Keep or trade? An experimental study of the exchange paradox

The “exchange paradox”—also referred to in the literature by a variety of other names, notably the “two-envelopes problem”—is notoriously difficult, and experts are not all agreed as to its resolution. Some of the various expressions of the problem are open to more than one interpretation; some are stated in such a way that assumptions are required in order to fill in missing information that is essential to any resolution. In three experiments several versions of the problem were used, in each of which the information given was sufficient to determine an optimal choice strategy when it exists or to justify indifference regarding keeping or trading when such a strategy does not exist. College students who were presented with the various versions of the problem tended to base their choices on simple heuristics and to give little evidence of understanding the probabilistic implications of the differences in the problem statements.     

A Moorean paradox of desire

A prevalent assumption among philosophers who believe that people can intentionally deceive themselves (intentionalists) is that they accomplish this by controlling what evidence they attend to. This article is concerned primarily with the evaluation of this claim, which we may call ‘attentionalism’. According to attentionalism, when one justifiably believes/suspects that not-p but wishes to make oneself believe that p, one may do this by shifting attention away from the considerations supportive of the belief that not-p and onto considerations supportive of the belief that p. The details of this theory are elaborated, its theoretical importance is pointed out, and it is argued that the strategy is supposed to work by leading to the repression of one's knowledge of the unwelcome considerations. However, I then show that the assumption that this is possible is opposed by the balance of a relevant body of empirical research, namely, the thought-suppression literature, and so intentionalism about self-deception cannot find vindication in the attentional theory.     

RECRIMINATION IN THE ANALYTIC SITUATION: A HYPOTHESIS ABOUT ITS INFLUENCE ON PSYCHOANALYTICAL GROUPS

This paper deals with certain distortions in communication generated by mutual recrimination that is the result of disturbances in the ideal agencies of both parties. Although the ideal ego, superego and ego ideal participate equally in reproach, it is the latter which is the most decisive. In clinical experience, recrimination may easily colour the analytic dialogue. In such cases, interpretation loses its sense of clarification and another type of dialogue replaces it. There, words are used to take possession of the other, for its autonomy is a threat to the static character of the pathology of mourning. The problem of recrimination has also tainted the development of psychoanalysis, to the point of disrupting the process of discovery itself. This paper deals with repercussions in the psychoanalytic movement and also in the elements that constitute its structure. Finally, different variations and disturbances in the psychoanalytic ideal are considered, as well as the involvement of the psychoanalytic institution in preserving or transforming the ideal. Here the importance of institutions and institutional ideals is emphasised. Finally, we suggest that ideals either encourage or hinder the working through of individual and collective mourning.     

Why the Liar Does not Matter

This paper develops a classical model for our ordinary use of the truth predicate (1) that is able to address the liar's paradox and (2) that satisfies a very strong version of deflationism. Since the model is a classical in the sense that it has no truth value gaps, the model is able to address Tarski's indictment of our ordinary use of the predicate as inconsistent. Moreover, since it is able to address the liar's paradox, it responds to arguments against deflationism based upon that paradox alone. The model is based upon a notion of the complexity of propositions that a fixed set of speakers might express. A context-sensitive definition of the truth predicate is then provided based upon a class of possible worlds defined in terms of these speakers. Reasonable constraints on the memories and lifetimes of ordinary speakers are used to limit the set of propositions that they might express so that deflationist requirements are satisfied.     

Reinhold Niebuhr's Paradox: Groundwork for Social Responsibility

This paper is an examination of Reinhold Niebuhr's embrace of the paradoxical in relation to his conception of the self. While it explores the theoretical and practical difficulties entailed in Niebuhr's account, it also seeks to defend his position, suggesting that in the light of Niebuhr's negative apologetic, the paradoxical self represents the only intelligible means of self–understanding available. Though Niebuhr never develops this epistemological ground, it may provide a way of avoiding the moral consequentialism to which Niebuhr appears to be resigned. The resulting framework points toward moral pragmatism, retaining its orientation and relevance in the midst of deliberations concerning means and ends.     

ON A PARADOX OF CHRISTIAN LOVE

The two love commands attributed to Jesus clearly show the basic feature of Christianity as a “religion of love.” However, it may be argued that there is conflict between these commands, so that the Christian idea of love confronts a deep paradox: on the one hand, it takes loving God as the ultimate foundation of loving one's neighbor and loving one's neighbor as the perfect manifestation of loving God. On the other hand, it gives supremacy to loving God over loving one's neighbor, with the result that, in cases of conflict, Christianity has to sacrifice loving one's neighbor to loving God and thus to negate the second great command by the first.     

The “Paradox of Self‐Constitution” and Korsgaard's Two Conceptions of Maxims for Action

This article argues that Christine Korsgaard gives two accounts of maxims, the identity‐priority account and the form‐priority account. There is a tension between the accounts because (1) Korsgaard's form‐priority maxims account cannot function apart from the identity of a well‐formed agent that precedes and tests maxims to determine if they should count as reasons or laws, and (2) Korsgaard's identity‐priority maxims account needs the form of the maxim to precede, bind, and constitute the well‐formed agent. This tension mirrors the two sides of what Korsgaard has called the “paradox of self‐constitution.” The article concludes that Korsgaard's paradox of self‐constitution leads to an arbitrariness that undermines the formation of moral laws.     

Is the paradox of fiction soluble in psychology?

If feeling a genuine emotion requires believing that its object actually exists, and if this is a belief we are unlikely to have about fictional entities, then how could we feel genuine emotions towards these entities? This question lies at the core of the paradox of fiction. Since its original formulation, this paradox has generated a substantial literature. Until recently, the dominant strategy had consisted in trying to solve it. Yet, it is more and more common for scholars to try to dismiss it using data and theories from psychology. In opposition to this trend, the present paper argues that the paradox of fiction cannot be dissolved in the ways recommended by the recent literature. We start by showing how contemporary attempts at dissolving the paradox assume that it emerges from theoretical commitments regarding the nature of emotions. Next, we argue that the paradox of fiction rather emerges from everyday observations, the validity of which is independent of any such commitment. This is why we then go on to claim that a mere appeal to psychology in order to discredit these theoretical commitments cannot dissolve the paradox. We bring our discussion to a close on a more positive note by exploring how the paradox could in fact be solved by an adequate theory of the emotions.     

"好人"如何一生平安?——走出"德福悖论"的怪圈

德福悖论现象一直是道德生活中所面,临的重大问题之一,为历代思想家所关注。在市场经济时代,“好人”虽不再是一个不言“利”的主体,但他能否“一生平安”,德福之间能否统一,关键在于“好人”是否处于一个“有道”或公正的社会制度里。     

The wealth paradox: Prosperity and opposition to immigration

The idea that economic downturns and economic deprivation provoke tensions and intergroup hostility is remarkably pervasive. These accounts often work from the premise that economic crises and poverty provide “fertile soil” for populist parties and leaders with an anti-immigrant agenda. This may explain why we intuitively expect that “hard times” produce “harsh attitudes” towards minorities. However, there is also robust empirical evidence showing that intergroup hostility (and anti-immigration sentiments more specifically) can (i) surge in times of economic prosperity, and (ii) be widespread among relatively affluent groups. In this article, I will review evidence showing that intergroup hostility (such as anti-immigrant sentiments) can be equally prevalent in times of relative gratification as well as in times of relative deprivation (accounting for the “Wealth Paradox”). In the second part of this contribution, I will explore these processes through the lens of classic social identity theorising focusing on the way that status anxiety, status threat, and fear of falling among members of wealthier groups are shaped by the permeability of group boundaries and the security of wealth positions. I argue that social identity theorising, typically applied to explain the behaviour of low status groups, can provide a parsimonious and integrative account for why and when high status (i.e., as a result of affluence and prosperity) may be associated with hostility towards minorities rather than with greater tolerance.