多元表征假设：概念表征机制的新观点

传统的认知主义认为概念表征是与主体的感知系统无关的抽象符号。而具身理论则认为,概念表征以主体的感觉、知觉运动系统为基础的,感知系统在概念表征中具有中心作用。然而,具身性假设无法恰当的解释抽象概念表征这一问题。这种局限性说明主体的概念系统可能具有多元表征机制：既包括感知表征以加工与身体经验相关的具体知识,也包括抽象符号表征以加工与身体经验无关的抽象知识。来自病理学、认知神经科学和行为实验的实证研究证明了不同类型的概念会涉及不同的表征机制,证实了多元表征存在的合理性。今后的研究应探讨各种表征机制之间的关系等问题。     

Two arguments against lying

Kant and Sidgwick are at opposite extremes on whether we may tell paternalistic lies. I trace the extremism to their views about ethical concepts. Sidgwick thinks fundamental ethical concepts must be precise. Common Sense morality says we may tell paternalistic lies to children but not to sane adults. Because the distinction between a child and an adult is imprecise, Sidgwick thinks this principle cannot be fundamental, and must be based on the (precise) principle of utility, which often mandates paternalistic lies to adults. Kant thinks that ethical concepts are ideals of reason, which do not fit the world precisely because the world is imperfect. We lie to children and the insane because they are irrational, but no one is perfectly rational. We must treat all persons with the respect due to rational agents, so the pressure of the theory is toward not lying to anyone. Decisions about where to draw the line must be made pragmatically and to some extent arbitrary. But fear of this is not a good reason to abandon ethical ideals for utilitarianism.     

道德概念垂直空间隐喻理解中的映射:双向性及不平衡性

通过4个实验考察道德概念垂直空间隐喻理解中的映射机制和特征。实验1采用空间Stroop范式,发现被试判断完道德词后,对判断随后呈现在屏幕上方或下方字母的反应时的差异不显著,没有发现词汇类型对空间位置的影响。实验2采用有意识迫选法,要求被试出声读出屏幕中央的道德词后,对屏幕上方或下方的希腊语非词进行二择一迫选,发现被试读出道德词后倾向于选择屏幕上方的非词,读出不道德词后倾向于选择屏幕下方的非词。实验3仍采用Stroop范式,发现被试做出空间"上"的判断后,对随后道德词的词义判断反应时显著快于不道德词,做出空间"下"的判断后,对不道德词的反应时显著快于道德词。实验4探讨空间位置是否会对判断人物的道德性产生影响,结果发现被试倾向于认为屏幕上方的人物是道德的,而屏幕下方的人物是不道德的。4个实验的结果表明,在道德概念垂直空间隐喻的理解中,映射的方式是灵活的、双向的,既可以由始源域向目标域映射,也可以由目标域向始源域映射,但两个方向上的映射力量是不平衡的。     

具身认知视角下的概念隐喻理论

隐喻是一种常见的语言现象.概念隐喻理论认为,隐喻不仅是一种语言修辞手段,隐喻反映了人类认知的重要特征:人类的抽象概念系统是以感知觉经验和具体概念为基础发展形成的.根据概念隐喻理论,主体可以以感知运动经验对抽象概念进行体验式表征与加工.大量研究证明,抽象概念的加工同对其进行隐喻化描述的身体经验具有关联.这些研究主要涉及空间隐喻、温度隐喻、洁净隐喻、触觉隐喻等.未来的研究应探讨多重隐喻对认知的影响、探索塑造隐喻映射单向作用与相互作用的因素,并关注概念隐喻理论的应用性等问题.     

二语情绪概念理解中的空间隐喻

采用空间启动范式考察二语情绪概念理解中是否激活空间信息, 即是否存在空间隐喻。实验1探讨单通道二语情绪概念理解中的空间隐喻, 实验2则探讨跨通道二语情绪概念理解中的空间隐喻。实验1中让32名母语为汉语的汉-英双语者先看一个英文情绪词, 接着进行视觉空间位置判断, 最后再让被试判断之前呈现的情绪词是积极词还是消极词。实验2中40名母语为汉语的汉-英双语者完成跟实验1类似的任务, 不同之处为英文情绪词以听觉形式呈现。两个实验的结果表明, 跨语言和跨通道的情绪词的空间隐喻受到空间位置方向的影响。垂直位置方向上, 二语情绪词在单通道和跨通道中都表现出了空间隐喻; 水平位置方向上, 二语情绪词没有表现出空间隐喻。该结果说明了情绪概念的空间隐喻会受到个体经验的影响, 进一步支持了知觉符号理论。     

Liberalism,Abstract Individualism,and the Problem of Particular Obligations

In the following I take issue with the allegation that liberalism must inevitably be guilty of ‘abstract individualism’. I treat Michael Sandel’s well-known claim that there are ‘loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are’ as representative of this widely held view. Specifically, I argue: (i) that Sandel’s account of the manner in which ‘constitutive’ loyalties function as reasons for action presupposes the possibility of there being (what I call) ‘underivable particular obligations’, but that such obligations are, in fact, a logical impossibility; and (ii) that Sandel’s account of the self as necessarily ‘encumbered’ presupposes an account of personal identity which confuses identification with definition, and which is, therefore, fundamentally flawed. For their constructive and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, I owe a special debt of gratitude to the following: Clare Chambers, Roger Crisp, Cécile Fabre, Paul Kelly, David Lloyd-Thomas. Thanks also go to Res Publica’s two anonymous referees.     

Spontaneous number discrimination of multi-format auditory stimuli in cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus)

Studies using operant training have demonstrated that laboratory animals can discriminate the number of objects or events based on either auditory or visual stimuli, as well as the integration of both auditory and visual modalities. To date, studies of spontaneous number discrimination in untrained animals have been restricted to the visual modality, leaving open the question of whether such capacities generalize to other modalities such as audition. To explore the capacity to spontaneously discriminate number based on auditory stimuli, and to assess the abstractness of the representation underlying this capacity, a habituation-discrimination procedure involving speech and pure tones was used with a colony of cotton-top tamarins. In the habituation phase, we presented subjects with either two- or three-speech syllable sequences that varied with respect to overall duration, inter-syllable duration, and pitch. In the test phase, we presented subjects with a counterbalanced order of either two- or three-tone sequences that also varied with respect to overall duration, inter-syllable duration, and pitch. The proportion of looking responses to test stimuli differing in number was significantly greater than to test stimuli consisting of the same number. Combined with earlier work, these results show that at least one non-human primate species can spontaneously discriminate number in both the visual and auditory domain, indicating that this capacity is not tied to a particular modality, and within a modality, can accommodate differences in format.     

Do phenomenal concepts misrepresent?

Many contemporary physicalists concede to dualists that conscious subjects have distinctive “phenomenal concepts” of the phenomenal qualities of their experiences. Indeed, they contend that idiosyncratic characteristics of these concepts facilitate responses to influential anti-physicalist arguments. Like some some other critics of this approach, James Tartaglia (2013 Tartaglia, J. (2013). Conceptualizing physical consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 26(6), 817–838.[Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) maintains that phenomenal concepts express contents that conflict with physicalism, but as a physicalist, the moral he distinctively draws from this is that phenomenal concepts misrepresent. He contends further that the contemporary physicalists’ account cannot accommodate this feature, and that in consequence, physicalists should abandon phenomenal concepts and return to the identity theory championed by Place and Smart in the 1950s. I respond to Tartaglia by identifying lacunae in his interpretation of contemporary physicalism and arguing that phenomenal concepts as conceived by the contemporary physicalists do not express contents that support either dualist or physicalist metaphysics: they are “metaphysically neutral.”