Skepticism: Genuine unbelief or implicit beliefs in the supernatural?

We examined whether skeptics hold implicit supernatural beliefs or implicit cognitive underpinnings of the beliefs. In study 1 (N = 57), participants read a biological or a religious story about death. The story content had no effect on skeptics’ (or believers’) afterlife beliefs. Study 2 examined the relationships between religious and non-religious paranormal beliefs and implicit views about whether supernatural and religious phenomena are imaginary or real (n1 = 33, n2 = 31). The less supernatural beliefs were endorsed the easier it was to connect “supernatural” with “imaginary”. Study 3 (N = 63) investigated whether participants’ supernatural beliefs and ontological confusions differ between speeded and non-speeded response conditions. Only non-analytical skeptics’ ontological confusions increased in speeded conditions. The results indicate that skeptics overall do not hold implicit supernatural beliefs, but that non-analytically thinking skeptics may, under supporting conditions, be prone to biases that predispose to supernatural beliefs.     

Effects of self-generated versus experimenter-provided cues on the representation of future events

Most experimental studies of prospection focused on episodic forms of future events prompted by means of verbal cues. However, there is evidence suggesting that future events differ considerably according to whether they are produced in response to external, experimenter-provided verbal cues or they are self-generated. In the present study, we compared the quality, the phenomenal characteristics, the temporal distribution, and the content of imagined events prompted by experimenter-provided cues (i.e., cue-words and short verbal sentences) or elicited by means of verbal cues that were self-generated in an autobiographical fluency task. The results showed that future events prompted by means of self-generated cues contained fewer event-specific details than future events prompted by experimenter-provided cues. However, future events elicited by means of self-generated and by experimenter-provided cues did not differ with respect to their phenomenal characteristics. The temporal distribution and the thematic content of future representations were also affected by the type of cue used to elicit prospection. These results offer a holistic view of the properties of future thinking and suggest that the content and the characteristics of envisioned future events may be affected by the method used to elicit prospection.     

Frequency,characteristics, and perceived functions of emotional future thinking in daily life

While many thoughts and mental images that people form about their personal future refer to emotionally significant events, there is still little empirical data on the frequency and nature of emotional future-oriented thoughts (EmoFTs) that occur in natural settings. In the present study, participants recorded EmoFTs occurring in daily life and rated their characteristics, emotional properties, and perceived functions. The results showed that EmoFTs are frequent, occur in various contexts, and are perceived to fulfil important functions, mostly related to goal pursuit and emotion regulation. When distinguishing between anticipatory and anticipated emotions (i.e., emotions experienced in the present versus emotions expected to occur in the future), a positivity bias in the frequency of EmoFTs was found to be restricted to anticipated emotions. The representational format and perceived function of EmoFTs varied according to their affective valence, and the intensity of anticipatory and anticipated emotions were influenced by the personal importance and amount of visual imagery of EmoFTs. Mood states preceding EmoFTs influenced their emotional components, which, in turn, impacted ensuing mood states. Overall, these findings shed further light on the emotional properties of future-oriented thoughts that are experienced in daily life.     

Journal reviews

Articles reviewed: Bernstein, Jeanne Wolff. ‘Countertransference: our new royal road to the unconscious?’, Psychoanalytic Dialogues Crastnopol, Margaret. ‘The analyst's personality: Winnicott analyzing Guntrip as a case in point’, Contemporary Psychoanalysis Epstein, L. ‘The analyst's “bad-analyst” feelings: a counterpart to the process of resolving implosive defenses’, Contemporary Psychoanalysis Garwood, Alfred. ‘Psychic security: its origins, development and disruption‘, British Journal of Psychotherapy Haynes, Jane. ‘Facing the self: is man no more than this?’, Harvest Papadopoulos, Renos K. ‘Storied community as secure base: Response to the paper by Nancy Caro Hollander “Exile: Paradoxes of Loss and Creativity”’, British Journal of Psychotherapy Sand, Rosemary. ‘The interpretation of dreams: Freud and the Western tradition’ & Greenberg, Ramon & Pearlman, Chester. ‘The interpretation of dreams: a classic revisited’, Psychoanalytic Dialogues Spensley, Sheila. ‘Learning from Bion’, Journal of the British Association of Psychotherapists Wilgowicz, Perel. ‘Listening psychoanalytically to the Shoah half a century on’,International Journal of Psychoanalysis     

论医学哲学的特征

医学哲学也称为医学辩证法,是在总结医学科学成就的基础上,通过对医学理论和实践中一般、普遍、共性问题的研究,揭示医学认识主体思维活动普遍规律的科学：是人们认识和处理健康和疾病问题的一般方法论。无论是与医学还是与哲学相比。医学哲学都有着显著的区别,运用对比分析的方法。对医学哲学的研究对象、理论体系特别是思维方式等不同方面的特征,进行理论探讨。     

关于道德原则的几点思考

信仰缺失、经济转型和文化变革,使信仰和道德从一元化走向了多元化,并引起了人们对道德的迷茫、沉思和渴求。在追求普遍适用道德原则的过程中,绝对主义把这种原则看成亘古不变的教条,而相对主义则否定这种原则的存在。我们认为,这种原则是存在的。它是绝对性与相对性的统一,是客观性与主观性的统一,是人们对历史必须性的一种表述形式。我们必须认真研究客观规律,才能总结出有价值的道德原则、范畴和规范。     

两种医学模式的方法论问题评价

生物医学模式和生物心理社会医学模式是对医学发展具有重要意义的两种医学模式,它们在对疾病和健康的看法上形成不同的思维方式;且这种思维方式在人们进行医学科研中具有不同的方法论作用。     

'I'm Just Saying . . .': Discourse Markers of Standpoint Continuity

Examining discourse markers (Schiffrin, 1987) in two transcribed discussions of controversial issues in an undergraduate 'critical thinking' class, we note frequent uses of 'I'm just saying' and related metadiscursive expressions (I'm/we're saying, I'm/we're not saying, etc.). Our central claim is that these 'saying' expressions are pragmatic devices by which speakers claim 'all along' to have held a consistent argumentative standpoint, one that continues through the discussion unless changed for good reasons. Through close analysis of a series of discourse examples, we show how these discourse markers are used to display continuity, deflect counterarguments, and acknowledge the force of counterarguments while preserving continuity. In a concluding section we reflect critically on the use of these continuity markers with regard to four pragmatic functions that they potentially serve: to specify and clarify argumentative standpoints, to acknowledge a presumption of standpoint continuity, to acknowledge a normative expectation that discussion participants should have standpoints, and to avoid overt disagreement while saving face.     

The ‘conjunction fallacy’ revisited: how intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors

Findings in recent research on the ‘conjunction fallacy’ have been taken as evidence that our minds are not designed to work by the rules of probability. This conclusion springs from the idea that norms should be content‐blind—in the present case, the assumption that sound reasoning requires following the conjunction rule of probability theory. But content‐blind norms overlook some of the intelligent ways in which humans deal with uncertainty, for instance, when drawing semantic and pragmatic inferences. In a series of studies, we first show that people infer nonmathematical meanings of the polysemous term ‘probability’ in the classic Linda conjunction problem. We then demonstrate that one can design contexts in which people infer mathematical meanings of the term and are therefore more likely to conform to the conjunction rule. Finally, we report evidence that the term ‘frequency’ narrows the spectrum of possible interpretations of ‘probability’ down to its mathematical meanings, and that this fact—rather than the presence or absence of ‘extensional cues’—accounts for the low proportion of violations of the conjunction rule when people are asked for frequency judgments. We conclude that a failure to recognize the human capacity for semantic and pragmatic inference can lead rational responses to be misclassified as fallacies. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.