Ethics in process perspective

Embedded in the thought of Whitehead is an extremely interesting but relatively neglected ethic which has relevance to current attempts to reflect creatively on the ethical dimension of human existence both in South Africa and the wider world. This paper notes the main features of the context in which such reflection is taking place, and then proceeds to give an account of process ethics. Thereafter it offers a critical discussion whose main conclusion is that process ethics has more to commend it than other approaches to ethics.     

On Some Affinities of Morin’s Complex Thinking with That of Chinese Classic Philosophy

Morin (1921) founded the complex mode of thinking in order to remedy the defects of the Western classic simple mode of thinking. In doing so, he approached to some degree the mode of thinking inherent to the Eastern civilization. This article elucidates that for some principles of Morin's complex thinking, such as correlation of opposites, recursive causality, and union of unity of multiplicity, there were similar ideas in Chinese classic philosophy. This shows that the complex paradigm of thinking, in a certain point of view, will be the fusion of Western and Eastern cultural factors. Besides, in integrating his theory of complexity with the reality of our time to find out solutions to the issues of globalization, Morin has become one of the representative thinkers of the planetary age of humankind.     

Our Cosmos,from Substance to Process

Philosophies of nature over the past three centuries have gone through three distinct phases, beginning with classical views and now evolving into a process view at the dawn of the 21st century. These phases derive from a complex weaving of two frameworks of physics since Newton's time [classical, modern] with two principal metaphysical frameworks[substance, event]. Problematic fin de siècle claims at the end of both the 19th and 20th centuries appear to have a common root in substance metaphysics and part/whole reductionism. Going beyond such simplistic forms of modernism requires a more integrated, ecological worldview, or process view of nature.     

How does knowledge bring one to the state of immortality in early Upaniṣadic philosophy? A new perspective on the ‘Magical’ way of cognition

ABSTRACT

The Upani?adic philosophers believed that acquiring certain knowledge would lead them toward a state of immortality. Merely by obtaining that knowledge, they thought people could surmount the various causes of death of the natural body. How and why did they develop and maintain this belief? To understand this, this article analyzes the difference between our views as modern humans and those of early Upani?adic philosophers, regarding the concepts of knowledge and death. They seem to have believed that knowing a concept meant actualizing that concept in the real world. Therefore, possessing the concept or knowledge of death guaranteed the actualized occurrence of death. This article argues that early Upani?adic philosophers must have thought that replacing the knowledge of death with the true knowledge of immortality would really make people immortal. In other words, to know that one is immortal truly makes one immortal. I also propose a new method of analyzing ancient thoughts.     

Causes,Counterfactuals, and Non-Locality

In order to motivate the thesis that there is no single concept of causation that can do justice to all of our core intuitions concerning that concept, Ned Hall has argued that there is a conflict between a counterfactual criterion of causation and the condition of causal locality. In this paper I critically examine Hall's argument within the context of a more general discussion of the role of locality constraints in a causal conception of the world. I present two strategies that defenders of counterfactual accounts of causation can pursue to respond to Hall's challenge—including the adoption of a counterfactual condition that is sufficient for causal action-at-a-distance in place of Hall's ‘process’ condition—and conclude that Hall's argument against counterfactual accounts of causation is unsuccessful.     

The Field of Science and Religion as Natural Philosophy

“Natural philosophy” is an important term from the history of science because it was used to describe the study of nature during medieval and early modern Europe. This article gives an overview of the history of natural philosophy, since the use and eventual disuse of the term helps one to understand the emergence of modern science. Following a suggestion by the historian of science Peter Dear, I argue that the term deserves to be rehabilitated because it draws attention to the complexities of scientific theorizing. The article concludes with an argument that the field of science and religion should be seen as an updated version of natural philosophy.     

An Historical Overview of Basic Approaches and Issues in Ethical and Moral Philosophy and Principles

Summary

This article provides a condensed history of ethics development for the purpose of exposing psychologists and other mental health professionals to ethical and moral bases upon which modern psychological ethics are founded. In addition, it focuses on contemporary theories, with an emphasis on professional ethics.     

Mindfulness reconsidered

Mindfulness has recently become a popular addition to the range of methods available to counsellors and psychotherapists, especially in the field of stress reduction but is the method being over-sold? This article reviews the origins of mindfulness, attempts a balanced review of what mindfulness is and is not good for, looks at the question of whether the meaning of the term has mutated or suffered dilution as its popularity has grown and considers what that popularity and possible mutation tell us about the current state of thinking in the psychotherapy field. In the process, it puts the usefulness and nature of mindfulness in a new perspective, challenging a number of commonly held contemporary views on the subject.     

Delusion,Dissociation and Identity

Abstract

Envy and resentment are generally thought to be unpleasant and unethical emotions which ought to be condemned. I argue that both envy and resentment, in some important forms, are moral emotions connected with concern for justice, understood in terms of desert and entitlement. They enable us to recognise injustice, work as a spur to acting against it and connect us to others. Thus, we should accept these emotions as part of the ethical life.