Experimentation on humans and nonhumans

In this article, I argue that it is wrong to conduct any experiment on a nonhuman which we would regard as immoral were it to be conducted on a human, because such experimentation violates the basic moral rights of sentient beings. After distinguishing the rights approach from the utilitarian approach, I delineate basic concepts. I then raise the classic “argument from marginal cases” against those who support experimentation on nonhumans but not on humans. After next replying to six important objections against that argument, I contend that moral agents are logically required to accord basic moral rights to every sentient being. I conclude by providing criteria for distinguishing ethical from unethical experimentation.     

Ethical considerations in the testing of biopharmaceuticals for adventitious agents

Safety testing of biological pharmaceuticals is often carried out by contract testing laboratories which perform these tests on behalf of the drug’s developer. These laboratories are confronted with a number of ethical issues related to selling their services, maintaining confidentiality, and the handling of results. This paper outlines these issues, and, by way of illustration, discusses how one such laboratory addresses them.     

The effect of the dominance of an in-vehicle agent’s voice on driver situation awareness,emotion regulation,and trust: A simulated lab study of manual and automated driving

As in-vehicle voice agents increase in popularity, related research is extending to how voice messages can affect the driver’s cognitive and emotional states. Accordingly, we investigated how in-vehicle agent (IVA) voice dominance and driving automation can affect the driver’s situation awareness (SA), emotion regulation (ER), and trust. To this end, a lab-based experiment was conducted with a medium-fidelity driving simulator using actor-recorded voice agents. Twenty-two female and nineteen male driver-licensed participants were recruited to drive simulated vehicles with voice agents and evaluated. The results demonstrated that compared with the dominant voice, the agent with a submissive voice significantly increased ER in both manual and automated driving. Furthermore, the submissive voice significantly increased trust in automated driving compared with the dominant agent. Cross and synergistic interaction effects exist between voice dominance and driving automation in SA and ER, respectively. This study revealed that both the content of the messages of the IVAs and their voice characteristics are essential for modulating the driver’s SA, ER, and trust in driving. It is expected that larger-scale future studies with simulation or on a real road would increase the validity of this study.     

Cautious Defection: Group Representatives Cooperate and Risk Less than Individuals

Individuals often make decisions that affect groups, yet the propensities of group representatives are not as well understood than those of independent decision makers or deliberating groups. We ask how responsibility for group payoffs—in the absence of group deliberation—affects the choice. The experiment utilizes the Interdependent Security Dilemma paradigm. In its deterministic version, the game is identical to a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. In the stochastic version, potential losses are larger but uncertain, occurring with a predefined probability when one or both players choose to forgo investment in protection. Participants were assigned to play either as individuals, or as representatives of three‐person groups, with each member's choices equally likely to determine the group's payoffs. In the deterministic condition, individuals were more likely to invest (cooperate) than group representatives (80% vs. 62% of rounds). In the stochastic condition, the pattern was reversed as representatives were slightly, but not significantly, more likely to invest than individuals (46% vs. 40%). The significant interaction effect suggested that group representatives were not only less cooperative but also more risk averse than individuals. A follow‐up study supported this account by showing participants who construed the invest strategy as low‐risk than those who perceived this strategy to be high risk. Overall, group representatives exhibited a tendency to act more competitively and more cautiously than individuals acting alone. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

自省主体对Moore-型信息的处理与融合

The main task is to discuss the issue in belief dynamics in which philosophical beliefs and rational introspective agents incorporate Moorean type new information. First, a brief survey is conducted on Moore’s Paradox, and one of its solutions is introduced with the help of Update Semantics. Then, we present a Dynamic Doxastic Logic (DDL) which revises the belief of introspective agents put forward by Lindström &; Rabinowicz. Next, we attempt to incorporate Moorean type new information within the DEL (DDL) framework, as advised by van Benthem, Segerberg et al. Though we maintain the principle of “the primacy of new information” from the literature on traditional belief revision theory, several unsuccessful ways are also presented. We then conclude that some special kind of success (weak success) can still be found in those revision processes although absolute success does not hold. At last, the relevant problem of “learnability” is re-considered through weak success.     

Empirical and modeling study of emotional state dynamics in social videogame paradigms

The objective of this work was to study the dynamics of human emotional states in the process of social interaction in a virtual environment. The previously developed for this purpose prototypes of the virtual actor (NPC) and its virtual environment simulator “Teleport” underwent significant re-design and modification. The experimental platform was re-implemented and used in experiments with college student participants, combining electromyography, emotion recognition in facial recordings and model-based game log analysis in a social videogame paradigm. Participants interacted with two virtual actors implemented based on the eBICA cognitive architecture (Samsonovich, 2013, 2018). Positive correlations were found between eBICA model predictions and participant affects extracted from their facial expressions and facial muscle activity. Affective dynamics of social phenomena, such as the establishment of partnership or an act of betrayal, were characterized and found consistent with the model predictions. Other findings include a gradually developing emotional reaction, possibly due to the integration of appraisals of game events. Overall, obtained results confirm the eBICA model, suggesting its further extension and refinement.     

Effects of ethanol withdrawal on muricidal behavior

When naive rats of our colony were individually housed for 1 month with free access to laboratory chow and water as drinking fluid, 6% exhibited muricidal behavior. When naive rats of the same colony were similarly housed but received ethanol 20% in water as the sole source of drinking fluid (ll.5 g ethanol/kg/day), the percentage of killer rats was the same. However, when the rats were housed in similar conditions and submitted to a 1-day ethanol withdrawal, the percentage of muricidal rats increased to 25%. Ethanol intake in the same conditions as described above did not change muricidal behavior of spontaneous killers and did not induce killing behavior in nonkiller animals. GABA-mimetic agents administered IP blocked ethanol withdrawal-induced killing behavior as well as spontaneous muricidal activity.     

A real‐world rational agent: unifying old and new AI

Explanations of cognitive processes provided by traditional artificial intelligence were based on the notion of the knowledge level. This perspective has been challenged by new AI that proposes an approach based on embodied systems that interact with the real‐world. We demonstrate that these two views can be unified. Our argument is based on the assumption that knowledge level explanations can be defined in the context of Bayesian theory while the goals of new AI are captured by using a well established robot based model of learning and problem solving, called Distributed Adaptive Control (DAC). In our analysis we consider random foraging and we prove that minor modifications of the DAC architecture renders a model that is equivalent to a Bayesian analysis of this task. Subsequently, we compare this enhanced, “rational,” model to its “non‐rational” predecessor and a further control condition using both simulated and real robots, in a variety of environments. Our results show that the changes made to the DAC architecture, in order to unify the perspectives of old and new AI, also lead to a significant improvement in random foraging.     

A working memory model improves cognitive control in agents and robots

Cognition entails those mental processes enabling understanding the current situation through senses, experience, and thought, and supporting the acquisition of new knowledge. A fundamental contribution in cognition is offered by the working memory, that is a small, short-term memory containing and protecting from interference goal-relevant pieces of information. Grounding our work on biological and neuroscientific studies, we modeled and implemented working memory processes in a software model, IDRA-WM, that can simultaneously act as short-term memory and actions generator, thanks to the use of a reinforcement-driven mechanism for chunk selection. Moreover our system integrates the functions of the working memory with a basic action planner. We tested the model with robot relevant tasks to assess whether the proposed solution can learn to solve a problem on the basis of a delayed reward. The experimental results indicate that IDRA-WM is able to solve even those tasks that do not provide immediate reward after an action.     

Skookumchuck,Kiidk'yaas,Gibbard: normativity,meaning, and idealization (critical notice of Allan Gibbard Meaning and Normativity)

Gibbard argues that ‘meaning is normative’. He explains the claim with an account of the normative which bases it on the process of planning, taken in part as issuing instructions to oneself. It seems to entail that the right kind of plans make norms. One ought to continue adding with plus rather than quus in a Kripkenstein horror story. I focus on Gibbard's characterization of normativity: it is not what one might expect. The main purpose of this review article is to present the way of understanding normativity that makes most sense of what he says, and which makes some otherwise implausible assertions defensible and perhaps even true. I give reasons for thinking that Gibbard's understanding of normativity-through-plans cannot do the work he wants it to. I also argue that he is onto something right, and it opens interesting new questions.