Can Explanatory Reasons Be Good Reasons for Action?

What kind of thing is a reason for action? Are reasons for action subjective states of the agent, such as desires and/or beliefs? Or are they, rather, objective features of situations that favor certain actions? The suggestion offered in this article is that neither strategy satisfies. What is needed is a third category for classifying reasons which makes them out to be neither purely subjective nor purely objective. In brief: a reason for action is a feature of the situation that matters to the agent. On this proposal, subjective states of the agent are indeed indispensable in characterizing reasons for action. Precisely which set of situational features matter to an agent—precisely what shape the agent experiences the situation as having—depends on the agent's psychological makeup. Those features themselves are not psychological states, however, and it is precisely those features that constitute the agent's reasons for action.     

Be careful what you wish for but also why you wish for it – Goal-striving reasons and subjective well-being

Individuals’ subjective well-being (SWB) when attaining their goals is moderated by the characteristics of their goals. Two significant moderators are whether goals are approach or avoidance oriented and their content. Within the goal-setting literature, these characteristics have been applied to goals as such, focussing on what it is people try to achieve. However, they can equally be applied to analyse why individuals pursue their goals. By applying the dimensions of approach and avoidance orientation as well as goal content to the analysis of goal-striving reasons, a framework has been developed encompassing the following four goal-striving reasons: goals pursuit because of pleasure, for altruistic reasons, out of necessity and for self-esteem reasons. The empirical findings (N?=?174) show that goal-striving reasons are significantly associated with affective SWB. Therefore goal-striving reasons provide an additional level of analysis, when analysing the relation between goals and affective SWB.     

Epistemic Justice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing

The dual aim of this article is to reveal and explain a certain phenomenon of epistemic injustice as manifested in testimonial practice, and to arrive at a characterisation of the anti–prejudicial intellectual virtue that is such as to counteract it. This sort of injustice occurs when prejudice on the part of the hearer leads to the speaker receiving less credibility than he or she deserves. It is suggested that where this phenomenon is systematic it constitutes an important form of oppression.     

医生的特殊干涉:面对患者及其家属的知情不同意的伦理选择

在医疗活动中,医疗机构与医务人员面临着患者及其家属的知情不同意,分析了导致知情不同意的可能原因,论证了面对危及患者生命的知情不同意时医生行使特殊干涉权的合乎伦理性,并提出了行使特殊干涉权的具体做法。     

Publicly Accessible Intuitions: "Neutral Reasons" and Bioethics

This article examines Leon Kass's contention that a choice forphysician-assisted suicide is "undignified." Although Kass isJewish rather than Christian, he argues for positions that mostChristians share, and he argues for these positions withoutpresupposing the truth of specific religious claims. I arguethat although Kass has some important intuitions, he too readilyassumes that these intuitions will be shared by his audience,and that this assumption diminishes the force of his argument.An examination of the limitations of Kass's argument is helpfulinsofar as it illustrates the real challenge faced by religiousbelievers who wish to defend their beliefs in the "public forum."For it illustrates that what needs to be made "accessible" isthe Judeo-Christian understanding of man and his place in theworld. While I do not wish to claim that this task is impossible,I do think that it is far more difficult than most realize.Like all important tasks, however, unless we wrestle with thedifficulties it raises, our arguments will strike many as unconvincing.