全文获取类型
收费全文 | 160篇 |
免费 | 12篇 |
国内免费 | 1篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 4篇 |
2022年 | 1篇 |
2021年 | 2篇 |
2020年 | 6篇 |
2019年 | 13篇 |
2018年 | 10篇 |
2017年 | 13篇 |
2016年 | 8篇 |
2015年 | 8篇 |
2014年 | 6篇 |
2013年 | 24篇 |
2012年 | 3篇 |
2011年 | 2篇 |
2010年 | 1篇 |
2009年 | 5篇 |
2008年 | 10篇 |
2007年 | 3篇 |
2006年 | 11篇 |
2005年 | 9篇 |
2004年 | 6篇 |
2003年 | 11篇 |
2002年 | 2篇 |
2001年 | 3篇 |
2000年 | 3篇 |
1999年 | 3篇 |
1998年 | 2篇 |
1997年 | 1篇 |
1994年 | 1篇 |
1993年 | 1篇 |
1992年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有173条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
61.
Christopher Woodard 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2003,6(2):215-229
This article endorses a familiar, albeit controversial, argument for the existence of group-based reasons for action, but then rejects two doctrines which other advocates of such reasons usually accept. One such doctrine is the willingness requirement, which says that a group-based reason exists only if (sufficient) other members of the group in question are willing to cooperate. Thus the paper argues that there is sometimes a reason, which derives from the rationality of some group action, to play one's part unilaterally in that group action. This seems implausible only because we tend wrongly to accept a second doctrine, monism about the unit of agency. Monism claims that, for any given deliberative problem, there is only one unit of agency to which reasons attach. If we are monists who believe in group-based reasons, the willingness requirement will seem necessary in order to avoid recklessness. We should reject monism, and if we do so we can recognise genuine conflict between individual-based and group-based reasons, and in doing so we can explain, without endorsing the willingness requirement, why we should not act recklessly. 相似文献
62.
Harvey Siegel 《Metaphilosophy》2004,35(5):597-613
Abstract: Philosophical/epistemic theories of rationality differ over the role of judgment in rational argumentation. According to the “classical model” of rationality, rational justification is a matter of conformity with explicit rules or principles. Critics of the classical model, such as Harold Brown and Trudy Govier, argue that the model is subject to insuperable difficulties. They propose, instead, that rationality be understood, ultimately, in terms of judgment rather than rules. In this article I respond to Brown's and Govier's criticisms of the classical model, and to the “judgment model” they propose in its place. I argue that that model is unable both to distinguish between rational and irrational judgment and to avoid recourse to rules, and is therefore inadequate as an account of rationality, critical thinking, or argument appraisal. More positively, I argue that an adequate account of rationality must include a place for both rules and judgment. 相似文献
63.
Juan Pablo Jiménez 《The International journal of psycho-analysis》2009,90(2):231-248
The central objective of this presentation is to reflect on the obstacles involved in the task proposed by the Chicago Congress, which is to explore convergences and divergences in psychoanalytic practice. The author discusses two major obstacles. First, the epistemological and methodological problems in relation to the construction of theory in psychoanalysis and especially the inaccessibility, in any reliable way, of what psychoanalysts really do in the intimacy of their practice. He proposes to separate, at least in part, theory from practice in psychoanalysis, in an attempt to grasp psychoanalysts' practice in its own merits. He then outlines a phenomenology of the practice of psychoanalysis, which reveals that, in their work with patients, analysts are guided more by practical reasons than theoretical reasons; that is, their interventions are predictions rather than explanations. Since these practical reasons need to be validated constantly in the analytic relationship based on their effects, he discusses the subject of validation in the clinical context of the core theory of therapeutic change in psychoanalysis, that is, the conditions required for clinical practice to satisfy the thesis of an inseparable union between gaining knowledge and cure. He ends by challenging the core of the psychoanalytic theory of change, arguing that it neither does justice to the practice of psychoanalysts nor to contemporary knowledge of processes and mechanisms of therapeutic change. Finally, he proposes that we detach practice from theory, in order to study the former in its own merits, utilising a plurality of methods ranging from systematic investigation to the recent methodology of the Working Party. 相似文献
64.
Christoph Lumer 《Argumentation》1997,11(3):329-340
Pascals wager is expounded as a paradigm case of a practical,decision-theoretical argument for acting as if a proposition is true when wehave no theoretical reasons to accept or reject it (1.1.–1.2.). Thoughthe paradigm is fallacious in various respects there are valid and adequatearguments for acting as if certain propositions are true: that theoreticalentities exist, that there are material perceptual objects, that the worldis uniform across time (1.3). After this analysis of examples the authorsgeneral approach for developing criteria for the validity and adequacy oftypes of argument (2.1.) is applied: Having discussed some problems(2.2.–2.3.), a general epistemic principle for such pascal argumentsis developed, which characterizes their premisses and, if introduced as anadditional premiss, can make them deductively valid (2.4). 相似文献
65.
Hallvard Lillehammer 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》1999,2(2):117-133
The paper examines the plausibility of analytical dispositionalism about practical reason, according to which the following claims are conceptual truths about common sense ethical discourse: i) Ethics: agents have reasons to act in some ways rather than others, and ii) Metaphysical Modesty: there is no such thing as a response independent normative reality. By elucidating two uncontroversial assumptions which are fundamental to the common sense commitment to ethics, I argue that common sense ethical discourse is most plausibly construed as committed to the denial of metaphysical modesty, and thereby as committed to the existence of a response independent normative reality. 相似文献
66.
《Psychologie du Travail et des Organisations》2023,29(3):151-165
Considered as an additional job demand, the use of technologies for work-related reasons could increase psychological demands at work, favoring the appearance of workaholism. Our study examines the impact of the frequency of this use on psychological demands at work and workaholism in a sample of 223 people at work from various professional backgrounds, by verifying whether there are differences between men and women. The results showed that the use of technologies (desktop computer, laptop, tablet, smartphone/mobile phone) for work-related reasons increases psychological demands felt at work, consequently favoring the appearance of the two components of workaholism (working excessively and working compulsively) in men and women. In addition, the results show us gender differences: the strength of the relationship between the use of technologies for work-related reasons and working excessively, partially mediated by psychological demands at work, was slightly higher among men than in women; strength of the relationship between the use of technologies for work-related reasons and working compulsively, partially mediated by psychological demands at work, was found just among men, whereas a full mediation was found among women. This research highlights the importance of investigating the mechanisms that may explain how the use of technologies for work-related reasons could enhance the risk of work addiction, by considering gender differences. 相似文献
67.
Coos Engelsma 《Metaphilosophy》2014,45(2):192-200
According to Peter Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows a vicious form of arbitrariness. The present article critically discusses his concept of arbitrariness. It argues that the condition Klein takes to be necessary and sufficient for an epistemic item to be arbitrary is neither necessary nor sufficient. It also argues that Klein's concept of arbitrariness is not a concept of something that is obviously vicious. Even if Klein succeeds in establishing that foundationalism allows what he regards as arbitrariness, this does not yet mean that he confronts it with a sound objection. 相似文献
68.
Kristján Kristjánsson 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(1):53-68
A number of contemporary philosophers have pointed out that justice is not primarily an intellectual virtue, grounded in abstract, detached beliefs, but rather an emotional virtue, grounded in certain beliefs and desires that are compelling and deeply embedded in human nature. As a complex emotional virtue, justice seems to encompass, amongst other things, certain desert-based emotions that are developmentally and morally important for an understanding of justice. This article explores the philosophical reasons for the rising interest in desert-based emotions and offers a conceptual overview of some common emotions of this sort having to do with the fortunes of others and of oneself, respectively. The article does not give a definitive answer to the question of whether those emotions really are virtuous, but aims at enriching our understanding of what kind of virtue they might possibly represent. 相似文献
69.
Tony Milligan 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(3):315-323
If X loves Y does it follow that X has reasons to love a physiologically exact replacement for Y? Can love's reasons be duplicated? One response to the problem is to suggest that X lacks reasons for loving such a duplicate because the reason-conferring properties of Y cannot be fully duplicated. But a concern, played upon by Derek Parfit, is that this response may result from a failure to take account of the psychological pressures of an actual duplication scenario. In the face of the actual loss of a loved one and the subsequent appearance of a duplicate, how could we resist the inclination to love? Drawing upon duplication scenarios from Parfit and from Stanislaw Lem's Solaris, this paper will argue that there could be reasons for X to come to love a duplicate of Y but that these would not be identical with the reasons that X had (and may still have) to love Y. Nor (in the case of an agent with a normal causal history) could they be reasons for a love that violates the requirement that love is a response to a relationship and therefore takes time to emerge. 相似文献
70.