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排序方式: 共有173条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
161.
Jeff Behrends 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2015,45(2):159-178
Source Hybridism about practical reasons is the position that facts that constitute reasons sometimes derive their normative force from external metaphysical grounds, and sometimes from internal. Although historically less popular than either Source Internalism or Source Externalism, hybridism has lately begun to garner more attention. Here, I further the hybridist's cause by defending Source Hybridism from three objections. I argue that we are not warranted in rejecting hybridism for any of the following reasons: that hybridists cannot provide an account of normative weight, that hybridists are committed to implausible results concerning practical deliberation, or that Source Hybridism is objectionably unparsimonious. 相似文献
162.
Charles Côté-Bouchard 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2015,23(3):337-355
AbstractAccording to epistemic instrumentalism (EI), epistemic normativity arises from and depends on facts about our ends. On that view, a consideration C is an epistemic reason for a subject S to Φ only if Φ-ing would promote an end that S has. However, according to the Too Few Epistemic Reasons objection, this cannot be correct since there are cases in which, intuitively, C is an epistemic reason for S to Φ even though Φ-ing would not promote any of S’s ends. After clarifying both EI and the Too Few Epistemic Reasons objection, I examine three major instrumentalist replies and argue that none of them is satisfactory. I end by briefly sketching a fourth possible response, which is, I suggest, more promising than the other three. 相似文献
163.
Christopher Cowie 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2016,94(1):115-130
Moral error theories are often rejected by appeal to ‘companions in guilt’ arguments. The most popular form of companions in guilt argument takes epistemic reasons for belief as a ‘companion’ and proceeds by analogy. I show that this strategy fails. I claim that the companions in guilt theorist must understand epistemic reasons as evidential support relations if her argument is to be dialectically effective. I then present a dilemma. Either epistemic reasons are evidential support relations or they are not. If they are not, then the companions in guilt argument fails. If they are, then a reduction of epistemic reasons to evidential support relations becomes available and, consequently, epistemic reasons cease to be a viable ‘companion’ for moral reasons. I recommend this structure of argument over existing strategies within the literature and defend my claims against recent objections from companions in guilt theorists. 相似文献
164.
Bart Streumer 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2016,24(4):537-546
Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini argues that we can believe the error theory. In this reply, I explain why I still think we cannot. 相似文献
165.
Matthew Hammerton 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2019,97(2):239-250
The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is one of the most important in contemporary moral theory. Yet providing an adequate formal account of it has proven to be difficult. In this article I defend a new formal account of the distinction, one that avoids various problems faced by other accounts. My account is based on an influential account of the distinction developed by McNaughton and Rawling. I argue that their approach is on the right track but that it succumbs to two serious objections. I then show how to formulate a new account that follows the key insights of McNaughton and Rawling's approach yet avoids the two objections. 相似文献
166.
Lilian O’Brien 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2019,49(1):123-146
In debates about rationalizing action explanation causalists assume that the psychological states that explain an intentional action have both causal and rational features. I scrutinize the presuppositions of those who seek and offer rationalizing action explanations. This scrutiny shows, I argue, that where rational features play an explanatory role in these contexts, causal features play only a presuppositional role. But causal features would have to play an explanatory role if rationalizing action explanation were a species of causal explanation. Consequently, it is not a species of causal explanation. 相似文献
167.
Symptom reduction and termination: client change and therapist identified reasons for saying goodbye
Theodore T. Bartholomew Allison J. Lockard Susan F. Folger Blakely E. Low Andrea D. Poet Brett E. Scofield 《Counselling psychology quarterly》2019,32(1):81-99
Empirical efforts have focused on predicting whether or not clients prematurely terminate therapy, with nonattendance of last session equated to premature termination. However, this fails to explore the relationship between clients’ distress reduction and reasons for termination. With this study, we aimed to understand how clients’ distress change relates to premature termination and examine clients’ distress change in conjunction with therapists’ perceptions of termination reasons. We collected data from 797 clients who prematurely terminated or attended termination but completed therapy a minimum of three individual sessions provided by 38 therapists. Clients completed an assessment of psychological symptoms before each session. At the end of treatment, therapists identified the reasons they believed termination occurred for all clients in the sample. Results demonstrate that total sessions attended and missed predict premature termination, whereas distress change does not. Additionally, clients who were believed to accomplish goals do show greater change. However, therapists’ indicated that over half of clients did not reach goals at termination and they did not perceive nonattendance at last session to equate to drop out in all cases. Implications are discussed with respect to understanding why clients’ terminate, therapeutic goal conceptualization, and review of goals during termination in time-limited psychotherapy. 相似文献
168.
Miranda Fricker 《Metaphilosophy》2003,34(1&2):154-173
The dual aim of this article is to reveal and explain a certain phenomenon of epistemic injustice as manifested in testimonial practice, and to arrive at a characterisation of the anti–prejudicial intellectual virtue that is such as to counteract it. This sort of injustice occurs when prejudice on the part of the hearer leads to the speaker receiving less credibility than he or she deserves. It is suggested that where this phenomenon is systematic it constitutes an important form of oppression. 相似文献
169.
According to the New Angle, any explanation of the Knobe effect must be gradable and asymmetric. It has been argued that only Hindriks’ approach meets both criteria. First, we argue that Holton’s hypothesis also meets the criteria. Second, we show that the authors are not justified in taking the criteria to be empirically justified. We have failed to replicate the asymmetry result in two experiments. Moreover, gradability can be objective or epistemic. We show that the New Angle presupposes objective gradability. In our experiments, the patterns of responses to questions about epistemic and objective gradability are the same, irrespective of whether the feature is objectively gradable (e.g., blameworthiness) or not (e.g., intentionality). Our results thus question the extent to which the New Angle is empirically grounded. Moreover, they raise doubt whether the answers to questions about epistemic and objective gradability can be taken at face value at all.
Abbreviations: NRH - normative reasons hypothesis; NVH - norm violation hypothesis; DQ - degree question; DAQ - degree of agreement question 相似文献
170.
Peter Schaber 《Ratio》2020,33(2):117-124
Consent that is voluntary, informed and given by a competent person sometimes transforms a wrong into a right act. How does consent that meets these requirements change the moral property of an act, namely that of being a wronging of a person? This is the question this paper will deal with. Some authors argue that valid consent changes the moral property of an act by changing the reasons which speak against the act. This account of the normative force of consent will be critically examined and rejected. An alternative model will then be put forward and defended according to which consent changes the moral property of an act if and only if the wrong-making property of the act is that it is not consented to. The upshot will be that consent does not eliminate the wrong-making property if the unconsented act is wrong for other reasons than not being consented to. 相似文献