范围假设解释大学生性别刻板印象表征的适用性*

通过任务助长实验范式考察范围假设对于某一熟悉群体刻板化特质判断的适用性。研究结果表明当大学生对于某一熟悉群体的刻板印象的抽象表征被激活时,违反刻板印象的样例表征也得到激活,用以限定抽象表征的适用范围。研究结果支持范围假设,即当一个抽象概念从语义记忆中被提取时,与抽象概念相冲突的情景记忆也被提取,以用来限定抽象概念的适用范围。     

Revisiting the learning-without-awareness question in human pavlovian autonomic conditioning: Focus on extinction in a dichotic listening paradigm

Numerous studies have indicated that, consistent with current “cognitive” accounts of information processing, human Pavlovian autonomic discrimination acquisition cannot occur without awareness of the CS-US relationship. However, extinction studies have suggested that awareness is not necessary, findings that, in information-processing terms, have been explained by assuming that the processing by the extinction stage is parallel (automatic) rather than serial (controlled). This explanation was tested in an 80-subject study. The first, acquisition phase was a standard semantic differential conditioning arrangement with a 96-db white noise as US, and a “long” CS-US interval of 8 s, with ten trials each of CS+ (paired with US) and CS− (unpaired) trials. In extinction (USs omitted), in order to obtain non-autonomic indices of processing and thereby test the information-processing account of “unaware” autonomic conditioning during extinction, a dichotic listening task was implemented, with the CSs presented in the unattended channel (ear), while the subject had to perform a semantic differential reaction task in an attended-to channel (other ear). In early extinction, the electrodermal response occurring at an interval of 9–15 s after CS onset (i.e., following placement of the US during acquisition) and the finger-pulse-volume response occurring at an interval of 4–11 s after CS onset both showed reliable conditioning, but reaction-time and subjective-report data for the recognized critical words indicated serial rather than parallel processing of the CSs during extinction.     

Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity

To articulate their understanding of Hume’s discussion of ‘distinctions of reason’, commentators have often taken what I refer to as a ‘respect-first view’ on resemblance, in which they categorize resemblance as based on resembling respects. Holding this view, Donald Baxter argues that Hume’s view on the distinctions of reason leads to a contradiction. As an alternative, I offer ‘the resemblance-first view’, which is not dependent on resembling respects. I argue that this view is textually supported, and that it rescues Hume from the proposed contradiction.     

A Neo-Kantian foundation of Corporate Social Responsibility

‘Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is conceptualized in many ways. We argue that one cannot be indifferent about the issue of its conceptualization. In terms of methodology, our position is that any conceptual discussion must embed CSR in political theory. With regard to substance, we link up with the discussion on whether CSR must be defined on the basis of a tripartite or a quadripartite division of business responsibilities. We share A.B. Carroll’s intuition that a quadripartite division is called for as a basis to define CSR. However, defending the quadripartite division of business responsibilities requires that the distinctions between economic, legal, ethical and discretionary business responsibilities be made intelligible. Carroll’s account is defective in this respect. We argue that contemporary Neo-Kantian political ethics is able to make sense of these distinctions, because of its specific interpretation of liberalism. Interestingly, from a conventional liberal perspective this interpretation of liberalism is atypical, as it extends public morality beyond the domain of the law.

The philosophical legacy of Meehl (1978): confirmation theory, theory quality, and scientific epistemology

The reach and impact of Paul Meehl’s work is extraordinary. Focusing on his “Theoretical Risks and Tabular Asterisks”, I trace three consequences of his findings. The first is the influence of his work on confirmation theory in the philosophy of science, in which he provided a more sophisticated alternative to Popperianism, despite some affinities with it. The second is a clear focus on the evaluation of theory quality as an explanation for the success of hard vs. soft theories. The third is a very deep critique of the practices of contemporary epistemology; his research recommends the replacement of demonstrably unreliable, subjective judgments about justification and knowledge with simple predictive models that outperform human experts. This is an impressive array of intellectual contributions to psychology and philosophy. As influential as his work was, it is just now beginning to receive attention commensurate with its merits.