The Representation of Action: Insights From Bimanual Coordination

ABSTRACT— The motor-program concept, emphasizing how actions are represented in the brain, helped bring the study of motor control into the realm of cognitive psychology. However, interest in representational issues was in limbo for much of the past 30 years, during which time the focus was on biomechanical and abstract accounts of the constraints underlying coordinated movement. We review recent behavioral and neuroscientific evidence that highlights multiple levels of constraints in bimanual coordination, with an emphasis on work demonstrating that a primary source of constraint arises from the manner in which action goals are represented.     

Reconsidering the “aspiration–expectation gap” and assumed gender differences among urban youth

The present study investigated the relevance of the “aspiration–expectation gap” and traditional gender differences among urban youth in middle school and high school (N = 294). Results failed to indicate a significant difference between the occupational prestige levels of aspired and expected careers, but did indicate a significant difference between aspired and expected levels of education. In general, the proportion of girls significantly outweighed the proportion of boys in traditionally “masculine” occupations with high levels of prestige; girls also had higher levels of occupational prestige than boys in terms of careers they hoped and expected to obtain. Black and bi/multi-racial youth expected to have higher levels of education than White youth.     

Modest sociality and the distinctiveness of intention

Cases of modest sociality are cases of small scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations. I seek a conceptual framework that adequately supports our theorizing about such modest sociality. I want to understand what in the world constitutes such modest sociality. I seek an understanding of the kinds of normativity that are central to modest sociality. And throughout we need to keep track of the relations—conceptual, metaphysical, normative—between individual agency and modest sociality. In pursuit of these theoretical aims, I propose that a central phenomenon is shared intention. I argue that an adequate understanding of the distinctiveness of the intentions of individuals allows us to provide a construction of attitudes of the participants, and of relevant inter-relations and contexts that constitutes shared intention. I explain how shared intention, so understood, differs from a simple equilibrium within common knowledge. And I briefly contrast my views with aspects of views of John Searle and Margaret Gilbert.

Feelings of control: Contingency determines experience of action

The experience of causation is a pervasive product of the human mind. Moreover, the experience of causing an event alters subjective time: actions are perceived as temporally shifted towards their effects [Haggard, P., Clark, S., & Kalogeras, J. (2002). Voluntary action and conscious awareness. Nature Neuroscience, 5(4), 382-385]. This temporal shift depends partly on advance prediction of the effects of action, and partly on inferential “postdictive” explanations of sensory effects of action. We investigated whether a single factor of statistical contingency could explain both these aspects of causal experience. We studied the time at which people perceived a simple manual action to occur, when statistical contingency indicated a causal relation between action and effect, and when no such relation was indicated. Both predictive and inferential “postdictive” shifts in the time of action depended on strong contingency between action and effect. The experience of agency involves a process of causal learning based on statistical contingency.     

On the signals underlying conscious awareness of action

To investigate whether conscious judgments of movement onset are based solely on pre-movement signals (i.e., premotor or efference copy signals) or whether sensory feedback (i.e., reafferent) signals also play a role, participants judged the onset of finger and toe movements that were either active (i.e., self initiated) or passive (i.e., initiated by the experimenter). Conscious judgments were made by reporting the position of a rotating clock hand presented on a computer screen and were then compared to the actual measured time of movement onset. In line with previous studies, judgment errors were found to be anticipatory for both finger and toe movements. There was a significant difference between judgment errors for active and passive movements, with judgments of active movements being more anticipatory than judgments of passive movements. This is consistent with a pre-movement (from here on referred to as an “efferent”) account of action awareness because premotor and efference copy signals are only present in active movements, whereas the main source of movement information in passive movements is sensory feedback which is subject to time delays of conduction (and hence predicts later judgment times for passive movements). However, judgments of active toe movement onset time were less anticipatory than judgments of active finger movement onset time. This pattern of results is not consistent with a pure efferent account of conscious awareness of action onset - as this account predicts more anticipatory judgments for toe movements compared to finger movements. Instead, the data support the idea that conscious judgments of movement onset are based on efferent (i.e., premotor, efference copy) and reafferent (i.e., feedback from the movement) components.     

青年学生自信问卷的编制

自信是指对自己的信任,对自己身体、心理和社会性的信任,表现为有信心,不怀疑。为了编制青年学生自信问卷,首先采用开放式问卷对130名大学生和高中学生进行了调查,内容分析表明青年学生自信包含五类行为,在此基础上编制了青年学生自信预试问卷。391份有效问卷的探索性因素分析表明,青年学生自信问卷测查的是个五因素结构,包括才智自信、人际自信、品质自信、应对自信和成就自信。为了进一步检验青年学生自信问卷的构想效度,并考察其效标效度,1084名青年学生完成了该问卷和五项效标的测查。验证性因素分析支持青年学生自信问卷的结构,结合信度分析和多元回归分析的结果,表明青年学生自信问卷具有较好的信度与效度。     

When Walking Makes Perception Better

ABSTRACT— When we move, the visual world moves toward us. That is, self-motion normally produces visual signals (flow) that tell us about our own motion. But these signals are distorted by our motion: Visual flow actually appears slower while we are moving than it does when we are stationary and our surroundings move past us. Although for many years these kinds of distortions have been interpreted as a suppression of flow to promote the perception of a stable world, current research has shown that these shifts in perceived visual speed may have an important function in measuring our own self-motion. Specifically, by slowing down the apparent rate of visual flow during self-motion, our visual system is able to perceive differences between actual and expected flow more precisely. This is useful in the control of action.     

Tool use as a way to assess cognition: how do captive chimpanzees handle the weight of the hammer when cracking a nut?

Tool use in apes has been considered a landmark in cognition. However, while most studies concentrate on mental operations, there are very few studies of apes’ cognition as expressed in manual skills. This paper proposes theoretical and methodological considerations on movement analysis as a way of assessing primate cognition. We argue that a privileged way of appraising the characteristics of the cognitive abilities involved in tool use lies at the functional level. This implies that we focus on how the action proceeds, and more precisely, on how the functional characteristics of the task are generated. To support our view, we present the results of an experiment with five captive chimpanzees investigating the way how chimpanzees adapt to hammers of various weights while cracking nuts. The movement performed in the hammering task is analyzed in terms of energy production. Results show that chimpanzees mobilise passive as well as active forces to perform the compliant movement, that is, they modulate the dynamics of the arm/tool system. A comparison between chimpanzees suggests that experience contributes to this skill. The results suggest that in tool use, movements are not key per se, but only in as much as they express underlying cognitive processes. Electronic supplementary material  The online version of this article (doi:) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

群际情绪理论及其研究

群际情绪理论认为, 群际情绪是当个体认同某一社会群体, 群体成为自我的一部分时, 个体对内群体和外群体的情绪体验。群际情绪借用社会认同方法, 采用集体自我的概念作为其理论的源点, 认知评价、情绪、行为倾向是群际理论的三件套; 群际水平的情绪不同于个体水平的情绪; 群际情绪取决于群体认同水平; 群际情绪弥散于整个群体; 群际情绪有助于激发和调节群内、群际态度和行为。新近的研究也为群际理论提供了一定的证据, 群际情绪理论为消解偏见和改善群际关系提供了一个崭新的框架。     

汉语婴儿词汇学习的注意偏好

婴儿的动、名词词类学习存在跨文化差异,但是很少研究从注意偏好角度解释这类差异。本研究利用习惯化范式考察汉语婴儿在6-8个月和17-19个月时对事件中人物,动作和物体的区分。结果发现,6-8个月的婴儿仅能区分动作变化,对人物和物体无法区分,而17-19个月的婴儿对三类变化均可以区分。本研究提供了婴儿早期注意偏好发展的实验依据,同时为儿童早期单词获得提供了新的理论基础。