Rethinking Accountability in the Context of Human Rights

Within liberal democratic theory, ‘democratic accountability’ denotes an aggregative method for linking political decisions to citizens’ preferences through representative institutions. Could such a notion be transferred to the global context of human rights? Various obstacles seem to block such a transfer: there are no ‘world citizens’ as such; many people in need of human rights are not citizens of constitutional democratic states; and the aggregative methods that are supposed to sustain the link are often used in favour of nation-state strategic action rather than human rights. So what could accountability mean in relation to human rights? This article argues that discourse theory offers resources for approaching these problems and for rethinking a normative notion of accountability in relation to human rights. It is suggested that accountability should link political decisions to universal agreements through global rights institutions and that the link should be sustained by deliberative rather than aggregative procedures.     

Accountability in a computerized society

This essay warns of eroding accountability in computerized societies. It argues that assumptions about computing and features of situations in which computers are produced create barriers to accountability. Drawing on philosophical analyses of moral blame and responsibility, four barriers are identified: 1) the problem of many hands, 2) the problem of bugs, 3) blaming the computer, and 4) software ownership without liability. The paper concludes with ideas on how to reverse this trend. Several people have contributed generously to this work. Michael Davis, Deborah G. Johnson, Arthur Kuflik, Pamela Samuelson, Debra Satz, Richard De George, Larry May, and Dennis Thompson read drafts and made invaluable suggestions. Reviewers forScience and Engineering Ethics offered thorough and challenging commentary. An earlier version of the paper was presented at The American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division Meeting, December 1993, where audience comments and questions led to clarification of several key issues.     

Blame and Responsibility

This paper looks at judgments of guilt in the face of alleged wrong-doing, be it in public or in private discourse. Its concern is not the truth of such judgments, although the complexity and contestability of such claims will be stressed. The topic, instead, is what sort of activities we are engaged in, when we make our judgments on others' conduct. To examine judging as an activity it focuses on a series of problems that can occur when we blame others. On analysis, we see that these problems take the form of performative contradictions, so that the ostensible purposes of assigning guilt to others are undermined.There is clear evidence from social psychology that blame is especially frequently and inappropriately attributed to individuals in modern Western societies. On the other hand, it has often been observed how suspicious we are about the activity of judging – thus a widespread perception that a refusal to judge is somehow virtuous. My suggestion is that the sheer difficulty of attributions of responsibility, in the face of a complex and often arbitrary moral reality, frequently defeats us. This leads to a characteristic set of distortions when we blame, so that it is no surprise that we have become suspicious of all blaming activities.Yet, the paper argues, these problems need not arise when we hold others responsible. This paper therefore investigates what, exactly, can be questionable about attempts to assign guilt, and the structural logic that lies behind these problems – what will be called, adapting a term from social psychology, a belief in a just world. Such a belief takes for granted what needs to be worked for through human activity, and therefore tends to be counter-productive in dealing with misdeeds and adverse outcomes.     

Scientific misconduct: The lessons of time

Conclusions Pascal’s paper indicates how far we have come. Now as then, however, there is a need to reflect from outside the cocoon of our agencies, institutions, and disciplines to behold the enterprise that shapes both our behavior and our interpretations of it. For the boundary separating propriety from impropriety continues to move. Just as science, and the knowledge it begets, continues to evolve, so must our collective standards. The lessons of time include this: ORI or biomedical research is no island; each is connected to a body of practitioners who are accountable to a society that is ever-more skeptical of expert knowledge and the institutions entrusted with its development. We are participants in a process of “continuous improvement”, not occupants of a state of grace. For the good of the enterprise we cherish, it is best that we all remember that. The views expressed here are the author’s own and reflect neither those of NSF nor of the National Science Board.     

Relationships,not boundaries

The authors find it more useful to payattention to relationships than to boundaries.By focusing attention on bounded, individualpsychological issues, the metaphor ofboundaries can distract helping professionalsfrom thinking about inequities of power. Itoversimplifies a complex issue, inviting us toignore discourses around gender, race, class,culture, and the like that support injustice,abuse, and exploitation. Making boundaries acentral metaphor for ethical practice can keepus from critically examining the effects ofdistance, withdrawal, and non-participation.The authors describe how it is possible toexamine the practical, moral, and ethicaleffects of our participation in relationshipsby focusing on just relationships rather thanon boundaries. They give illustrations andclinical examples of relationally-focusedethical practices that derive from a narrativeapproach to therapy.     

The analyst's countertransference when supervising: friend or foe?

This paper explores transference and countertransference dynamics in the supervisory relationship and their impact on the task of supervision. The development of analytic theory in relation to supervision is described and the value-and ambiguity-of the concepts of 'mirroring', 'parallel process' and 'reflective process' are discussed. The impact of organizational dynamics on the supervisory relationship is investigated in relation to four main unconscious forces: a) organizational defences, b) power and authority, c) accountability and responsibility, d) ethical concerns. Clinical situations which illustrate these issues are described and explored and used as a basis for examining the role of the supervisor's countertransference in supervision. The different framework of practice in supervision, as opposed to analysis, is described in terms of its focus, the supervisor's ways of responding and the dynamic process, and the concept of refracted countertransference is introduced and explained.     

An Exploration of Young Clients' Experiences in Counseling With Post‐Master's Counselors

This phenomenological study adds to current literature about clients' meaningful experiences in counseling by exploring the experiences of eight young clients (ages 8–18) in individual counseling with post‐master's counselors in an outpatient setting. Interviews with these clients revealed the following six themes: (a) the process of growth, (b) having a safe place to talk, (c) counselor accepts and meets the client where they are, (d) counseling is a team effort, (e) supportive accountability from the counselor, and (f) understanding self and others. The final theme includes two subthemes: learning coping and emotion management skills, and learning better ways to communicate and behave. Findings and implications for counselors are discussed.