From universal laws of cognition to specific cognitive models

The remarkable successes of the physical sciences have been built on highly general quantitative laws, which serve as the basis for understanding an enormous variety of specific physical systems. How far is it possible to construct universal principles in the cognitive sciences, in terms of which specific aspects of perception, memory, or decision making might be modelled? Following Shepard (e.g., 1987 ), it is argued that some universal principles may be attainable in cognitive science. Here, 2 examples are proposed: the simplicity principle (which states that the cognitive system prefers patterns that provide simpler explanations of available data); and the scale‐invariance principle, which states that many cognitive phenomena are independent of the scale of relevant underlying physical variables, such as time, space, luminance, or sound pressure. This article illustrates how principles may be combined to explain specific cognitive processes by using these principles to derive SIMPLE, a formal model of memory for serial order ( Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007 ), and briefly mentions some extensions to models of identification and categorization. This article also considers the scope and limitations of universal laws in cognitive science.     

UNIQUENESS IN CONTEXT

Wentzel van Huyssteen's Gifford Lectures, published as Alone in the World? Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology, accomplish critical and constructive thinking about interdisciplinary reflection on science and religion and about the meaning of human uniqueness. One approach to discussion of van Huyssteen's text entails consideration of three issues: the contextual character of research on humans and animals, the difficult problem of defining uniqueness, and the important consequences of exploring human uniqueness. Evolutionary biology and primatology contribute specific scientific insights.     

What 50 years of research tell us about pausing under ratio schedules of reinforcement

Textbooks in learning and behavior commonly describe performance on fixed-ratio schedules as “break and run,” indicating that after reinforcement subjects typically pause and then respond quickly to the next reinforcement. Performance on variable-ratio schedules, on the other hand, is described as steady and fast, with few long pauses. Beginning with Ferster and Skinner''s magnum opus, Schedules of Reinforcement (1957), the literature on pausing under ratio schedules has identified the influences on pausing of numerous important variables, in particular ratio size and reinforcement magnitude. As a result, some previously held assumptions have been called into question. For example, research has shown that the length of the pause is controlled not only by the preceding ratio, as Ferster and Skinner and others had assumed (and as implied by the phrase postreinforcement pause), but by the upcoming ratio as well. Similarly, despite the commonly held belief that ratio pausing is unique to the fixed-ratio schedule, there is evidence that pausing also occurs under variable-ratio schedules. If such widely held beliefs are incorrect, then what about other assumptions? This article selectively examines the literature on pausing under ratio schedules over the past 50 years and concludes that although there may indeed be some common patterns, there are also inconsistencies that await future resolution. Several accounts of pausing under ratio schedules are discussed along with the implications of the literature for human performances, most notably the behaviors termed procrastination.     

INCREASING OUR COMPASSION FOOTPRINT: THE ANIMALS' MANIFESTO

Our relationships with animals are wide‐ranging. When people tell me that they love animals and then harm or kill them I tell them I'm glad they don't love me. Many individuals, including scientists, ignore their responsibility when they interact with animals and fail to recognize that doing something in the name of science, which usually means in the name of humans, is not an adequate reason for intentionally causing suffering, pain, or death. “Good welfare” usually is not “good enough”. Existing regulations allow animals to be treated in regrettable ways that demean us as a species. Compassion is the key for bettering both animal and human lives. A good way to make the world a more compassionate place for animals is to increase our compassion footprint. We could begin by deciding that we will not intrude on animals' lives unless our actions are in the best interests of the animals irrespective of our desires. It is simple to make more compassionate choices about what we eat and wear and how we educate students, conduct research, and entertain ourselves at the expense of animals. The time to make these changes is long overdue.     

Stress and Adaptation

ABSTRACT— Animal models have contributed considerably to the current understanding of mechanisms underlying the role of stress in health and disease. Despite the progress made already, much more can be made by more carefully exploiting animals' and humans' shared biology, using ecologically relevant models. This allows a fundamental analysis of factors modulating individual adaptive capacity and hence individual vulnerability to disease. This article highlights an emerging scientific approach that uses a framework of interpretation that is more biologically oriented than previous approaches, to evaluate both the adaptive and maladaptive nature of the stress response in relation to existing environmental demands.     

骨科疾病诊治中的临床思维

医学哲学是对医学科学成就总的概括,并以此为基础探讨生命活动和病程的一般规律,研究医学科学的思维方式,直至疾病预防、诊断治疗。同时研究辩证规律和范畴在医学科学中的表现,从而指导骨科医师解决在骨科疾病诊治中遇到的诸多问题,并有助于形成正确的临床思维。结合临床工作体会,探讨医学哲学在骨科疾病诊治临床思维中的应用。     

森田疗法与认知行为疗法的比较分析

规律是客观的,而规则具有主观性,虽然两者本质上不同,但他们又是相关的。从口腔临床医学规则的制定过程来看,我们不难得出结论:口腔临床医学规则的制定要遵循临床医学的一般规律,突出口腔临床医学的特点,并受到我国经济、文化、政治等因素的影响,且随着这些因素的改变而改变,以适应新的环境条件。     

如何评价哮喘动物模型

鉴于人体研究的局限性,动物模型在哮喘研究中起了无可替代的作用。尤其在阐明哮喘的病理生理和免疫学机制方面,动物研究可以给我们提供人体研究难以得到的结果。但是,由于人类与动物之间存在的差别,动物模型的研究结果应用于人类时还需要进一步评估。本文将对哮喘动物模型在哮喘研究中的作用及其局限性作一介绍。     

Animal Mind: Science,Philosophy, and Ethics

Although 20^th-century empiricists were agnostic about animal mind and consciousness, this was not the case for their historical ancestors – John Locke, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and, of course, Charles Darwin and George John Romanes. Given the dominance of the Darwinian paradigm of evolutionary continuity, one would not expect belief in animal mind to disappear. That it did demonstrates that standard accounts of how scientific hypotheses are overturned – i.e., by empirical disconfirmation or by exposure of logical flaws – is inadequate. In fact, it can be demonstrated that belief in animal mind disappeared as a result of a change of values, a mechanism also apparent in the Scientific Revolution. The “valuational revolution” responsible for denying animal mind is examined in terms of the rise of Behaviorism and its flawed account of the historical inevitability of denying animal mentation. The effects of the denial of animal consciousness included profound moral implications for the major uses of animals in agriculture and scientific research. The latter is particularly notable for the denial of felt pain in animals. The rise of societal moral concern for animals, however, has driven the “reappropriation of common sense” about animal thought and feeling.