空间图式加工促进方向性时间表述的理解

时间表征是否具有空间方向性？本研究通过考察66名研究生时间表述实时加工中的空间引导效应来回答这个问题。实验一表明：空间垂直方向性图式促进被试加工含有空间词汇的时间表述;实验二表明：两种空间方向性图式,即水平方向性图式和垂直方向性图式,都促进被试加工含有纯时问词汇的时间表述。实验结果证实了时间表征具有空间方向性,并为“抽象思维以感知一动觉经验为基础”这一论点提供心理学证据。     

神经网络模型对内隐学习的探索

近几年来,研究者们借助人工神经网络模型的方法对内隐学习研究中突出的争论性问题进行了新的探索。针对内隐学习的无意识问题,模拟研究发现确实存在一种无意识的内隐学习,然而这种无意识加工的发生与否要取决于规则的难易程度;针对内隐学习的抽象性问题,人工神经网络模型所主张的分布式概率表征能较好地加以解释。可见,神经网络模型的原理和模拟研究可能为真正地解决内隐学习的无意识性和抽象性等目前争论较多的领域提供一个全新的视角和研究方向。     

低卷入情境中品牌远延伸的成功机制

品牌延伸是近年营销学界的一个研究热点。多数实证研究表明,母品牌认知、母品牌好感、延伸类别与母品牌类别之间的拟合度以及母品牌特定联想对品牌延伸评价有重要的影响作用。然而,已有理论在解释跨类别的远距离延伸的成功机制上比较乏力。本研究采用实证方法对这一点进行了补充。考虑到初始延伸评价所处的低卷入情境,概念层级较高的品牌相关变量在品牌远延伸评价中有重要的影响作用,本研究对三个品牌相关变量：品牌类别固着度、品牌抽象性与功能性特点、品牌声誉的主效应采用三个控制实验进行了测查。实验结果表明,较小的类别固着度,较高的品牌抽象性特点,以及较高的品牌声誉是品牌远延伸获得成功的机制保证。     

Concept learning by monkeys with video picture images and a touch screen.

Two rhesus monkeys were trained in a same/different task to discriminate digitized computer-stored picture stimuli. The pictures were digitized from 35-mm slides and presented in pairs on a computer monitor. The monkeys were required to touch the pictures and then make a choice response to indicate whether the pictures were identical or nonidentical. The response areas and stimuli were located to the sides of the picture stimuli. Responses were defined and monitored by an infrared matrix touch screen. After learning the same/different task, both monkeys showed performance accuracy with novel picture stimuli similar to that with training picture stimuli. This accurate novel-picture transfer indicates that a same/different concept had been learned, a concept similar to the one they had previously demonstrated in a different apparatus with rear-projected slide stimuli and a response lever.     

幼儿对具体图片与抽象图片内隐记忆的实验研究

本研究选择３—６岁幼儿为被试,采用具体图片与抽象图片两种材料,分别交叉使用内隐学习与外显学习两种方式,探讨不同年龄幼儿内隐记忆与外显记忆的效果及特点。实验结果表明：幼儿期幼儿确实存在内隐学习,幼儿对抽象材料的内隐记忆效果优于外显记忆效果;幼儿内隐记忆与外显记忆两种效果均随年龄增长而逐步发展。     

自我概念清晰性的影响因素与干预策略：基于自我概念结构三元整合假设的新视角

自我概念清晰性是个体对自身看法感到明晰、确信、内部一致和跨时间稳定的程度,它影响广泛,但现有研究缺乏对其影响因素和干预策略的理论整合。受低自我概念清晰性源于自我概念结构整合困难启发,本文提出了自我概念结构三元整合假设,将自我概念结构整合分为跨经验抽象整合、跨场域共时整合和跨时间历时整合三方面,从这三方面剖析了如何降低自我概念结构整合难度,并基于此梳理了影响自我概念清晰性的环境因素（外因）和个体因素（内因）。本文为理解自我概念清晰性形成机制提供了新的理论框架,为自我概念清晰性干预提供了“路线图”。     

Monster character profiling and Chinese classifier cognition: linguistic and conceptual perspectives

In this research, we explored the construal of mythical creatures created out of ordinary animals by approaching the selection of Chinese classifiers zhi and ge. Monster figures as such are viewed ambiguously as an animal or as a novel entity. From the lexico-semantic perspective, we surveyed the co-occurrences of these two classifiers with two Chinese labels commonly used for monsters: guaishou and guaiwu, which provide lexical cues for the finely nuanced difference in (non-)/animate readings respectively. From the conceptual perspective, we examined the acceptability as to the uses of these two classifiers for the monster figures, the structures of which incurred different effects of novelty. We found that the (non-)/animal-like interpretation is encoded by zhi and ge at both the linguistic and conceptual layers. The findings of our work have implications for the relation of language and thought, our understanding of fictional world entities, and our understanding of classifier cognition.     

The ontological status of minimal entities

Minimal entities are, roughly, those that fall under notions defined by only deflationary principles. In this paper I provide an accurate characterization of two types of minimal entities: minimal properties and minimal facts. This characterization is inspired by both Schiffer’s notion of a pleonastic entity and Horwich’s notion of minimal truth. I argue that we are committed to the existence of minimal properties and minimal facts according to a deflationary notion of existence, and that the appeal to the inferential role reading of the quantifiers does not dismiss this commitment. I also argue that deflationary existence is language-dependent existence—this clarifies why minimalists about properties and facts are not realists about these entities though their language may appear indistinguishable from the language of realists.

Persons,animals, and identity

The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of animalist accounts. Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via brain transplants or cerebrum transplants are committed to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. This counterintuitiveness can be defused by holding that a person is biological animal (on neo-Lockean views) if the “is” is the “is” of constitution rather than the “is” of identity, and that a person is identical with an animal in a sense of “animal” different from that which requires the persistence conditions of animals to be biological. Another challenge is the “too many minds problem”: if persons and their coincident biological animals share the same physical properties, and mental properties supervene on physical properties, the biological animal will share the mental properties of the person, and so should itself be a person. The response to this invokes a distinction between “thin” properties, which are shared by coincident entities, and “thick” properties which are not so shared. Mental properties, and their physical realizers, are thick, not thin, so are not properties persons share with their bodies or biological animals. The paper rebuts the objection that neo-Lockean accounts cannot explain how persons can have physical properties. To meet a further problem it is argued that the biological properties of persons and those of biological animals are different because of differences in their causal profiles.