When symptom is symbol: some comments on Rosemary Gordon's, ‘Masochism: the shadow side of the archetypal need to venerate and worship’

This paper is a commentary on Rosemary Gordon's paper, ‘Masochism: the shadow side of the archetypal need to venerate and worship’, with a suggestion for an alternative interpretation of masochism as a part of a sado‐masochistic couple. Gordon postulates an archetypal need to venerate and worship that can be hidden in the shadow and distorted in such practices as sexual masochism. Her paper also offers several avenues of exploration for further studies in connection with the phenomenon of masochism, including sexual perversion (‘paraphilia’), chronic psychological victimhood, PTSD and traumatology, religious extremist behaviour such as self‐flagellation, transformation in the individuation process and numinous experience. An extension of her hypothesis to include religious problems of modernity is suggested.     

Group process in Jungian analytic training and institute life

Group process experience for analytic candidates is a neglected dimension of training, and receives little attention in the analytic literature. Jung observed group dynamics, but he never studied them closely, attending instead to the psychology of the individual. Unconscious currents in small groups have been studied by others, most notably by Wilfred Bion, and there are similarities between his theories of the group unconscious and Jung's theories of complexes. Experiential and didactic seminars in group process were added to the analytic curriculum at the C.G. Jung Institute of San Francisco in the early 1990s, leading to changes in the group dynamic of trainees and analysts alike. A discussion of the theories of Bion and Jung are followed by a report on our experiences of facilitating group process for analytic candidates. We give quotes from candidates and analyst members to illustrate the group process and its effects. The need for further study to develop a uniquely Jungian perspective on the unconscious structure and dynamics of the group is suggested.     

Decision making and confidence given uncertain advice

We study human decision making in a simple forced-choice task that manipulates the frequency and accuracy of available information. Empirically, we find that people make decisions consistent with the advice provided, but that their subjective confidence in their decisions shows 2 interesting properties. First, people's confidence does not depend solely on the accuracy of the advice. Rather, confidence seems to be influenced by both the frequency and accuracy of the advice. Second, people are less confident in their guessed decisions when they have to make relatively more of them. Theoretically, we develop and evaluate a type of sequential sampling process model—known as a self-regulating accumulator—that accounts for both decision making and confidence. The model captures the regularities in people's behavior with interpretable parameter values, and we show its ability to fit the data is not due to excessive model complexity. Using the model, we draw conclusions about some properties of human reasoning under uncertainty.     

Possible research area bias in the Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA) draft journal rankings

An analysis of the Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA) draft rankings of 661 psychology journals points to systematic differences between research areas in the distribution of ranks. Journals in experimental, biological and neuroscientific psychology obtained higher mean ranks, consistent with a tendency for “hard‐science” areas to have higher bibliometric journal impact. The ERA will influence the distribution of resources and rewards within psychology and create powerful incentives for institutions and researchers, so differences in ranks across research areas may alter the shape of the discipline. Although they do not necessarily imply bias, such differences raise the possibility that psychology researchers will not operate on a level playing field.     

Belief in a just world and subjective well-being: mothers of normal and Down syndrome children

A cross-sectional study examined the relationship between three dimensions of the belief in a just world and the subjective well-being of Pakistani mothers of normal and Down syndrome children (n = 100 each). Personal belief in a just world and two dimensions of general belief in a just world-beliefs in immanent and ultimate justice-were assessed along with four dimensions of subjective well-being: life satisfaction, mood, state anxiety, and depression. It was hypothesized that personal belief in a just world and belief in ultimate justice would be positively associated with subjective well-being for both groups of mothers. Results were obtained through moderated regression analyses. In line with our hypothesis, personal belief in a just world positively predicted life satisfaction and mood level and negatively predicted state anxiety and depression in both groups of mothers. In contrast, beliefs in immanent and ultimate justice were not consistently adaptive. In particular, the more the mothers of a Down syndrome child believed in immanent justice, the more anxiety they experienced the previous week. In addition, the more the mothers of normal children believed in ultimate justice, the more they experienced anxiety. The pattern of results persisted when controlled for mothers' education, the total number of their children and marital status. Overall, the results support the role of personal belief in a just world as a personal resource in adverse as well as normal life circumstances.     

Personal and general belief in a just world as judgement norms

Research on the belief in a just world (BJW) has focused on its intra-individual functions (e.g., psychological well-being) and its inter-individual consequences (e.g., derogation of victims). Recent theorizing, however, has indicated that the BJW may also have more societal functions and consequences, serving as a legitimizing device of the status quo. The studies in the current paper focus on this latter view and are based on Alves and Correia's ( 2008 ) research which found that the expression of high personal and general belief in a just world is injunctively normative. Two experimental studies aimed at ascertaining three issues: (1) the dimension(s) of social value (social utility and/or social desirability) on which the BJW normativity anchors; (2) whether the expression of moderate BJW is also injunctively normative; and (3) whether the injunctive normativity of the BJW is related to perceptions of truth. Results indicate that moderate and high personal and general BJW are normative. Yet, whereas the normativity of personal BJW anchors both on social utility and social desirability, that of general BJW anchors only on social utility. We discuss personal and general BJW as judgement norms, whose normativity may not be personally acknowledged (in the case of general BJW) and does not necessarily derive from being perceived as true, but from the fact that such norms carry social value at least in individualistic societies.     

Adults' memories of childhood: Affect,knowing, and remembering

Adult questionnaire respondents reported, for each of a number of events, if they had experienced that event during childhood and, if so, if they remembered the experience or merely knew it had happened. Respondents also rated the emotion of each event and judged whether they would remember more about each reportedly experienced event if they spent more time trying to do so. Study 1 respondents were 96 undergraduates, whereas Study 2 tested 93 community members ranging widely in age. Respondents often reported no recollections of reportedly experienced events. Reportedly experienced events rated as emotional were more often recollected than those rated as neutral, and those rated as positive were more often recollected than those rated as negative. Predicted ability to remember more was related to current memory. Claims of remembering reportedly experienced events increased with age, but predicted ability to remember more about them declined with age.     

Early Muslim Scholarship in Religionwissenchaft: A Study of Muhammad ‘Abd Al-Karīm Al-Shahrastānī's On the Concept of the People of a Dubious Book (Ahl Shubhat Kitāb)

The issue of the People of the Book has long been of central significance to Islam and later to the study of comparative religion. Many Muslim and European scholars have hence taken close heed of the People of the Book and their role as the holders of sacred books. The question of the People of the Book becomes more crucial when Muhammad ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī (d.548/1153) develops another category identified as “Man Lahu Shubhat Kitāb,” (those who possess doubtful sacred scrolls) or “Ahl Shubhat Kitāb” (the People of a Dubious Book), the term that may be considered similar to that of al-Shahrastānī. The question of the People of a Dubious Book remains vague or confusing for many people. This confusion occurs not only among lay Muslims, but also among the Jews and Christians. In effect, the condition of these groups has not yet been systematized properly, although they have been treated in several major works of theology as well as in Qur’ānic commentary. The present analysis is an attempt to evaluate the nature of the People of a Dubious Book as exclusively developed by al-Shahrastānī. Considering the fact that some of the Muslim scholars have considered these groups as belonging either to People of the Book or Polytheists, a critical study shall be attempted to investigate why al-Shahrastānī exclusively expands this concept in Islamic Religious Tradition. It is hoped that the study will provide a preliminary yet clear understanding of the People of a Dubious Book, which hopefully can inspire further investigation leading to a critical study on these groups of peoples.     

Reasons and practical possibility

According to a common thesis about normative reasons for action, you have a reason to perform a given action only if you can act for that reason. This thesis has long had broad appeal and is intended to capture the practical character of practical reasons. I’ll call it the ‘Practicality Thesis’. Recently, however, various writers have developed subtly different objections to it, each designed to show that there can be actions you have a reason to perform even though you could not act for that reason – because, were you aware of the reason-giving facts in the ways needed to act for the reason, it would no longer be a reason for you to so act. This article defends the Practicality Thesis against such objections. It considers some extant defences but shows that these are inadequate. It then advances an alternative approach intended to counter any structurally similar objection.