人的所有制与人权概念

人的所有制是被用来从总体上表明一个人类共同体内部各成员之间占有关系的一种社会制度或社会关系;人的所有制是人类社会最基本的经济制度,它是区别和划分人类历史上各种不同经济形态的根本标志,是一个比生产资料所有制更为重要和更为基本的社会所有制的存在形式;人权概念是一个先后为在相关人类共同体中分别建立和维持人的公民所有制、劳动力的公民所有制、公民所有制的劳动者人身所有制、人格的公民平等、人的个人所有制、劳动力的个人所有制、个人所有制的劳动者人身所有制、婚权的个人所有制和使包括所有成年女性在内的所有社会成年成员享有人格的人类平等、劳动力的部分社会所有制等社会制度而被提出来的哲学概念、法律概念和政治概念。     

Rethinking Accountability in the Context of Human Rights

Within liberal democratic theory, ‘democratic accountability’ denotes an aggregative method for linking political decisions to citizens’ preferences through representative institutions. Could such a notion be transferred to the global context of human rights? Various obstacles seem to block such a transfer: there are no ‘world citizens’ as such; many people in need of human rights are not citizens of constitutional democratic states; and the aggregative methods that are supposed to sustain the link are often used in favour of nation-state strategic action rather than human rights. So what could accountability mean in relation to human rights? This article argues that discourse theory offers resources for approaching these problems and for rethinking a normative notion of accountability in relation to human rights. It is suggested that accountability should link political decisions to universal agreements through global rights institutions and that the link should be sustained by deliberative rather than aggregative procedures.     

On the Fulfillment of Moral Obligation

This paper considers three general views about the nature of moral obligation and three particular answers (with which these views are typically associated) concerning the following question: if on Monday you lend me a book that I promise to return to you by Friday, what precisely is my obligation to you and what constitutes its fulfillment? The example is borrowed from W.D. Ross, who in The Right and the Good proposed what he called the Objective View of obligation, from which he inferred what is here called the First Answer to the question. In Foundations of Ethics Ross repudiated the Objective View in favor of the Subjective View, from which he inferred a Second Answer. In this paper each of the Objective and Subjective Views and the First and Second Answers are rejected in favor of the Prospective View and a Third Answer. The implications of the Prospective View for another question closely related to the original question are then investigated: what precisely is your right regarding my returning the book and what constitutes its satisfaction?     

如何评价哮喘动物模型

鉴于人体研究的局限性,动物模型在哮喘研究中起了无可替代的作用。尤其在阐明哮喘的病理生理和免疫学机制方面,动物研究可以给我们提供人体研究难以得到的结果。但是,由于人类与动物之间存在的差别,动物模型的研究结果应用于人类时还需要进一步评估。本文将对哮喘动物模型在哮喘研究中的作用及其局限性作一介绍。     

Human rights and applied psychology

Applied and community psychology necessarily involves the consideration of human rights issues. The problems experienced by many of the clients of applied psychologists result from human rights abuses, the provisions of the Human Rights Act (1998) relate to the everyday practice of applied and community psychologists, and psychologists have a distinctive perspective on human rights. For psychologists, human rights reflect formalized systems for ensuring that people's basic needs are satisfied. Declarations of human rights and legal provisions therefore represent, for psychologists, codifications of how we collectively understand our relationships and social obligations. It is therefore argued that psychologists should positively advocate for the application of psychological science to these issues. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Animal Rights and Animal Experiments: An Interest-Based Approach

This paper examines whether non-human animals have a moral right not to be experimented upon. It adopts a Razian conception of rights, whereby an individual possesses a right if an interest of that individual is sufficient to impose a duty on another. To ascertain whether animals have a right not to be experimented on, three interests are examined which might found such a right: the interest in not suffering, the interest in staying alive, and the interest in being free. It is argued that while the first two of these interests are sufficient to ground animal rights against being killed and made to suffer by experiments, the interest in freedom does not ground a general animal right not to be used in experimentation. Winner of the second annual Res Publica Postgraduate Essay Prize, 2006.     

Animal Mind: Science,Philosophy, and Ethics

Although 20^th-century empiricists were agnostic about animal mind and consciousness, this was not the case for their historical ancestors – John Locke, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and, of course, Charles Darwin and George John Romanes. Given the dominance of the Darwinian paradigm of evolutionary continuity, one would not expect belief in animal mind to disappear. That it did demonstrates that standard accounts of how scientific hypotheses are overturned – i.e., by empirical disconfirmation or by exposure of logical flaws – is inadequate. In fact, it can be demonstrated that belief in animal mind disappeared as a result of a change of values, a mechanism also apparent in the Scientific Revolution. The “valuational revolution” responsible for denying animal mind is examined in terms of the rise of Behaviorism and its flawed account of the historical inevitability of denying animal mentation. The effects of the denial of animal consciousness included profound moral implications for the major uses of animals in agriculture and scientific research. The latter is particularly notable for the denial of felt pain in animals. The rise of societal moral concern for animals, however, has driven the “reappropriation of common sense” about animal thought and feeling.     

Thinking Without Words: An Overview for Animal Ethics

In Thinking without Words I develop a philosophical framework for treating some animals and human infants as genuine thinkers. This paper outlines the aspects of this account that are most relevant to those working in animal ethics. There is a range of different levels of cognitive sophistication in different animal species, in addition to limits to the types of thought available to non-linguistic creatures, and it may be important for animal ethicists to take this into account in exploring issues of moral significance and the obligations that we might or might not have to non-human animals. I am grateful for comments on an earlier version from Robert Francescotti and Clare Palmer.     

OUR COMMON ENEMY: COMBATTING THE WORLD'S DEADLIEST VIRUSES TO ENSURE EQUITY HEALTH CARE IN DEVELOPING NATIONS

In a previous issue of Zygon (Carvalho 2007), I explored the role of scientists—especially those engaging the science-religion dialogue—within the arena of global equity health, world poverty, and human rights. I contended that experimental biologists, who might have reduced agency because of their professional workload or lack of individual resources, can still unite into collective forces with other scientists as well as human rights organizations, medical doctors, and political and civic leaders to foster progressive change in our world. In this article, I present some recent findings from research on three emerging viruses—HIV, dengue, and rotavirus—to explore the factors that lead to the geographical expansion of these viruses and the increase in frequency of the infectious diseases they cause. I show how these viruses are generating problems for geopolitical stability, human rights, and equity health care for developing nations that are already experiencing a growing poverty crisis. I suggest some avenues of future research for the scientific community for the movement toward resolution of these problems and indicate where the science-religion field can be of additional aid.     

PHILOSOPHERS OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: A TAXONOMY

Abstract: This essay explores various roles that philosophers occupy in relation to intellectual disability. In examining how philosophers define their object of inquiry as experts and gatekeepers, it raises critical questions concerning the nature of philosophical discourse about intellectual disability. It then goes on to consider three alternate positions, the advocate or friend, the animal, and the "intellectually disabled," each of which points to new ways of philosophizing in the face of intellectual disability.