Two Objections to Moran’s Transparency Account

Abstract

Gareth Evans and others have argued that our intentional attitudes are transparent to facts in the world. This suggests we can know them by looking outwards to the world rather than inwards to our minds. Richard Moran uses this idea of transparency in his account of self-knowledge. Critics have objected to his account on several counts. For example, Jonathan Way has argued that irrational attitudes can give ordinary self-knowledge when they are not transparent and that there are rational attitudes that are not transparent. I argue here that these objections fail because Way does not fully consider the two different kinds of self-knowledge, ‘ordinary’ and evidence-based, that differentiate the two stances that Moran claims a subject can have towards his attitudes. It is the differences between these two stances and the implications of these that motivate Moran’s account, rather than whether the formed attitude is rational or irrational, as long as the subject avows it from the deliberative stance, focuses on the attitude’s object and conforms to the transparency condition as Moran sets this out.     

Effects of joint immobilization on standing balance

We investigated the effect of joint immobilization on the postural sway during quiet standing. We hypothesized that the center of pressure (COP), rambling, and trembling trajectories would be affected by joint immobilization. Ten young adults stood on a force plate during 60 s without and with immobilized joints (only knees constrained, CK; knees and hips, CH; and knees, hips, and trunk, CT), with their eyes open (OE) or closed (CE). The root mean square deviation (RMS, the standard deviation from the mean) and mean speed of COP, rambling, and trembling trajectories in the anterior–posterior and medial–lateral directions were analyzed. Similar effects of vision were observed for both directions: larger amplitudes for all variables were observed in the CE condition. In the anterior–posterior direction, postural sway increased only when the knees, hips, and trunk were immobilized. For the medial–lateral direction, the RMS and the mean speed of the COP, rambling, and trembling displacements decreased after immobilization of knees and hips and knees, hips, and trunk. These findings indicate that the single inverted pendulum model is unable to completely explain the processes involved in the control of the quiet upright stance in the anterior–posterior and medial–lateral directions.     

Preschoolers favor the creator's label when reasoning about an artifact's function

The creator of an artifact, by virtue of having made the object, has privileged knowledge about its intended function. Do children recognize that the label an artifact's creator uses can convey this privileged information? 3- and 4-year-olds were presented with an object that looked like a member of one familiar artifact category, but which the speaker referred to with the label of a different familiar category (e.g. a key-like object was called a "spoon"). Children who heard the speaker refer to the object as something she made were more likely to assign its function on the basis of the anomalous label she used than those who heard it referred to as something the speaker found. Thus, even very young children expect a unique connection between the label the creator of an artifact uses and the function she intends it to have.     

Understanding response patterns in dyadic conflict: An interactive approach combining self‐construal and opponent's dominance‐submissiveness

Previous works on the effect of self‐construal in interpersonal behaviours tend to adopt a main effect approach. The present research proposes an interactive approach in understanding two response patterns in dyadic conflict by combining self‐construal and the stance of the opponent. Independent self‐construal was hypothesised to be associated with a self‐centred pattern of conflict response, which is characterised by taking contending responses regardless of whether the stance of the opponent is dominant or submissive. Relational self‐construal was hypothesised to be associated with a tuning‐in pattern of conflict response, which is characterised by showing contending responses when the opponent is submissive but yielding responses when the opponent is dominant. With trait self‐construal measured and opponent's stance manipulated, Study 1 provided initial support for the hypotheses. Study 2 showed a three‐way interaction effect between trait self‐construal, manipulated self‐construal and the opponent's stance on actual conflict responses during discussion of a scenario. The effect of self‐construal manipulation was only observed among people who were low in trait independent self‐construal and average in trait relational self‐construal. The results pinpoint the importance of considering personal and opponent factors simultaneously in understanding the dynamics of dyadic conflict processes.     

On What Empiricism Cannot Be

Bas C. van Fraassen, in his Terry Lectures at Yale University (subsequently published as The Empirical Stance), is concerned to elucidate what empiricism is, and could be, given past and current failures of characterization. He contends that naïve empiricism—the metaphilosophical position that characterizes empiricism in terms of a thesis—is self‐refuting, and he offers a reductio ad absurdum to substantiate this claim. Moreover, in place of naïve empiricism, van Fraassen endorses stance empiricism: the metaphilosophical position that characterizes empiricism in terms of certain attitudes and commitments. The present article, however, argues that van Fraassen begs the question in his reductio of naïve empiricism, and thus that his primary defense of stance empiricism is inadequate.     

CUI BONO? A REVIEW OF BREAKING THE SPELL: RELIGION AS A NATURAL PHENOMENON BY DANIEL C. DENNETT

The three requirements for a Darwinian evolutionary process are replication, variation and selection. Dennett (2006) discusses various theories of how these three processes, especially selection, may have operated in the evolution of religion. He believes that the origins of religion, like the origins of language and music, may be approached scientifically. He hopes that such investigations will open a dialog between science and religion leading to moderation of current religious extremism. One problem with Dennett's program, illustrating the difficulty of breaking away from creationist thinking, is Dennett's own failure to consider how Darwinian methods may be used to study evolution of behavioral patterns over the lifetime of individual organisms.     

Modulation of tendon tap reflex activation of soleus motor neurons with reduced stability tandem stance

Reduced stability while standing typically decreases the soleus muscle Hoffmann (H-) reflex amplitude, purportedly to prevent the Ia afferent signal from excessively activating spinal motor neurons during the unstable stance. H-reflex measures, however, by excluding the spindle do not reflect the actual effect of the Ia pathway (i.e. the combined effects of spindle sensitivity and Ia presynaptic inhibition) on motor neuron activation, as tendon tap reflex measures can. But the effect of stance stability on soleus muscle tendon tap reflex amplitude is largely unknown. This study examined 30 young adults (mean(s), 21(2) years) as they stood in a wide stable stance position and an unstable tandem stance with a reduced base of support. Standing body sway, the amplitude of the soleus muscle tendon tap reflex, background EMG and tap force were measured in both stances. A repeated measured design t-test was calculated for each variable. Most subjects (69%) decreased tendon tap reflex amplitude when in the tandem stance position (mean decrease 11.6%), compared to the wide stance (wide stance 0.248(0.124) mV, tandem stance 0.219(0.119) mV, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.24 small) with no significant differences in background soleus and tibialis anterior EMG, and tap force across the stances. There was no relationship between the modulation of the tendon tap reflex amplitude across the stances and standing body sway in the tandem stance. Results support the idea that for most subjects examined, during a less stable stance the Ia excitation of motor neurons is decreased, likely by presynaptic inhibition, thereby avoiding potential instability in the reflex loop or saturating the reflex pathway and possibly interfering with descending control of the involved spinal motor neurons.     

Katz’s Revisability Paradox Dissolved

Quine's holistic empiricist account of scientific inquiry can be characterized by three constitutive principles: noncontradiction, universal revisability and pragmatic ordering. We show that these constitutive principles cannot be regarded as statements within a holistic empiricist's scientific theory of the world. This claim is a corollary of our refutation of Katz's [1998, 2002] argument that holistic empiricism suffers from what he calls the Revisability Paradox. According to Katz, Quine's empiricism is incoherent because its constitutive principles cannot themselves be rationally revised. Using Gärdenfors and Makinson's logic of belief revision based on epistemic entrenchment, we argue that Katz wrongly assumes that the constitutive principles are statements within a holistic empiricist's theory of the world. Instead, we show that constitutive principles are best seen as properties of a holistic empiricist's theory of scientific inquiry and we submit that, without Katz's mistaken assumption, the paradox cannot be formulated. We argue that our perspective on the status of constitutive principles is perfectly in line with Quinean orthodoxy. In conclusion, we compare our findings with van Fraassen's [2002] argument that we should think of empiricism as a stance, rather than as a doctrine.     

Postmetaphysical Thinking or Refusal of Thought? Max Horkheimer’s Materialism as Philosophical Stance

Abstract

Frankfurt School critical theory has long opposed metaphysical philosophy because it ignores suffering and injustice. In the face of such criticism, proponents of metaphysics (for example Dieter Henrich) have accused critical theory of not fully investigating the questions is raises for itself, and falling into partial metaphysical positions, despite itself. If one focuses on Max Horkheimer’s early essays, such an accusation seems quite fitting. There he vociferously attacks metaphysics, but he also develops a theory that pushes toward metaphysical questions. His work can thus seem laden with unpacked metaphysical baggage, and fraught with contradiction. The aim of this paper is to show that Horkheimer’s critique of metaphysics makes sense and is not contradicted by a surreptitious metaphysics. To show this, Horkheimer’s views will be compared with Bas van Fraassen’s in The Empirical Stance. Ultimately, the paper should show that Horkheimer’s early philosophy can be reconstructed in such a way that it employs a ‘materialist stance’.     

Role Development

SUMMARY

In this chapter, I first explain my research stance, which reflects how I became interested in this study, as well as the personal perspective and professional background that I bring to the study, which may clarify how I may hear and listen to the participants and face biases that emerge (Ely et al., 1997; Tedlock, 1995; Van Manen, 1990). Next, I describe the research setting, the participants, and the methods for recruiting the participants. Finally, I outline the research procedures, data collection, data management, analysis, methods to achieve trustworthiness, presentation of the findings, negative analysis, and preparatory study.