What should religious education in Germany be about and how does religiosity fit into this picture? An empirical study of pre-service religious education teachers’ beliefs on the aims of RE

In secularising Germany the aim of religious education (RE) is under discussion. The churches opt for denominational education familiarising the students with their own religious tradition. Humanists claim an ethical education, giving students objective information about different religions. Which perspective do students who will become RE teachers take in this discussion? Does their religiosity affect this perspective? All over Germany 1828 first-year students (with an average age of 21; 81% females; 72% Catholic and 28% Protestant) completed a relevant questionnaire. The respondents favour a RE which offers objective information. Most of them are pluralist thinkers in religious terms and show a moderate religious practice. The more relativist the students are thinking in religious terms, the more they tend to favour objective information. These findings challenge the churches’ perspective on RE, because even future RE teachers do not agree with the churches’ ideal on RE. A reformulation of this approach on cognitive level will be discussed.     

LOOKING TO CHARLES TAYLOR AND JOSEPH ROUSE FOR BEST PRACTICES IN SCIENCE AND RELIGION

People discussing science and religion usually frame their conversations in terms of essentialist assumptions about science, assumptions requiring the existence (but not the specification) of criteria according to which science can be distinguished from other forms of inquiry. However, criteria functioning at a level of generality appropriate to such discussions may not exist at all. Essentialist assumptions may be avoided if science is understood within a broader context of human practices. In a philosophy of practices, to label a practice as “scientific” is to make a practically motivated provision for a way of speaking. Charles Taylor and Joseph Rouse have produced complementary philosophies of practice that promote this kind of understanding. In this essay I review the work of Taylor and Rouse, identify apparent residues of essentialism that each seems to harbor, and offer a resolution to some of their disagreements. I also criticize a form of essentialism commonly employed in Christian circles and outline an anti‐essentialist view of science that may be helpful in science‐and‐religion discussions.