluation, innovative practice poses similar risks to the wider community of patients and society as a whole. Given these concerns, how should we control and oversee innovative practice, and in particular, how should we coordinate innovative practice and clinical research? In this article, I argue that an ethical approach overseeing innovative practice must encourage the early transition to rigorous clinical research without delaying or deferring the development of beneficial innovations or violating the autonomy rights of clinicians and their patients. 相似文献
546.
Paul Weithman 《The Journal of religious ethics》2009,37(2):179-192
This introduction sets the stage for four papers on Nicholas Wolterstorff's Justice: Rights and Wrongs , written by Harold Attridge, Oliver O'Donovan, Richard Bernstein, and myself. In his book, Wolterstorff defends an account of human rights. The first section of this introduction distinguishes Wolterstorff's account of rights from the alternative account of rights against which he contends. The alternative account draws much of its power from a historical narrative according to which theory and politics supplanted earlier ways of thinking about justice. The second section sketches that narrative and Wolterstorff's counter-narrative. The third section draws together the main points of Wolterstorff's own account. 相似文献
547.
Bharat Ranganathan 《The Journal of religious ethics》2014,42(4):770-775
What are “human rights” supposed to protect? According to most human rights doctrines, including most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), human rights aim to protect “human dignity.” But what this concept amounts to and what its source is remain unclear. According to Glenn Hughes (2011), human rights theorists ought to consider human dignity as an “intrinsically heuristic concept,” whose content is partially understood but is not fully determined. In this comment, I criticize Hughes's account. On my view, understanding inherent human dignity as an intrinsically heuristic concept tethers it to an “indeterminateness of sense,” which leaves it open to exploitation from theorists unsympathetic to the moral salience of rights and what rights are supposed to protect. 相似文献
548.
Letter: Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World's Religions
Commenting on "Leaping into the Boundless: A Daoist Reading of Comparative Religious Ethics" by Francisca Cho, "Moral Reason, Risk, and Comparative Inquiry" by Robin W. Lovin, "Heuristic Power as the Test of Theory" by Ronald M. Green, and "The Author Replies" by Francisca Cho 相似文献
Commenting on "Leaping into the Boundless: A Daoist Reading of Comparative Religious Ethics" by Francisca Cho, "Moral Reason, Risk, and Comparative Inquiry" by Robin W. Lovin, "Heuristic Power as the Test of Theory" by Ronald M. Green, and "The Author Replies" by Francisca Cho 相似文献
549.
Oliver O'Donovan 《The Journal of religious ethics》2009,37(2):193-207
The historical problem about the origins of the language of rights derives its importance from the conceptual problem: of “two fundamentally different ways of thinking about justice,” which is basic? Is justice unitary or plural? This in turn opens up a problem about the moral status of human nature. A narrative of the origins of “rights” is an account of how and when a plural concept of justice comes to the fore, and will be based on the occurrence of definite speech‐forms—the occurrence of the plural noun in the sense of “legal properties.” The history of this development is currently held to begin with the twelfth‐century canonists. Later significant thresholds may be found in the fourteenth, sixteenth, and eighteenth centuries. Wolterstorff's attempt to find the implicit recognition of rights in the Scriptures depends very heavily on what he takes to be implied rather than on what is stated, and at best can establish a pre‐history of rights‐language. 相似文献
550.
Glenn Hughes 《The Journal of religious ethics》2014,42(4):776-782
This essay responds to Bharat Ranganathan's “Comment” on my essay, “The Concept of Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (2011). Addressing key criticisms in this “Comment,” I make the following points. First, neither the idea of inherent dignity being “imparted” to humans, nor the Universal Declaration's implication—through its use of terms such as “inherent” and “inalienable”—that humans participate in transcendent reality, necessarily presuppose a Christian metaphysics. Second, a concept such as “inherent dignity” must be affirmed to be intrinsically heuristic unless we are to assume that its meaning can be completely known within the conditions of existence; but this affirmation does not render such concepts “indeterminate of sense.” Finally, Ranganathan's distinction between“weak” and “strong” senses of transcendence is untenable. If human truths beyond all contingencies are knowable (“weak” transcendence), then there must be a real dimension of meaning that transcends all contingencies (“strong” transcendence). 相似文献