Dogs recall their owner's face upon hearing the owner's voice

We tested whether dogs have a cross-modal representation of human individuals. We presented domestic dogs with a photo of either the owner's or a stranger's face on the LCD monitor after playing back a voice of one of those persons. A voice and a face matched in half of the trials (Congruent condition) and mismatched in the other half (Incongruent condition). If our subjects activate visual images of the voice, their expectation would be contradicted in Incongruent condition. It would result in the subjects’ longer looking times in Incongruent condition than in Congruent condition. Our subject dogs looked longer at the visual stimulus in Incongruent condition than in Congruent condition. This suggests that dogs actively generate their internal representation of the owner's face when they hear the owner calling them. This is the first demonstration that nonhuman animals do not merely associate auditory and visual stimuli but also actively generate a visual image from auditory information. Furthermore, our subject also looked at the visual stimulus longer in Incongruent condition in which the owner's face followed an unfamiliar person's voice than in Congruent condition in which the owner's face followed the owner's voice. Generating a particular visual image in response to an unfamiliar voice should be difficult, and any expected images from the voice ought to be more obscure or less well defined than that of the owners. However, our subjects looked longer at the owner's face in Incongruent condition than in Congruent condition. This may indicate that dogs may have predicted that it should not be the owner when they heard the unfamiliar person's voice.     

Relevance and argumentation: How bald can you get

This paper is concerned with vagueness in language, its relation to logico-philosophical questions on the one hand, and to so-called syncategorematic terms and their linguistic use on the other hand. It attempts to show that it is not language itself which is vague but rather the way we use it.     

Two arguments against lying

Kant and Sidgwick are at opposite extremes on whether we may tell paternalistic lies. I trace the extremism to their views about ethical concepts. Sidgwick thinks fundamental ethical concepts must be precise. Common Sense morality says we may tell paternalistic lies to children but not to sane adults. Because the distinction between a child and an adult is imprecise, Sidgwick thinks this principle cannot be fundamental, and must be based on the (precise) principle of utility, which often mandates paternalistic lies to adults. Kant thinks that ethical concepts are ideals of reason, which do not fit the world precisely because the world is imperfect. We lie to children and the insane because they are irrational, but no one is perfectly rational. We must treat all persons with the respect due to rational agents, so the pressure of the theory is toward not lying to anyone. Decisions about where to draw the line must be made pragmatically and to some extent arbitrary. But fear of this is not a good reason to abandon ethical ideals for utilitarianism.     

Object knowledge and the emergence of language

Infants' spontaneous play with objects was examined for evidence of developments in object knowledge in relation to the emergence of words and the single-word period in language development. Subjects were 7 girls and 7 boys, from different ethnic and economic backgrounds, who were studied longitudinally from 9 months to 26 months of age. Two types of displacements of objects in relation to one another were identified in the children's play: separations and constructions. The development of constructions was associated with the emergence of words, and constructions increased with age while separations decreased. The development of specific constructions, which account for knowledge of the particular properties of objects, was more strongly associated with a vocabulary spurt at the end of the single-word period than with chronological age. Despite the wide variation in the infants' ages when developments in language and play were reached, relations between achievements in the two domains were consistent among them, as confirmed with the Friedman test, p<.001. The results are discussed in terms of the cognitive developments required for play with objects and saying words.     

The associated nontargets effect: Evidence of nontarget processing at and beyond the level of letter recognition

In four visual search tasks participants were asked to make a target response if either of two targets was present and to make a nontarget response if neither target was present. Some target-absent displays included only nontarget stimuli or features that never occurred in the same displays as targets, whereas other target-absent displays included nontarget stimuli or features that did sometimes occur with targets. Nontarget responses were reliably faster in the former case than in the latter. This “associated nontargets effect” indicates that nontargets are not simply classified as nontargets but in addition are discriminated from one another. Current visual search models may underestimate the degree to which nontargets are processed during search.     

Frege,Boolos, and Logical Objects

In this paper, the authors discuss Frege's theory of logical objects (extensions, numbers, truth-values) and the recent attempts to rehabilitate it. We show that the eta relation George Boolos deployed on Frege's behalf is similar, if not identical, to the encoding mode of predication that underlies the theory of abstract objects. Whereas Boolos accepted unrestricted Comprehension for Properties and used the eta relation to assert the existence of logical objects under certain highly restricted conditions, the theory of abstract objects uses unrestricted Comprehension for Logical Objects and banishes encoding (eta) formulas from Comprehension for Properties. The relative mathematical and philosophical strengths of the two theories are discussed. Along the way, new results in the theory of abstract objects are described, involving: (a) the theory of extensions, (b) the theory of directions and shapes, and (c) the theory of truth values.     

Natural Numbers and Natural Cardinals as Abstract Objects: A Partial Reconstruction of Frege" s="" grundgesetze="" in="" object="" theory"="

In this paper, the author derives the Dedekind–Peano axioms for number theory from a consistent and general metaphysical theory of abstract objects. The derivation makes no appeal to primitive mathematical notions, implicit definitions, or a principle of infinity. The theorems proved constitute an important subset of the numbered propositions found in Frege"s Grundgesetze. The proofs of the theorems reconstruct Frege"s derivations, with the exception of the claim that every number has a successor, which is derived from a modal axiom that (philosophical) logicians implicitly accept. In the final section of the paper, there is a brief philosophical discussion of how the present theory relates to the work of other philosophers attempting to reconstruct Frege"s conception of numbers and logical objects.     

道德概念垂直空间隐喻理解中的映射:双向性及不平衡性

通过4个实验考察道德概念垂直空间隐喻理解中的映射机制和特征。实验1采用空间Stroop范式,发现被试判断完道德词后,对判断随后呈现在屏幕上方或下方字母的反应时的差异不显著,没有发现词汇类型对空间位置的影响。实验2采用有意识迫选法,要求被试出声读出屏幕中央的道德词后,对屏幕上方或下方的希腊语非词进行二择一迫选,发现被试读出道德词后倾向于选择屏幕上方的非词,读出不道德词后倾向于选择屏幕下方的非词。实验3仍采用Stroop范式,发现被试做出空间"上"的判断后,对随后道德词的词义判断反应时显著快于不道德词,做出空间"下"的判断后,对不道德词的反应时显著快于道德词。实验4探讨空间位置是否会对判断人物的道德性产生影响,结果发现被试倾向于认为屏幕上方的人物是道德的,而屏幕下方的人物是不道德的。4个实验的结果表明,在道德概念垂直空间隐喻的理解中,映射的方式是灵活的、双向的,既可以由始源域向目标域映射,也可以由目标域向始源域映射,但两个方向上的映射力量是不平衡的。     

ISOLATING THE INDIVIDUAL: THEOLOGY,THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION,AND THE PROBLEM OF ABSTRACT INDIVIDUALISM

Debates about the theological implications of recent research in the cognitive and evolutionary study of religion have tended to focus on the question of theism. The question of whether there is any disagreement about the conceptualization of the individual human being has been largely overlooked. In this article, I argue that evolutionary and cognitive accounts of religion typically depend upon a view of cognition that conceptually isolates the mind from its particular social and physical environmental contexts. By embracing this view of the mind, these accounts also unwittingly embrace an abstract individualist view of individual personhood that Christian theologians have explicitly battled against. Taken as a whole, the field leaves sufficient room for supplementary theories that are compatible with theological accounts of the relational individual, but in practice, no effort has been made to engage, or even to accommodate, any other view of individual personhood.