Relationship and transfer between mental and written arithmetic

In a first experiment, adults practiced single- and two-digit mental addition over a 6-day period. There was a clear training effect for both types of problems, even if two-digit additions were different from one day to another. Moreover, participants were tested on their written calculation abilities before and after the training programme. We showed that participants who entered the mental arithmetic training programme did not progress more in written arithmetic than participants who did not receive any training between the pre- and the post-tests. Conversely, in a second experiment, participants were trained in multidigit written addition and we examined the effect of such training on single- and two-digit mental addition. Again and trivially, there was a clear effect of training on written addition, but, more importantly, a transfer on mental addition. The implications of these results on the nature of the relationship between mental and written arithmetic are discussed.     

Orthogonal factors of mental ability? A response to Hampshire et al.

We respond to the main points raised by Hampshire et al. (2014). First, we note that the simulation study of Hampshire et al. (2012) was based on the assumption that individual differences in the capacities of the three proposed brain networks are mutually independent. However, this orthogonality cannot be assumed even if those networks are anatomically and functionally distinct. We also consider further the implications of our finding that a blended variable or task-mixing model of the structure of mental ability would require nearly every mental ability task to load on nearly every factor of mental ability. We explain that such a result is implausible and favors more parsimonious models that include a g factor.     

Killing Baby Suzy

In her (1996) Kadri Vihvelin argues that autoinfanticide is nomologically impossible and so that there is no sense in which time travelers are able to commit it. In response, Theodore Sider (2002) defends the original Lewisian verdict (Lewis 1976) whereby, on a common understanding of ability, time travelers are able to kill their earlier selves and their failure to do so is merely coincidental. This paper constitutes a critical note on arguments put forward by both Sider and Vihvelin. I argue that although Sider’s criticism starts out promisingly he doesn’t succeed in establishing that Vihvelin’s analysis fails, because (a) he neglects to rule out a class of counterfactuals to which Vihvelin’s sample-case may belong; and (b) (together with Lewis) he is wrong to suggest that future facts are irrelevant in the evaluation of time travelers’ abilities. I show instead that Vihvelin’s argument is viciously circular, indicating that even if there are nomological constraints on autoinfanticide these cannot be established a priori.

The construct validity of three entry level personality inventories used in the UK: a cautionary case study

We report an error in “The Construct Validity of Three Entry Level Personality Inventories Used in the UK: A Cautionary Case Study” by Neil Anderson and Deniz S. Ones (European Journal of Personality, 2003, Vol. 17, S39–S66). We also alert the reader to a potential data shift of one data row in the dataset reported on in Anderson and Ones (2003) and provide an alternate table. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Age-related differentiation of cognitive abilities in ages 3–7

One important issue in the study of individual differences in cognitive abilities has been the question whether abilities tend to become more differentiated with increasing age. The present study examines age-related differentiation in the structure of cognitive abilities among children 3–7 years of age, using data from the recently undertaken Swedish standardisation of the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence-Revised. A confirmatory factor analytic modelling approach is applied. Models of different factor structure are built, evaluated and tested against empirical data using the LISREL 8 and the Mplus2 programs run under the STREAMS modelling environment. The results provide support for the notion that cognitive abilities show increasing differentiation with increasing age.     

Women are not less field independent than men—the role of stereotype threat

Prior research has shown that females are less field independent (FI) than males. However, when gender identity is salient, performance on tests assessing constructs similar to FI may be hindered, because of stereotype threat. This study examined the impact of stereotype threat on gender differences in FI. We expected that (a) reporting one's own gender prior to FI testing and (b) having an opposite‐gender experimenter would activate stereotype threat, and in turn result in lower performance on a test of FI among females. Overall, 170 participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions in a between‐participants design varying the participant's gender, experimenter's gender and timing of the gender question (before vs. after test). Results showed that reporting one's gender before the FI test led to lower FI performance among females. Furthermore, females achieved higher FI when experimenters were females and gender questions were administered after the FI test.     

Cognitive abilities and personality traits in old age across four years: More stability than change

The current study (N = 236) examined stability and change of six cognitive abilities and three personality traits in old age (M = 74.12 years, SD = 4.40) over four years. Furthermore, we investigated whether levels of one domain were related to the other domain (and vice versa) four years later. The results showed a mean–level decline for processing speed and a mean–level increase for neuroticism. Cross–lagged effects indicated that reasoning was related to openness and conscientiousness was related to verbal knowledge four years later. In general, few and weak associations between the two domains were found. The findings showed that the development of cognitive abilities and personality traits in old age is marked more by stability than by change.     

Individual Differences in Decision Making Depend on Cognitive Abilities,Monitoring and Control

Decision making is the process by which actions are constructed and initiated. Across many research streams, this can be explained in terms of three broad cognitive processes: cognitive abilities that construct judgements and potential courses of action, and interacting monitoring and control processes that determine when to initiate them as behaviour. The aim of this research was to investigate the generality of individual differences in these processes, and their power to predict patterns of decision behaviour identified in our previous research. Undergraduate participants (N = 364) completed nine tests assessing cognitive abilities, monitoring confidence, control thresholds and various patterns of decision behaviour. The tests differed in their cognitive ability requirements and the nature of the payoffs associated with decisions. Cognitive abilities were a strong predictor of individuals' decision competence and optimality, while monitoring confidence and control thresholds were strong and unique predictors of their overall decisiveness, and reckless and hesitant errors. These results were strongest when the measures of cognitive abilities and monitoring confidence were derived from tests with the same cognitive requirements as the tests used to derive the decision behaviours and when the control threshold measure was derived from tests with the same decision payoffs as the test used to derive the decision behaviours. This effect was particularly pronounced for control thresholds, highlighting the domain‐specific nature of cognitive control processes. These findings demonstrate how cognitive abilities, monitoring output and control thresholds interact with cognitive requirements and context‐specific payoffs to drive individual differences in decision‐making behaviour. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Emotional Intelligence and cognitive abilities – associations and sex differences

In order to expand on previous research, this cross-sectional study investigated the relationship between Emotional Intelligence (EI) and cognitive abilities in healthy adults with a special focus on potential sex differences. EI was assessed by means of the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso-Emotional-Intelligence Test (MSCEIT), whereas cognitive abilities were investigated using the Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia (BACS), which measures key aspects of cognitive functioning, i.e. verbal memory, working memory, motor speed, verbal fluency, attention and processing speed, and reasoning and problem solving. 137 subjects (65% female) with a mean age of 38.7 ± 11.8 years were included into the study. While males and females were comparable with regard to EI, men achieved significantly higher BACS composite scores and outperformed women in the BACS subscales motor speed, attention and processing speed, and reasoning and problem solving. Verbal fluency significantly predicted EI, whereas the MSCEIT subscale understanding emotions significantly predicted the BACS composite score. Our findings support previous research and emphasize the relevance of considering cognitive abilities when assessing ability EI in healthy individuals.