论权利与义务的关系

权利与义务的关系可以归结为两种相关性。一种是一个人的权利与他人的义务的关系:一个人的权利,必然是他人的义务;反之亦然。这是一个人的权利与他人的义务的必然的、客观的、事实如何的关系,亦即所谓“权利与义务的逻辑相关性”。另一种则是基于这种逻辑相关性的“权利义务道德相关性”,亦即一个人的权利应该是对他自己的义务的交换:一个人所享有的权利应该等于他所负有的义务;而他所行使的权利则应该至多等于他所履行的义务。     

Trauma, forgiveness and the witnessing dance: making public spaces intimate

In this paper I explore the concept of forgiveness as a response to gross human rights violations. I present a conceptual examination of the effects of massive trauma in relation to what I refer to as the 'unfinished business' of trauma. Using a psychoanalytic framework, I consider the process of 'bearing witness' about trauma and examine how this process opens up the possibility of reciprocal expressions of empathy between victim and perpetrator. I then argue that, in this context of trauma testimony and witnessing, empathy is essential for the development of remorse on the part of perpetrators, and of forgiveness on the part of victims. Using a case study from South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) I clarify the relationship between empathy and forgiveness, and show how the restorative model of the TRC can open up an ethical space and create the possibility of transformation for victims, perpetrators and bystanders. In my conclusion I suggest that forgiveness in politics is the only action that holds promise for the repair of brokenness in post-conflict societies, particularly if, as in South Africa, victims have to live together with perpetrators and beneficiaries in the same country.     

Equality of Education and Citizenship: Challenges of European Integration

What kind of equality among Europeans does equal citizenship require, especially regarding education? In particular, is there good reason to insist of equality of education among Europeans—and if so, equality of what? To what extent should the same knowledge base and citizenship norms be taught across state borders and religious and other normative divides? At least three philosophical issues merit attention: (a) The requirements of multiple democratic citizenships beyond the nation state; (b) how to respect diversity while securing such equality and inculcating commitments to justice and norms of citizenship, and (c) The multiple reasons for equality of various kinds among political equals living in a Union as compared to a unitary state. The article responds on the basis of several arguments in favour of certain kinds of equality. All Union citizens must enjoy a high minimum level of education, and all pupils must be informed concerning the various ways of life prevalent in Europe. Furthermore, there must be standards for securing equality of opportunity across the EU, though it is difficult to measure under multiculturalism. Citizens must also be socialised to certain ‘citizenship norms’. This shared basis to be taught in schools should avoid contested religious or philosophical premises as far as possible. Yet the school system should socialise pupils to three commitments: to the just domestic and European institutions and hence the legislation they engender, to principles that justify these institutions; and to a political theory that grounds these principles in a conception of the proper role of individuals, of member states and of the Union. I also argue that equality of result is not a plausible normative requirement among Europeans, while equality of opportunity is. The paper concludes with some comments on the lessons to be drawn for ‘Global’ citizenship.     

Persons,animals, and identity

The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of animalist accounts. Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via brain transplants or cerebrum transplants are committed to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. This counterintuitiveness can be defused by holding that a person is biological animal (on neo-Lockean views) if the “is” is the “is” of constitution rather than the “is” of identity, and that a person is identical with an animal in a sense of “animal” different from that which requires the persistence conditions of animals to be biological. Another challenge is the “too many minds problem”: if persons and their coincident biological animals share the same physical properties, and mental properties supervene on physical properties, the biological animal will share the mental properties of the person, and so should itself be a person. The response to this invokes a distinction between “thin” properties, which are shared by coincident entities, and “thick” properties which are not so shared. Mental properties, and their physical realizers, are thick, not thin, so are not properties persons share with their bodies or biological animals. The paper rebuts the objection that neo-Lockean accounts cannot explain how persons can have physical properties. To meet a further problem it is argued that the biological properties of persons and those of biological animals are different because of differences in their causal profiles.     

Selective antiaggressive effect of an alpha-2 adrenoceptor agonist naphthylmedetomidine in mice

Alpha-2 adrenoceptors (alpha(2)-ARs) are critically involved in regulating neurotransmitter release from sympathetic nerves and neurons and play an important role in the regulation of awareness, arousal and vigilance. In our recent study, dexmedetomidine, a full alpha(2)-AR agonist, produced antiaggressive effects in the social conflict test in mice at doses that were twice smaller than those producing sedation. The aim of this study was to ascertain antiaggressive effect of a novel drug naphthylmedetomidine, with a more selective alpha(2)-AR activity. Behavioral effects of naphthylmedetomidine (150-1200 microg/kg i.p.) were studied in the activity cage and in the social conflict tests in mice. Naphthylmedetomidine dose dependently decreased aggressive behavior during social conflict in aggressive mice with significant reduction already at the lowest doses tested (150 microg/kg), whereas locomotion and social investigation were significantly decreased only after four times bigger dose of naphthylmedetomidine (600 microg/kg) in aggressive mice. Naphthylmedetomidine had no effect on aggression in nonaggressive mice. Naphthylmedetomidine reduced locomotion in the activity cage significantly only at the highest doses tested (600 and 1200 microg/kg), and this effect was only partially reversed by administration of high doses of an alpha-2 antagonist atipamezole (3 and 10 mg/kg). In nonaggressive mice, the difference between the dose reducing dominant social behavior (social investigation) and locomotion (150 and 300 microg/kg, respectively) was smaller than in aggressive mice. In conclusion, naphthylmedetomidine showed a very strong and selective antiaggressive effect in aggressive mice, which was devoid of locomotion-inhibiting/sedative effect. This study suggests that naphthylmedetomidine may have clinical potential as antiaggressive drug.     

A BIOLOGIST'S PERSPECTIVE ON THE FUTURE OF THE SCIENCE‐RELIGION DIALOGUE IN THE TWENTY‐FIRST CENTURY

In recent issues of Zygon, numerous reflections have been published commenting on where the field of science‐and‐religion has been, where it presently stands, and where it should move in the future. These reflections touch on the importance of the dialogue and raise questions as to what audience the dialogue addresses and whom it should address. Some scholars see the dialogue as prospering, while others point out that much work needs to be done to make the dialogue more accessible to a larger audience and more successful at tackling the provocative questions before us. Other academics view the questions themselves as needing further consideration and focus before answers to them can even be explored. In this article I provide a general overview of these essays by outlining some general categories of thought that seem to emerge from the contributors. I then present some of my own opinions concerning the future of the science‐religion field and emphasize that the dialogue, in addition to its traditional roles, must further the philosophical framework that can aid humanity in resolving the most pressing global concerns of our time.     

Children’s spiritual development in forced displacement: a human rights perspective

This article provides a synthesis of current research and theories of spiritual development in forced displacement from a human rights perspective. Spirituality, understood as a cognitive‐cultural construct, has shown positive impact on children’s development through both collective and individual processes and across ecological domains of the physical world, the community and the individual child. Findings support a human rights framework of spiritual development that privileges the child’s and the community’s own understandings of human development, and this framework may further serve as an important resource for scaffolding refugee children’s development. The study of spiritual development will enable more effective human rights protection of child development in situations of war and forced displacement.     

The Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts

The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalism—moral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns a higher moral status to the great apes than to all severely disabled human infants with less rational capacities than the great apes. Anthropocentrism—moral status depends on membership in the human species—falsely grants all humans a higher moral status than the great apes. Animalism—moral status is dependent on the ability to suffer—mistakenly equates the moral status of humans and most animals. (2) The concept person is widely used for justificatory purposes, but it seems that it cannot play such a role. It seems that it is either redundant or unable to play any justificatory role. I argue that we can solve the second problem by understanding person as a thick evaluative concept. This then enables us to justify assigning a higher moral status to the great apes than to simple animals: the great apes are persons. To solve the first problem, I argue that certain severely disabled infants have a higher moral status than the great apes because they are dependent upon human relationships for their well-being. Only very limited abilities are required for such relationships, and the question who is capable of them must be based on thick evaluative concepts. Thus, it turns out that to make progress in bioethics we must assign thick evaluative concepts a central role.

精神分裂症的潜伏抑制动物模型

精神分裂症动物模型的建立,是当前研究精神分裂症的神经生物学机制以及开发新的抗精神病药物的一个重要课题。文章系统地阐述了以潜伏抑制为行为模式的精神分裂症动物模型的理论以及神经机制,并重点介绍了精神分裂症的潜伏抑制动物模型的建立方法,包括（1）调节某些与精神分裂症相关的中枢神经递质的传递活动;（2）对与精神分裂症有关的中脑-伏隔核神经环路进行结构损伤或药物性干预;（3）在发育早期给予免疫刺激或环境应激     

Animals and the Image of God in the Bible and Beyond

Abstract :  This article examines theological thought pertaining to the imago Dei doctrine in light of its relation to non-human animals within the framework of biblical, intertestamental Jewish, and early Christian writings. Evaluating theological understandings of human nature as they relate to and interact with theological and philosophical understandings of animals and animal nature, the author finds that the understandings of the image of God and dominion as they are ideally conceived in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures are significantly more closely related to the ideas of human-animal continuity, compassion, and responsibility than to human rationality or the human immaterial immortal soul (and the entailed implication of animals' lack thereof).