Sportsmanship

What is sportsmanship? Following Keating, we may say that sportsmanship is conduct befitting a person involved in sports. This raises the question of what kind of activity exactly sport is. This is notoriously difficult to answer, but roughly speaking, sport is a rule-governed activity that is about excellence, an understanding of how to play the game, and, in competitive sports, winning. Accordingly, there are four elements of sportsmanship: fairness, equity, good form and the will to win. These four elements are equally important and not reducible to one another. Yet, the will to win is in systematic conflict with the other three elements. Hence, sportsmanship is not only compromised of these four elements, but also requires that a balance be held between them.     

Sinnott-Armstrong,Walter, ed., Moral Psychology Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity,Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2008, pp. xviii + 585, US$30 (paper)

It is plausible that the universe exists: a thing such that absolutely everything is a part of it. It is also plausible that singular, structured propositions exist: propositions that literally have individuals as parts. Furthermore, it is plausible that for each thing, there is a singular, structured proposition that has it as a part. Finally, it is plausible that parthood is a partial ordering: reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric. These plausible claims cannot all be correct. We canvass some costs of denying each claim and conclude that parthood is not a partial ordering. Provided that the relevant entities exist, parthood is not anti-symmetric and proper parthood is neither asymmetric nor transitive.     

消费者的归因对价格公平感和购买意愿的影响

采用实验情景模拟的方法,通过2X5的被试间设计,以712名被试作为研究对象,检验了在不同原因和不同商品涨价情景下消费者的价格公平感和购买意愿。在不提供涨价原因的情景下,被试的反应比较温和。根据归因理论,从控制点和可控性的维度区分了四种研究情景。结果发现,控制点和可控性之间的交互作用显著,控制点和商品种类的交互作用显著,消费者的消极情绪和对组织的评价在公平感与购买意愿之间具有部分中介效应。     

Motives and Likelihood of Bribery: An Experimental Study of Managers in Taiwan

Many studies of bribery acknowledge the important role of bribe-givers, but their true motives remain unclear. We propose that the likelihood of bribery depends on the willingness of an organization to affiliate with local parties or to be successful in a host country, or to have power over local parties. We further argue that different opportunities, either pervasive or arbitrary, facilitate different types of motives that affect the likelihood of bribery. In addition, we investigate the effect of perceived fairness on the likelihood of bribery. We employ a 3 (motives: affiliation vs. achievement vs. power)?×?2 (opportunities: pervasiveness vs. arbitrariness)?×?2 (perceived fairness: high vs. low) factorial design in experimental settings among Executive MBA students in southern Taiwan. Our findings indicate that, when companies perceive a higher level of distributive fairness, high-achieving organizations are more likely to offer a bribe when the condition is pervasive. When they have a powerful motive, arbitrariness engenders a higher likelihood of bribery. When they perceive less distributive fairness, there are no significant differences between motive and opportunity.     

Workplace fairness and emotional exhaustion in Nigeria police: The moderating role of gender

Abstract

This study examined the moderating role of gender in the relationship between perceived workplace fairness and reported level of emotional exhaustion among a sample of Nigeria police. A total of 214 participants took part in the cross-sectional survey. Results of the moderated hierarchical regression analysis provided support for gender as a moderating variable in the relationship between perceived workplace fairness and emotional exhaustion, such that perceived workplace fairness was a stronger predictor of emotional exhaustion among male police than for female police. The practical implications for the management of emotional exhaustion in general, and for the Nigeria police in particular, were emphasized.     

Order,disorder, and the absolute: An experiment in dialogue

The first section of this dialogue is excerpted from an edited conversation between Sean Kelly and the late David Bohm, and focuses on the concepts of order, disorder, and the Absolute. The second section explores these concepts in greater depth, with Bohm maintaining the impossibility of absolute knowledge and the fundamental unintelligibility of the concept of disorder, preferring instead to speak of “orders of infinite degree” which emerge out of an “unknown ground.” Kelly responds by proposing the concept of “absolute knowing” as the cognitive process within which the concepts of order and disorder, the known and the Unknown are seen as dialectically related moments of the Absolute as complex whole. The third section is Edgar Morin's response to the preceding dialogue. He begins by outlining his views on the nature and limits of rationality, maintaining, with Bohm, the superiority of the “negative modality” of speaking about “being” or “reality.” In the second part, however, he proposes the notion of nature as “chaosmos,” which he understands as a creative “dialogic” of order, disorder, and organization.     

Can Competition Ever be Fair? Challenging the Standard Prejudice

In this paper, we challenge the usual argument which says that competition is a fair mechanism because it ranks individuals according to their relative preferences between effort and leisure. This argument, we claim, is very insufficient as a justification of fairness in competition, and we show that it does not stand up to scrutiny once various dynamic aspects of competition are taken into account. Once the sequential unfolding of competition is taken into account, competition turns out to be unfair even if the usual fairness argument is upheld. We distinguish between two notions of fairness, which we call U-fairness, where U stands for the usual fairness notion, and S-fairness, where S stands for the sequential aspect of competition. The sequential unfairness of competition, we argue, comprises two usually neglected aspects connected with losses of freedom: first of all, there is an eclipse of preferences in the sense that even perfectly calculating competitors do not carry out a trade-off between effort and ranking; and second, competitive dynamics leads to single-mindedness because the constraints on the competitors choices always operate in the sense of increased competitiveness and, therefore, in the direction of an increased effort requirements. We argue (1) that competition is S-unfair even if it is U-fair, (2) that as S-unfairness increases, the ethical relevance of U-fairness itself vanishes, so that (3) by focusing as they usually do on U-fairness alone, economists neglect a deeper aspect of unfairness.     

The role of cues to differential absolute size in children's transitive inferences

To investigate the role that "nonlogical" cues might play in transitive inference, 6- and 7-year-olds were given a three-term transitive task in which perceptual cues to differential absolute size were either present or absent. Relationships between the taught premises and the relational information that was physically present were manipulated using four basic conditions: "congruent," "inverse," "pretended," or "persuaded." Both age groups showed identical overall premise memory, but the younger group tended to reason more on the basis of the perceptual information rather than on the successfully encoded premise information. Contrasts between the various conditions showed that categorical effects can be circumvented in three-term problems with appropriate controls, that there may be qualitative as well as quantitative differences in transitive inference with age, and that transitive inference is not based solely on memory. The findings also indicate that, although 7-year-olds are competent in "logic-based" transitive inference, they experience great difficulty on tasks involving pretend information.     

Rawls and Research on Cognitively Impaired Patients: A Reply to Maio

In his paper, “The Relevance of Rawls’ Principle of Justice for Research on Cognitively Impaired Patients” (Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 23 (2002):45–53), Giovanni Maio has developed athought-provoking argument for the permissibility of non-therapeutic research on cognitively impaired patients. Maio argues that his conclusion follows from the acceptance of John Rawls’s principles of justice, specifically, Rawls’s “liberty principle” Maio has misinterpreted Rawls’s “libertyprinciple” – correctly interpreted it does notsupport non-therapeutic research on cognitivelyimpaired patients. Three other ‘Rawlsian’ arguments are suggested by Maio’s discussion –two “self-respect” arguments and a “presumed consent” argument – but none of them are convincing. However, an alternative argument developed from Rawls’s discussion of “justice in health care” in his most recent book, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, may justify certain kinds of non-therapeutic research on some cognitively impaired patients in special circumstances. We should not expect anything more permissive from a liberal theory of justice. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.