高中生创造性思维发展特点的研究

选取110名高中生为被试,采用自编“中学生创造性思维测验”,考察了高中生创造性思维水平的年龄特点、性别差异以及学科成绩与创造性思维水平之间的相关.结果表明:(1)从创造性思维总分上看,高中生的创造性思维水平发展比较平缓,各年级间差异不显著;其中创造性思维最重要的品质——独特性:从高一到高二年级处于较为平稳的水平,二者无显著差异;高三比高二(P<001)和高一(P<0001)有显著提高;(2)高中学生的创造性思维不存在显著的性别差异;(3)中学生语文成绩与创造性思维总得分及部分项目得分有一定相关,与创造性思维的独特性及各项目上的独特性均无显著相关.数学成绩与创造性思维的诸方面均无显著相关.     

Critical thinking in North America: A new theory of knowledge,learning, and literacy

The pace of change in the world is accelerating, yet educational institutions have not kept pace. Indeed, schools have historically been the most static of social institutions, uncritically passing down from generation to generation outmoded didactic, lecture-and-drill-based, models of instruction. Predictable results follow. Students, on the whole, do not learn how to work by, or think for, themselves. They do not learn how to gather, analyze, synthesize and assess information. They do not learn how to analyze the diverse logic of the questions and problems they face and hence how to adjust their thinking to those problems. They do not learn how to enter sympathetically into the thinking of others, nor how to deal rationally with conflicting points of view. They do not learn to become critical readers, writers, speakers and listeners. They do not learn how to use their native languages clearly, precisely, or persuasively. They do not, therefore, become literate, in the proper sense of the word. Neither do they gain much in the way of genuine knowledge since, for the most part, they could not explain the basis for what they believe. They would be hard pressed to explain, for example, which of their beliefs were based on rational assent and which on simple conformity to what they have been told. They have little sense as to how they might critically analyze their own experience, or identify national or group bias in their own thinking. They are much more apt to learn on the basis of irrational than rational modes of thought. They lack the traits of mind of a genuinely educated person: intellectual humility, courage, integrity, perseverance, and faith in reason.Happily, there is a movement in education today striving to address these problems in a global way, with strategies and materials for the modification of instruction at all levels of education. At its foundation is an emerging new theory of knowledge, learning, and literacy, one which recognizes the centrality of independent critical thinking to all substantial learning, one which recognizes that higher-order, multilogical thinking is as important to childhood as to adult learning, and as important to foundational learning in monological as in multilogical disciplines. This educational reform movement is not proposing an educational miracle cure, for its leading proponents recognize that many social and historical forces must come together before the ideals of the critical thinking movement will become a full academic reality. Schools do not exist in a social vacuum. To the extent that the broader society is uncritical so, on the whole, will be society's schools. Nevertheless, the social conditions necessary for fundamental changes in schooling are increasingly apparent. The pressure for fundamental change is growing. Whether and to what extent these needed basic changes will be delayed or side-tracked, thus requiring new periodic resurgences of this movement, with new, more elaborate articulations of its ideals, goals, and methods — only time will tell.     

Individualization,singularization and e-ducation (between indifference and responsibility)

It is commonly supposed that acting and judging ought to rest on a community-wide, binding definition of what is right and respectable, that is, a substantial consensus. Such consensus is thought possible only when we engage shared values and criteria, when we use knowledge and abilities appropriated through education. On this view, education deals with the reproduction of consensus and, hence, with the passing on of traditions and norms. On my view, we need to question the framework in which the debate over social erosion takes place. I take a cue from remarks of Hannah Arendt and question the presupposition that acting and judging in a right way requires both common values and the appropriation of what we call knowledge of criteria and principles. I do not suggest that knowledge has nothing to do with acting and judging. Rather, I wish to draw attention to (Arendt's concept of) thinking as a condition for acting and judging. Here, thinking has nothing to do with knowledge or with appropriation. Rather, it has to do with living-together with somebody. Educa-tion for thinking is, then, a public thinking which leads out of the serf and into communal responsibility. On this treatment, the educator is to be a faithful guardian of this calling out into responsibility.     

A developmental perspective on psychotherapy process, psychotherapists' expertise, and “Meaning-Making Conflict” within therapeutic relationships: A two-part series

Part I (in this issue)—A Dialectical-Constructivist View of Human Development, Psychotherapy, and the Dynamics of Meaning-Making Conflict Within Therapeutic Relationships— reviews a dialectical-constructivist model of human development and articulates, in the language of that model, how psychotherapy, in general, works. It describes and illustrates three generic processes, which contribute to the frequent successes of an extremely diverse range of psychotherapy theories and practices. This view of psychotherapy focuses on both the client's meaning-making processes and the therapist's meaning-making processes and how they contribute together to effective psychotherapy. Part I also offers a way of understanding what is going on when therapeutic progress is blocked by conflict between the client's and the therapist's meaning-making processes. Part II—Dialectical Thinking and Psychotherapeutic Expertise: Implications for Training Psychotherapists and Protecting Clients from Theoretical Abuse—explores those experiences in which the therapist's own exercise of his or her meaning-making structures, and maintenance of the integrity of his or her theories, has a limiting or destructive impact on the value of therapy to the client. It considers the concept of “theoretical abuse” by psychotherapists as a way of characterizing the most destructive of these experiences. This serves as a rhetorical device for introducing comparisons between these phenomena and the phenomena of sexual abuse by psychotherapists, in terms of dynamics, prevalence, and appropriate strategies for prevention. Part II uses work on the development of dialectical thinking in adulthood to conceptualize how different understandings of the nature of psychotherapists' expertise increase or decrease the likelihood and severity of “theoretical abuse”. Finally, it derives implications for training psychologists and other psychotherapy professionals.     

Nonabsolute/relativistic thinking: A common factor underlying models of postformal reasoning?

Strong empirical evidence was obtained in support of the proposition that nonabsolute/relativistic (N/R) thinking is a unifying commonality underlying four postformal models of higher-order thinking, namely, problem finding, dialectical reasoning, relativistic operations, and reflective judgment. Within the construct of N/R thinking, two dimensions—the basic form and the epistemic view—and two levels—the formal form and the postformal form—were differentiated as hypothesized. The findings clarify logical relationships among the models as well as provide a common link unifying their diversity. Implications and suggestions for future research are provided.     

A View of the violence contained in chronic fatigue syndrome

In this paper I ask whether there might be any one particular psychopathology likely to be linked specifically with the physical illness known as chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) or myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME), and whether CFS/ME aids and abets and 'fits' an original mental state. I think the question cannot yet be answered. However it is my hypothesis that in some personality structures the onset of CFS/ME following a physical illness exacerbates negativity and is an aspect of ordinary depression where there is a lowering of energy levels and a loss of zest for life, or it may reveal the pathological aspect of unresolved rage.
Depending on the degree of pathological disturbance, working with and through the rage may or may not result in a resolution of the symptoms of ME. In this paper I consider some of the problems in the transference and countertransference relationship, which make it extremely difficult to separate out reality from phantasy. There is then the further problem of the denial of the psyche by the patient as part of the violence inherent in the illness.
One case is presented, an example of ME in a borderline male patient in whom resolution could not be achieved.     

超常与常态儿童的兴趣、动机与创造性思维的比较研究

在超常儿童研究领域存在着许多争议的问题,超常儿童的智力与创造力的关系问题就是其中的一个。为了更好地解释超常儿童的创造力与智力的本质关系,我们曾提出了“创造性系统模型”。本研究的主要目的是进一步证实模型提出的假设。本研究以超常和常态儿童为被试对儿童的兴趣、动机与创造性思维的关系作了进一步的考察。结果发现：（１）超常儿童的图形、数字和实用创造性思维的流畅性和独创性成绩都明显高于常态儿童;（２）超常和常态儿童的创造性思维与兴趣、动机之间存在显著的相关;（３）兴趣和动机得分较高的被拭的创造性思维得分显著高于兴趣和动机得分较低的被试;（４）超常儿童中有相当部分处于低兴趣和低动机水平,而常态儿童中却有相当部分处于高兴趣和高动机水平。因此,本研究从一个侧面进一步支持了系统模型中提出的有关儿童创造性的假设     

Children's supernatural thinking as a signalling behaviour in early childhood

In this study, we analysed the reaction times of 137 college students when making decisions on pairs of hypothetical children verbalizing different types of vignettes and/or exhibiting different physical appearance (photographs of faces). Vignettes depicted immature and mature versions of both supernatural (e.g., ‘The sun's not out today because it's mad’ vs. ‘The sun's not out today because the clouds are blocking it’) and natural (‘I can remember all 20 cards!’ vs. ‘I can remember 6 or 7 cards’) explanations to ordinary phenomena. Photographs of children's faces were morphed with a physical appearance of approximately 4–7 years old or approximately 8–10 years old. In earlier research, immature supernatural thinking produced positive‐affect reactions from adults and older adolescents (14–18 years old) towards young children, with cognitive cues being more important than physical‐appearance cues in influencing adults’ judgements. Reaction times to make decisions varied for the Supernatural and Natural vignettes and for the immature and mature vignettes/faces, reflecting the differential cognitive effort adults used for making decisions about aspects of children's physical appearance and verbal expressions. The findings were interpreted in terms of the critical role that young children's immature supernatural thinking has on adults’ perception, analogous to the evolved role of immature physical features on adults’ perception of infants.