Increased accessibility of semantic concepts after (more or less) subtle activation of related concepts: support for the basic tenet of priming research

Abstract

Increasingly remote concepts and behaviors have been primed, which have come under increasing criticism. In this present experiment, we take a step back and try to strengthen the roots of priming research. In this experiment, we systematically varied the activation or priming of a concept in six experiments (N?=?1285). We then measured accessibility for semantic concepts using a word stem completion task. Across the six experiments, our investigations showed that the activation of semantic concepts is possible through greater accessibility of semantically congruent words (with only one experiment failing to reach a conventional level of significance). These results provide a prerequisite for further investigation into behavioral priming. The present experiment showed that the basal priming mechanisms are robust effects. The meta-analytic integration showed that women reliably had access to more baby-related words. A possible explanation is that social role stereotypes associate women more with the reproductive sphere than men and that women, to a certain extent, internalize these societal views. Other explanations and potential future applications are discussed.     

On the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics

In recent years, there has been growing discussion amongst philosophers about “conceptual engineering”. Put roughly, conceptual engineering concerns the assessment and improvement of concepts, or of other devices we use in thought and talk (e.g., words). This often involves attempts to modify our existing concepts (or other representational devices), and/or our practices of using them. This paper explores the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, where conceptual ethics is taken to encompass normative and evaluative questions about concepts, words, and other broadly “representational” and/or “inferential” devices we use in thought and talk. We take some of the central questions in conceptual ethics to concern which concepts we should use and what words should mean, and why. We put forward a view of conceptual engineering in terms of the following three activities: conceptual ethics, conceptual innovation, and conceptual implementation. On our view, conceptual engineering can be defined in terms of these three activities, but not in a straightforward, Boolean way. Conceptual engineering, we argue, is made up of mereologically complex activities whose parts fall into the categories associated with each of these three different activities.